

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

29 December 2017

Mark S. Zaid, P.C.
1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 200
Washington D.C. 20036

Reference: F-2016-02310; Civil Action No. 16-cv-01917

Dear Mr. Zaid:

This letter is in response to the 27 July 2016 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted by your clients, Jeffrey Scudder, Ken Osgood, Hugh Wilford, and Mark Stout, for the following records:

1. Electronic copies of 386 historical documents

We completed a review of five (5) documents in accordance with the FOIA, 50 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended. We have determined that five (5) documents can be released in segregable form with redactions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(6). The proper withholding statute with regard to CIA's assertion of FOIA exemption (b)(3) pertains to Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, 50 U.S.C. Sec. 3507, noted as exemption "(b)(3)CIAAct" on the enclosed documents, and Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 3024, noted as exemption "(b)(3)NatSecAct."

The released in part documents are enclosed.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Allison Fong".

Allison Fong
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

RIP

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Reference: F-2016-02310; Civil Action No. 16-cv-01917

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PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE AGENCY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING
JANUARY 1946 - JULY 1963

VOLUME I TEXT

~~Secret~~

DCI-6

June 1973

Copy 2 of 4

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	7-D-18 Hqs.

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DCI-6

PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE
AGENCY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING
JANUARY 1946 - JULY 1963

VOLUME I TEXT

*by**Peyton F. Anderson**and**Jack B. Pfeiffer*

June 1973

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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~~SECRET~~A Personal Note from Colonel Lawrence K. White

I've read the Building History and found it most interesting and well done. For personal reasons I've suggested one minor change. There is plenty left to illustrate, or even dramatize, the internal struggles. I have no objection to these being used and I assume others involved wouldn't either. After all, intelligent and strong minded men do have differences of opinion. In fact, as I read the history and relived some of those experiences it seemed to me that its greatest value might be to illustrate to anyone contemplating such a project just how complicated it is to handle all of the myriad of detail over and above what you expect Architects, Engineers, and Contractors to do for you. The pressures from within the Agency, within the Executive Branch, from the Congress -- individuals as well as the body itself -- the various planning Councils and Commissions, State and local bodies, Civic Organizations, business, and just plain citizens etc. etc. are tremendous. I would like to think that dealing with all of them fully, fairly, and frankly -- and of course forcefully -- accounts for our completing this building.

I think your history tells the story. Thanks for allowing me to read it and my congratulations to Anderson and Pfeiffer.

LKW
7 June 1973

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~~SECRET~~Foreword

The effort to provide CIA with a Headquarters Building -- acquisition, planning, construction, and occupancy -- stretches over a period of about fifteen years (1947-62), during which Agency components in the Washington area were stuffed, crammed, or otherwise deployed in a variety of structures, few of which became "home." Initial responsibility for preparing this segment of the Agency's history fell to the Real Estate and Construction Division (RECD) of the Office of Logistics, principally because it was the component most closely concerned with the problem before the formation of the Building Planning Staff (BPS) -- to which, as noted in the history, RECD contributed several key personnel.

Upon completion of the occupancy of the Langley Headquarters in 1962, many of the BPS personnel returned to RECD; and as this history was begun (October 1970), they were available to provide guidance, and memories to the original author, Peyton F. Anderson -- himself formerly a member of the BPS. Because Anderson was scheduled for a PCS almost simultaneously

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with his designation as an historian, he was able to complete only a first draft of the report; and, because of the little time available to him, many basic sources were not fully exploited.

Major additions to this first draft were recommended by the Curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection (HIC), Walter Pforzheimer, who at the time of the activities described was CIA's Legislative Counsel and therefore deeply involved in the negotiations for the new site. Consequently he has been quoted extensively throughout this history. In addition to his own in-depth review of the draft, Pforzheimer also opened the files of the HIC to

[redacted] a senior support officer awaiting reassignment, who undertook the extensive research necessary to fill many of the gaps left by the first draft.

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The Curator of HIC also provided guidance to other source materials that proved most useful.

[redacted] of course, took advantage of the HIC materials, and, in addition, put his own broad knowledge of the Support Directorate to use to recover other pertinent data.

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Among the numerous figures which appear in this history, special mention should be made of the excellent photos used from the collection of James Q. Reber. Photos 22-25, 27, 29-32, and 37-38 -- some of which were displayed at Headquarters in honor of the Agency's 25th anniversary -- are from Reber's files.

In conjunction with the sources noted above, the files and *Diary Notes* of Colonel Lawrence K. White, Executive Director-Comptroller (1965-72) -- and Deputy Director for Support during the Headquarters Building construction period -- proved invaluable. These *Diary Notes* were kept almost daily from 1 January 1952, when he became Assistant Deputy Director for Administration (ADDA), until his retirement in 1972. The *Diary Notes* covering 1952 through 1964, which were examined in detail for purposes of this history by the Support Services Historical Officer (SSHO), make clear the major role played by Colonel White. He was instrumental in seeking policy approval during both the planning and the construction phases of the story, and he was directly involved in meetings with the President, Congressmen, state and local officials,

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business and industrial leaders, private citizens, and civic organizations in attempting to resolve the multitudinous problems of the time.

Because the *Diary Notes* give much of the flavor of the day-to-day personal involvement of the Agency's principal manager for activities related to the planning and construction of the Headquarters Building, they have been cited verbatim, paraphrased, and otherwise heavily relied on in this history.

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PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE
AGENCY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING
JANUARY 1946 - JULY 1963

Chapter I

The Development of Building Planning

Introduction

A problem of prime importance throughout the early years of the Agency was the acquisition of suitable space to house its headquarters organization.* The facilities inherited from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and those in use during the brief period of the interim Strategic Services Unit (SSU) of the War Department and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) were at best temporary and were not adaptable to the growing requirements of CIA.

In March 1947

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* For a chronology, see Appendix A.

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Administration, collaborated in preparing the first of many letters from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, to the Commissioner of the Public Buildings Services (PBS) of the Federal Works Agency (FWA), W. E. Reynolds, requesting " ... that CIG be assigned a single permanent, fire-proof building having a minimum capacity of 350,000 net square feet." 1/* This urgent requirement for single-occupancy space in the metropolitan area of Washington was supported by the statement that CIG presently was assigned ten buildings.**

Two of the buildings ("M" and "Q") are of temporary construction ... housing the most secret phases of the centralized day-to-day operations of the Group ... access to these buildings by simple housebreaking methods are inherent in their construction ... both buildings constitute an ever-present fire hazard ... loss of the documents and/or information ... would be a severe blow to national security. 2/

To this plea the commissioner of PBS replied, "at the moment the only action I can take regarding the subject matter ... is to thank you for it and to

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.

** Appendix P, Figures 1 through 9, show some buildings occupied by CIG/CIA prior to the move to Headquarters Building.

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note your future needs ... " He then explained:

Space ... in the area is expected to remain tense during the remainder of the current fiscal year and perhaps well into the succeeding period. Prevailing country wide conditions in the construction industry have prevented our embarking upon a program of construction ... which would go a long way toward relieving the existing shortage. 3/

Until new construction could be completed, apparently there was no alternative to the continued and increased occupancy of the temporary buildings that were built during World War I and World War II; and the CIG would have to make do.*

Inasmuch as a copy of the DCI's letter also was sent to the Bureau of the Budget (BOB), F. J. Lawton, Acting Assistant Director, replied for that organization. Lawton reported that there appeared to be no hope during fiscal year 1948 for the assignment of a permanent fire-proof building for the exclusive use of the CIG; and, as to removing the secret activities of the organization to fire-proof space during

* By mid 1948, CIG occupied a total of 230,450 net square feet. 4/

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the course of fiscal year 1949, no commitment could be made. The BOB was relatively certain that there would be little probability of finding 350,000 square feet of properly secure space but stated that the request would be kept in mind when a reviewer of the War and Navy Department space requirements was undertaken. It should be noted that the key words were:

the renewal of the federal building program in the metropolitan area would present an opportunity for a wholly adequate solution to the CIG space problem. I ... wish to assure you that neither the PBS nor the BOB will overlook the importance or the urgency of your needs.^{5/}

In July 1947 another request for a solution to CIG's serious space problem was directed to Major General Philip B. Fleming, USA, Administrator of the Federal Works Agency (FWA), by Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, Rear Admiral, USN, after his appointment as DCI succeeding Vandenberg.* The new DCI again emphasized the paramount importance of physical security for the many scattered locations, noting that the temporary construction and accessibility at ground level seriously

* Hillenkoetter was sworn in as DCI on 1 May 1947.

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complicated the handling and processing of highly classified documents. The DCI closed his letter with "I hope that you can appreciate the urgency of our problem and give it early and favorable consideration." 6/ In his reply of 23 July Fleming assured Hillenkoetter that the CIG's needs would be thoroughly studied by the PBS for possible future action but added that with the imminence of the recentralization of a number of Government agencies, which had recently been approved by Congress, it was quite evident that all space would remain at a premium because Congress had not approved any new construction in the Washington area to alleviate the existing space needs. 7/

Background Period, 1948-1951

The DCI next approached Fleming on 16 January 1948; he had been advised by the PBS that the FWA was then considering a long-range plan for the construction of additional Government-owned buildings for various new federal activities. The DCI felt that his request would be strengthened by the fact that CIA had now been made a permanent Federal Government Agency by the 80th Congress.

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I would like to discuss ... the complete housing requirements ... [and] possible future site locations ... in order that steps may be taken now to prepare the necessary ... drawings and specifications in accordance with our requirements. I would appreciate hearing from you ... [or] your representatives as to the feasibility of proceeding with such a plan. 8/

Again the reply was not encouraging. On 2 February 1948 Fleming said that "As far as I have been able to weigh Congressional opinion, construction funds will not be made available for any buildings except those in an emergency category." It appeared that Congress might give authority for a very limited program of construction that would involve only funds for the purchase of sites and the design of federal buildings at that time. FWA's first priority was the new General Accounting Office (GAO) building which had been initially authorized before World War II -- the GAO space situation was considered by PBS to be critical -- but new Congressional authorization was required. Another project of high priority was the extension of the State Department Building on Government-owned land, for which the design development drawings were partially complete. Fleming questioned whether anything could be gained at that time by initiating a

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new project before the BOB for a separate building for CIA; the discussion of a possible future site and the housing requirements for the Agency could be started, however, with the Public Buildings Administration (PBA). 9/

A meeting was set for 2 March 1948 in the office of Commissioner Reynolds of the PBS. The Agency was represented by the DDCI, Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright; the Executive for Administration and Management, Lyle T. Shannon; and the Chief of the Services Branch, [REDACTED]. 10/ Reynolds suggested that CIA survey four sites owned by the US Government in the Suitland area of Maryland. A brief tour of the area on 18 March 1948, as directed by the DDCI, was completed by Shannon, Andrew E. Van Esso, the Acting Services Officer, and [REDACTED]. Although the sites appeared to be generally adequate for new construction to provide for 5,000 persons, warehousing, and all special equipment, they were not satisfactory from the point of view of the residence of 70 percent of the civilian employees of the Agency. Shannon was concerned about the possible loss of a considerable

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number of staff personnel because of transportation and traffic problems. 11/ Reynolds further suggested that CIA re-study its overall projected space requirements and present them to the PBS for the preparation of an estimate of construction costs and for the proposed legislation appropriating the funds PBS would need to finance the cost of preliminary plans and outline specifications.

A review and survey of requirements in April 1948 showed that the Agency occupied 407,000 net square feet of space at 19 locations and that the estimated requirement was for a single building of 500,000 net square feet -- exclusive of the areas required for food service -- and an auditorium to accommodate 1,000 persons. The projected requirement was based on reasonable expansion of activities in accordance with the CIA budget as approved by the BOB. This information was forwarded to FWA on 29 April 1948 with the understanding that site recommendations would be the subject of a separate letter at a later date. The letter also stated:

I wish to acknowledge with appreciation the invaluable assistance given by

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[redacted] in assembling the above
information 12/*

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Less than a year after the April 1948 survey --
a period of internal reorganization, transition, and
rapid expansion -- the Acting Executive Director,
Shannon, had directed Van Esso to make another space
survey. 14/ [redacted]

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[redacted]
Jr., Chief of the Building Maintenance and Utilities
Branch, assisted Van Esso in the space review. 15/
Shannon later informed the DCI in a memorandum dated
16 March 1949 that the Agency occupied 511,640 net
square feet in 21 buildings. He added,

PBS has performed near miracles at
various times, sometimes at the expense
of similar emergency needs of other
Government agencies.

This reference was to the acquisition by the Agency of
temporary "K" building in the West Potomac Park area. 16/
A further space report, dated 30 September 1949, was

* [redacted] was an architect with the
Real Property Acquisition and Utilization Division of
the PBS during the 1946-48 period. He collaborated
with [redacted] on the first draft of the referenced
letter. 13/

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prepared by Space Analyst
of the Contract Section of the Services Branch, for
Van Esso. This report indicated that 3,260 persons
were on duty and 560,229 net square feet of space were
occupied. 17/

The political climate and the economic conditions
of the country during 1949-50 were not considered to
be favorable for a DCI approach to the BOB regarding
the building planning and funding authorization re-
quired from the Congress. The US national security
and international expenditures for fiscal year 1950
were reduced by \$1.3 billion, and military manpower
had been reduced from 1.5 million to 1.4 million for
fiscal year 1949. 18/

In the early part of 1950 the Agency explored
the possibility of adding two wings to temporary
buildings "M" and "Q" in order to relieve the critical
space problems confronting the personnel of the col-
lection and dissemination office. In a letter of
31 March 1950 Oscar L. Chapman, Secretary of the
Interior, replied to Jess Larson, Administrator of
the General Services Administration (GSA), conveying
the thought that the use of federal park lands " ...

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might be considered a dereliction of duty ... regrets to Admiral Hillenkoetter." This information was relayed in an 18 April 1950 covering letter to the DCI from GSA. 19/

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On 1 August 1950 [] then Acting CIA Executive Director, called for a report from each Agency Assistant Director and Staff Chief indicating "the ultimate anticipated space requirement for the activities under your jurisdiction." This report assumed office occupancy on the basis of 100 square feet per person and special-use space in accordance with each activity. 20/ A working chart developed from these estimated component needs called for 507,770 square feet of office space and 444,245 square feet of special-use space, a total of 952,015 net square feet. 21/ [] recognized that such estimates would not be accurate but would provide a planning base for the DCI's efforts to obtain one or several permanent buildings to centralize CIA activities. 22/

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The Decision to Begin, 1951-1953

When General Walter Bedell Smith took the oath as DCI on 7 October 1950, a new era began for CIA.

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Smith and his deputy, William H. Jackson, took steps at once to strengthen the organization of the Agency. In December they authorized two new Deputy Directors -- one for Administration and one for Operations -- to improve control over the numerous Assistant Directors, who had previously reported directly to the DCI. Murray McConnell was named the first Deputy Director for Administration (DDA), eliminating the position of CIA Executive. Allen W. Dulles was brought aboard in November as Special Consultant, slated to head the Directorate for Operations. Objections were raised to the somewhat ingenuous title of Director of Operations, so on 2 January 1951 Dulles was appointed Deputy Director for Plans (DDP). 23/

The new management team -- the DCI, his deputy, Jackson, Walter R. Wolf, who succeeded McConnell as DDA on 1 April 1951; and the Legislative Counsel, then Walter L. Pforzheimer* -- acted vigorously from the spring to the fall of 1951 to try to obtain Congressional authorization and funding for a CIA

* Walter Pforzheimer currently (1973) serves as Curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection.

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headquarters building. 24/ The authorization was submitted in the Military and Naval ^{(b)(1)} Construction bill (H.R. 4914*) in the amount of \$38 ^{(b)(3) NatSecAct} million and was approved by the Congress on 28 September 1951 (Sec. 401, P.L. 82-155).** It was recognized that it would be impossible to conceal the construction of a new CIA building for very long, but it was determined to keep the project secret for as long as possible. There were three major reasons for this: to avoid public reaction to a CIA move from the center of Washington, which the public might feel was based on special knowledge that an attack was expected in the near future; to avoid a rise in land prices in the area of a new building for as long as possible; and to allow the Agency to complete plans and perhaps some construction with maximum security regarding the location of communications rooms, special vaults, and other special features. 25/ Therefore the

* H.R. 4914 was originally introduced as H.R. 4524 on 20 June 1951. On 24 July, H.R. 4914 was drawn up by the House Armed Services Committee as a clean version of the original.

** For complete Congressional References, see Appendix C.

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authorizing legislation contained no overt reference to a CIA building and no CIA witnesses testified before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. The two chairmen, Congressman Vinson and Senator Russell, were briefed privately by General Smith, Wolf, and Pforzheimer; and the chairmen took the legislation through their committees. The reports of the Senate and House Armed Services Committee merely note that all projects contained in Section 401 are classified. According to Pforzheimer the final decision to go forward with the request for an appropriation was made so late in the budget year that the Agency worked hastily to prepare for Congressional hearings. Wolf, the DDA, arranged for an outside architectural firm, Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, to provide an artist's rendering of the building for use in the hearings. At least one criticism was made of the artist's concepts; Pforzheimer has noted that

It was Allen Dulles who stated that he could not work in an office without a window. At that point, General Smith drew a small window into the otherwise windowless building in the sketch before him and said to Mr. Dulles, "That's your office." It is not only my memory but also Mr. Houston's that this is the correct version. In subsequent testimony, Mr. Dulles also referred to it. 26/

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The proposal called for construction of a building with a large base, underground parking, four multi-story towers, and no windows; it was to be located on the Government-owned "Nevius Tract" -- approximately 25 acres in the vicinity of the Iwo Jima statue in Arlington County, Virginia, and the adjacent hill near the Arlington National Cemetery. As late as 29 August 1951 the DCI and Pforzheimer conferred separately with the Chairman of the Senate Committee, Senator Russell (D-Ga.), and with Senator Byrd (D-Va.) regarding the legislation authorizing CIA to construct a building. Senator Russell stated that

he would handle the matter personally with his committee and make the necessary explanations; and he preferred that no CIA witness appear. 27/*

Senator Byrd expressed concern regarding the continued federalization of Virginia counties adjacent to the District of Columbia because of the resultant tax losses but agreed not to oppose the CIA request.

* This was the same position previously adopted by Chairman Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee.

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As soon as the House passed the authorizing legislation in August 1951 and in accordance with standard procedure for CIA matters, the Chief Clerk of the House Appropriations Committee was informed of the \$38-million authorization for a CIA building and the Agency's desire that the committee appropriate the funds. On 2 October, as the committee was approaching hearings on funding the section of the Military and Naval Construction Act in which the CIA authorization was included, Pforzheimer was invited by Congressman Mahon (D-Tex.), Chairman of the Armed Services Appropriation Subcommittee before which the hearings were being held, to discuss the project with him informally. The chairman was fully briefed by Pforzheimer, who explained that for security reasons Chairman Vinson and Senator Russell had handled the authorizing legislation themselves without any formal CIA testimony. Chairman Mahon agreed that this would be the preferable method of handling the matter, that he would consider the problem, and that he would advise the Agency if formal testimony was required. Any funding would be contained in the Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1952 --

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then before the full committee -- which included the military construction funds.

To the Agency's surprise and consternation the House Appropriations Committee eliminated funds for the CIA building in reporting out the bill on 8 October 1951. The next day Chairman Mahon advised Pforzheimer that the subcommittee felt that the item had come before them too late to be considered in detail and had therefore rejected it. He suggested, however, that the Agency have the item restored by the Senate Appropriations Committee, and if that committee approved funds for the building the matter could be thrashed out in conference between the two committees. If this procedure were followed, Chairman Mahon said he would be inclined to accept the Senate amendment but would not commit himself prior to a joint House-Senate committee meeting. On the same date, in a letter to Pforzheimer, Mahon confirmed the denial of funds by his subcommittee. 28/

Considerable scurrying around ensued, both at headquarters and on Capitol Hill, leading to the DCI's appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee to seek restoration of the funds that the

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House had disallowed. As a result of the DCI's testimony, the committee restored the funds as requested, and after Senate passage the bill went to conference to iron out disputed items in the House and Senate versions.*

A member of the Senate Appropriations Committee or its staff later told an interesting story that occurred during the "mark up" of the bill. No outsiders are present during the mark up, at which time members of the committee determine what items to approve, change, or disapprove. The Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee at that time was Senator Kenneth McKellar (D-Tenn.), who was then a little senile and given to dozing off during committee meetings. He would then wake up and interpolate a

* With reference to the date of the DCI's appearance before the Committee, Pforzheimer has noted that "I have found no written record of the date in our files. Mr. Francis S. Hewitt, then as now a member of the professional staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee, checked the committee records for me in February 1971. They have no record of the date of General Smith's appearance in Executive Session. As was the custom at that time, no transcript of the testimony was made. From internal evidence, however, Mr. Hewitt and I have concluded that the date of the DCI's testimony was almost certainly 12 October 1951." 29/

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remark and doze off again. While the committee was considering the CIA building, Senator Cordon (R-Ore.) remarked that the proposed building would be a very interesting one because it would have no windows. Senator McKellar woke up with a start and said "What! A building without any women!" and went back to sleep again.

On 23 October 1951 Chairman Mahon wrote Smith that the House's original position had been sustained in conference and that no funds for a CIA building were provided by the conferees. He assured the Agency, however, of consideration at a future date. 30/ Smith replied on 26 October, stating that CIA would resubmit the project "as soon as possible" 31/; but this did not occur in 1951. One participant in the negotiations with Congress has since reported that

The loss of funds to construct a CIA building was indeed a blessing in disguise. Our estimates as to space requirements were woefully inadequate, as were the cost estimates. No firm decision had been reached as to a site. In fact, we were ill-prepared to make even those submissions which achieved our authorization. 32/

At this point in the planning stage the Agency had an approved Congressional authorization of \$38 million

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but no planning or construction appropriation of any kind -- not even funds to cover the costs of the design or the preliminary plans and outline specifications. Space reports as of 25 September 1951 indicated that the Agency occupied 947,575 net square feet, with 6,987 persons in 31 buildings at more than a score of scattered locations in the metropolitan area. 33/

Long before the act became a law, the Agency was well aware that the authorization of \$38 million was insufficient. In a memorandum for the record dated 9 April 1951, Shannon described a conference with Martin, the Emergency Planner for BOB; Reynolds of PBA; Wilfred L. Peel, Chief of CIA Administration Services (AS); and Edward R. Saunders, the CIA Comptroller, in which Martin stated that the Estimates Division of BOB wanted to incorporate in the military budget for fiscal year 1952 funds for the construction of a complete new CIA installation. This estimate was required not later than 13 April 1951. The following is from Shannon's memorandum:

Based on space for 10,000 people, complete physical security, special space for training, food, medical facilities, vaults, air conditioning, warehouses, garage, etc. Mr. Reynolds stated that an estimate of approximately \$46 million should be submitted.

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This is broken down broadly as indicated below:

Office buildings:	\$40,000,000
Development of site, including utilities	1,500,000
Warehouse and garage	2,250,000
Access roads	1,500,000
Contingencies	750,000

Mr. Reynolds stated that the access roads figure was flexible and would depend entirely on site location. He further stated that the figure for site development was based on utilizing land now owned by the Government. He suggested the most suitable sites now owned ... were two tracts of approximately 400 acres each one located between Langley, Virginia, and the Potomac River (now owned by the Public Roads Administration) and one at Suitland, Maryland, (now owned by the Public Buildings Service). We have been requested to survey these sites and to indicate whether or not they are considered suitable by the Director.

Mr. Reynolds strongly advised against underground construction. He stated that all recent tests and information had indicated that underground construction of the nature proposed was more dangerous in atomic attack than above-surface areas. His proposal is an "H" shaped building completely above-ground, the first two wing stories to be windowless and blast-proof, and the wings connected by space for food facilities to be also of blast-proof and fire-proof construction. They have basic plans and specifications for such a type building which could be suitably modified to meet our physical security needs and the interior laid out in a manner completely adaptable to our requirements.

Both Mr. Martin and Mr. Reynolds pointed out that this project should be presented as a special project and in such a manner that it would not become confused with the so-called "Dispersal Plan." 34/

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Active Agency internal planning finally began after a meeting with Commissioner Reynolds on 10 August 1951 when Peel directed [redacted], Chief of the Real Estate and Construction Division, to respond to a study entitled "Adaption of Federal Office Building to Housing Requirements of CIA." 35/ Peel had previously received from the Chief of the CIA Security Office, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, information dated 30 July 1951 concerning security measures for consideration with any preliminary planning for a proposed new headquarters building.*

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These studies, as well as others prepared during the fall and winter of 1951-52, were made primarily to determine the style and type of facility most suitable for CIA and whether or not a typical government building could be converted or constructed to meet the needs of the Agency. 37/ As indicated below, [redacted] pointed out how the preliminary design proposals submitted by the PBA for CIA consideration were unacceptable, even though he was convinced that

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* By the end of January 1952, it had been decided that a Security Office representative would "participate actively from now on in the planning of the new building." 36/

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PBA/GSA would be a better design and construction agent than any Department of Defense design and construction supervisory service that might be available to the Agency.

The proposed design is another massive type of structure with technical disadvantages as the block-type originally proposed, but to a greater degree, since the new scheme envisions the elimination of all windows. ... the H-shaped building design would lend itself somewhat more readily to compartmentalization ... as the tallest and most imposing structure within a radius of several miles, the building would be an excellent target for aerial attack. ... [Its] location and architectural treatment will inevitably make it a focal point for much attention and curiosity and the possibilities for future expansion are not good. ... the scheme is not based upon functional requirements, but representing a grouping of elements designed to result in an esthetically pleasing ensemble. ... costs basis [sic] would be considerably greater than the budgeted amount ... since in lieu of partial mechanical ventilation ... complete air conditioning would be required. ... as a monumental structure it will require more costly exterior finish than the untreated poured concrete envisioned for the earlier scheme. ... numerous special features required by our components were not taken into account in the original cost estimates. ... estimates of space requirements are now approximately 25 percent in excess of the amount provided in the original authorization proposal.

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[] strongly advised that these points be submitted for consideration by the persons responsible for the ultimate decision on the suitability of these PBA design schemes. 38/ The Acting Chief of RECD,

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[] * stated in a memorandum to the Chief of Administrative Services that "the general and technical details ... [of] plans and specifications for the new CIA building" were high on the list of projects of the division. 39/

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In the fall of 1951 Colonel Lawrence K. White, then Deputy Assistant Director for Operations, was asked to become the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration (ADDA). After considerable soul searching -- and no little pressure from higher echelons, including the DCI -- Col. White accepted the new position, effective on 2 January 1952. 40/ As he recorded at the time, "The DD/A also made me responsible for the new building plans and asked me to accept this as a number one priority among other things." 41/

* [] was Chief, Acquisitions Branch, RECD, and the first Agency Realty Officer. He resigned from the Agency on 2 October 1956 and as of September 1970 was serving as Circuit Court Judge for the 8th District, Commonwealth of Virginia.

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As chief of planning for the new building, White began a task that was to occupy a significant portion of his time over the next decade. The job required a "ramrod"; and as will be apparent in subsequent chapters of this history, White more than met the challenges of the assignment. Almost immediately he established an *ad hoc* committee for the new building. [REDACTED], Chief of Administration Services, was designated as secretary to maintain and distribute the minutes. 42/

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On 7 January 1952, just a few days after his appointment as ADDA, White accompanied the DDA, Wolf, on a visit to Commissioner Reynolds of PBS to review the building planning problem. They emphasized that inasmuch as Congress had declined to appropriate the funds at its last session,

... there was no existing structure ...
into which our departmental organization
could fit under one roof ... and none
available at any time in the foreseeable
future.

Reynolds stated that Wolf's understanding of the problem was entirely correct and that he did not consider a written statement to be necessary and, further, that he would be happy to testify personally before

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any committee with which the Agency had difficulty. The DDA related the Agency's understanding that the only three possible sites available were the Langley and Nevius sites in Fairfax County and Arlington, Virginia, respectively and Suitland, Maryland.* Wolf added that he did not believe that the DCI would be willing to locate at either Suitland or Langley. He said that

the plans prepared by PBS for the Nevius Tract are attractive and acceptable ... however, it would ... require the entire \$38 million ... to construct a building on this site which would meet the approval of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission (NCPPC).

The DDA thought that the Congress might not appropriate \$38 million and that CIA might be forced to contract something for, say, \$25 million; thus he concluded that "we, therefore, cannot construct a building on the Nevius Tract."

The Commissioner replied that a fourth site could be made available on the US Soldiers' Home

* The locations of the sites which were at one time or another considered for the Headquarters Building are shown on map 1, inside back cover of Volume II.

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property, and the construction would not require the architectural and esthetic fringes that would be necessary for the Nevius location. Reynolds then compared the Agency space problem with that of the new General Accounting Office Building, which was to house 8,000 employees and cost \$25 million. He stated that if CIA would reduce the number of employees who were required to be under one roof to, say, 7,500 rather than 10,000, "we could come very close to constructing an adequate building," even though construction costs had risen approximately 17 percent since the GAO contract was let.

Reynolds summarized his position by saying that he much preferred to see the Agency build on the Nevius site. Wolf agreed but subsequently requested that White, Peel, and visit the Soldiers' Home property the following day, 8 January 1952. Reynolds also is reported to have stated that

he thought we ought to know ... it was the President's desire that the Government "Dispersal Plan" was to be revived ... and NSRB has lowered its minimum distance requirements from the previous twenty-mile radius to a ten to twelve-mile radius.

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When asked by the ADDA whether in his opinion this should influence CIA in any way in proceeding with the new building plans, Reynolds was positive in his belief that it should not. 43/

The ADDA thought that the Soldiers' Home site was "adequate, that the location was in rolling country with fairly large trees covering practically the entire area." This site was 2.4 miles from the Capitol -- 10 minutes traveling time -- compared with 2.6 miles from the existing CIA Administration Building to the Capitol -- also 10 minutes traveling time. 44/

At its first meeting on 10 January 1952 the *ad hoc* committee also was advised that four possible sites were available: Langley, the US Soldiers' Home, the Nevius tract, and the tract in Suitland. The DCI had already declared the Suitland tract to be unsatisfactory, so the committee decided to concentrate on Langley -- although the DCI had indicated that it might be too distant from the center of things -- and the Soldiers' Home. The committee did not think the \$38 million authorized would be sufficient for the monumental type of building required on the Nevius tract. Pforzheimer, a member of the committee,

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pointed out that the steps that the committee was taking had been urged by him in mid-November and that now two valuable months had been lost; speed was of the essence if the Agency was to secure appropriations in the 1952 session of Congress. 45/

At the second meeting of the *ad hoc* committee, on 16 January 1952, White reported the DCI's decision that the Langley and Suitland sites were not to be considered; that the Nevius tract was his objective; and that the only alternative was the Soldiers' Home site. On 30 January 1952, PBS was advised of the Agency's desire to proceed with the Nevius site and was told that the DCI would not consider Langley under any conditions. 46/ At this time the Agency agreed to make not more than \$5,000 available to PBS for preliminary sketches of a "modified type block building" for the Nevius tract. The plans were to include cost estimates for the structure and were to be completed by the end of February 1952.* 47/

* With reference to the PBS sketches, White noted: reports that PBS has gone over the \$5,000 we guaranteed as reimbursement for plans and estimates for our new building. I told him we would make good a reasonable amount in excess of \$5,000, but wanted to make sure that they understood that they did not (footnote continued on following page)

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Allen W. Dulles, the DDP, had been named to succeed William H. Jackson as DDCI on 23 August 1951, at which date Jackson became the DCI's Special Assistant and Senior Consultant. 51/ In the meantime the Chief of RECD was directed to make a realistic updated cost estimate for construction of a building similar to Federal Office Building No. 2 (the US Navy Annex), at 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. He reported that

... The Navy Annex was built in 1941 ... on 25 acres of Park land ... at four dollars per gross square foot ... has seven wings and headhouse. It could be built in 1951 for eight dollars per gross square foot, or \$13.5 million, based on 10,000 people at 100 square feet per person ... partitions, lighting, floor treatment, elevators and escalators

have a blank check." 48/ This excess amount may also have included sketches for a building at the Soldiers' Home tract. 49/ White's admonitory attitude toward overexpenditures was characteristic throughout his Agency career. About this same time, and also in connection with the new building, a member of the Building Committee asked for about \$1,000 to prepare briefing aids for Congress. White told the requestor that "he should talk with the Comptroller and the General Counsel about the legality of spending funds in this manner and added that if it could be arranged, I would approve of the expenditure; however, I cautioned him not to develop a presentation so elaborate that a Congressman might ask how much it cost, etc." 50/

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would bring the cost to approximately \$15.8 million ... special requirements, soundproof areas, standby power, laboratories, conference areas, numerous vaults, secure telecommunication, sound and projection systems, floodlighting, security fences, etc. ... plus 10 percent consultant fees would bring the total [to] \$24.5 million for 1 million square feet or 1.670 million gross square feet of space.

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[] stated that in most respects this type of building was reasonably adaptable to the needs of the Agency and offered a much more acceptable solution than the three proposals previously submitted by PBS: "the writer believes that the figure of \$25 million may be regarded as probably sufficient."* 52/

Meanwhile, in the winter of 1952, another problem arose. This was in the form of Congressional hearings before the House Public Works Committee -- ignorant of any possible CIA interest -- as to the ultimate disposition of the Nevius tract, including the possibility of surplus sale, return to private ownership, or turning it over to the National Capital Parks and Planning Commission. 53/ Subsequently, through CIA intercession, the bill was stricken from

* Palmer, Chief Estimator of the Design and Construction Division of PBS, assisted [] in the research for this cost-estimate study.

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the House consent calendar, thus killing it for the remainder of the session and leaving the Agency free to consider plans for using the tract.

Towards the end of May 1952 the Legislative Counsel recommended that unless there was an emergency no CIA legislation should be submitted to the Congress in that session. It was obvious that since Congress was economy minded and this was a Presidential election year -- and with Congress anxious to adjourn for the party conventions and campaigns -- nothing but the most pressing legislation and appropriations would be considered. Nevertheless the Bureau of the Budget included a request for funds in the amount of \$38 million in the draft of the Military Construction Appropriations bill, which they forwarded to the Congress early in June. On about 5 June 1952 the DCI discussed with Congressman Mahon, Chairman of the Armed Services Appropriations Subcommittee, before which the CIA appropriation came, the advisability of going forward with the appropriation request at that time. Chairman Mahon informed Smith that in his opinion it would be inadvisable to proceed, as it might subject CIA to undue publicity and criticism.

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In view of this opinion Smith decided not to proceed, and the \$38 million request was withdrawn from the bill. 54/

Meanwhile every practicable alternative for a solution to the growing space problems was being investigated. The PBS acquired the Riverside Stadium Building at 26th and D Streets, N.W., and assigned it to CIA after the DCI furnished a certificate of necessity dated 3 August 1951. 55/ This building and temporary buildings "I" and "J" added another 245,000 net square feet of office space to the Agency's position

as of 30 June 1952. [] Liaison Officer to CIA from the Space Management Division of PBS, greatly assisted CIA in obtaining space during the

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early part of 1951-52. 56/ [] was named Chief of the Office of General Services of OGS,

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replacing Peel, on 17 March 1952. 57/ []

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[] an architect, also transferred from PBS to CIA

on 12 May 1952. [] who had held several im-

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portant positions in the PBS since December 1941, had

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most recently (1948-1952) been on loan from the Office of the Supervising Architect of PBS to the Office of Lorenzo S. Winslow, Architect of the White House.*

[] was named Chief of RECD, with a staff of five, and assumed an active part in the further development of that division and in resolving the rapidly growing world-wide space and construction problems facing CIA. 58/

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By mid-summer 1952 as the Agency continued its rapid expansion, the search for new space was intensified. Consideration was given to a building at 7th and D Streets N.W. in the District, to the Munitions and Navy buildings on Constitution Avenue, to Temporary Buildings T and E, and to the Hurley-Wright Building. 59/ On 1 August 1952 the Acting DDA, White, submitted a staff study to the DCI recommending that the Agency should make an immediate attempt to acquire the Navy Building, with the Munitions Building as second choice.**

* [] was one of the principal PBS liaison officials during the reconstruction and modernization of the executive mansion under the administration of President Harry S. Truman. The John McShane Construction firm was the contractor-builder for this major renovation project.

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** For the text of the staff study, see Appendix D.

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The DCI approved the recommendation on the day it was submitted. 60/ Search for the site for the building did not close, however, and, at the end of 1952 and the beginning of 1953, consideration was given to the possibility of construction on the 2430 E Street property.* 61/

Almost one year later, however, the General Services Administration (GSA), after careful study, again recommended that CIA construct a new building. In its report of 24 June 1953, GSA suggested that the site at Langley, Virginia, was the best available for that purpose. 63/

In 1953 there was little activity on the Congressional front for a CIA building. In June, White raised the question of whether or not it was advisable to discuss the matter with the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee in order to insure committee support with the Bureau of the Budget. 64/ On 9 June, White, Saunders, and Pforzheimer met with Kenneth Sprankle, chief clerk of the committee, to see whether

* It may have been that the proposed site was on the North side of E Street, across from the building at 2430 E. 62/

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or not Chairman Taber or the full Appropriations Committee might at least give some expression of endorsement to bringing the Agency together in one building, particularly as funds for construction for a new building had been eliminated from the budget for fiscal year 1953. Sprankle said that such support should come from the Executive Branch initially; otherwise the Agency might be tempted to use the Congressional endorsement to coerce the Executive Branch.

White assured Sprankle that this was not so, as the Bureau of the Budget had agreed that CIA should have a building. Sprankle noted that as yet the Agency had no firm proposal for a building or for costs, that any such committee move would be premature, and that the Agency representatives should raise the question at a later date when figures were available for the chairman to assess costs against potential savings. 65/

By September the site selection was still in doubt, and White informed Pforzheimer that he had discussed the matter with the DCI and DDCI on 12 September, at which time the DCI favored the present site at 2430 E Street and the DDCI preferred Langley. GSA held to its position that there was no building

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presently available that could house the whole Agency and that they would support CIA's request in Congress. 66/ No final determination was yet in sight, and none was made in 1953.

Summary and Conclusions, 1946-1953

During the transition from CIG to CIA, and continuing through the Korean war, there was a steady increase in the number of Agency personnel in the headquarters area. Make-do facilities in various structures of World War-I and World War-II vintage were acquired and used for a host of sensitive intelligence purposes, both overt and covert.* From 1946 to 1950 various space surveys and projections of space requirements were used by Agency spokesmen in appeals to Congress, the Federal Works Administration, and the General Services Administration for additional space and authorizations and appropriations for a new building to house the Agency.

* See Appendix E for a list of buildings and locations as of 26 January 1953. On this date the Agency occupied more than 1.1 million net square feet in 37 widely scattered locations. 67/

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At the end of September 1951 the approved Military Construction Act included a \$38-million authorization for a new CIA building. There was, however, no Congressional appropriation of funds to implement the authorization; and there was serious doubt by some Agency planners that the appropriation was adequate to meet estimated construction needs. The Agency and other Governmental departments -- Interior, Navy, and GSA, in particular -- were uncertain about the suitability, in fact the availability, of potential construction sites. By June 1953, however, the General Services Administration recommended the Langley site as the best available. As will be noted subsequently, not everyone agreed with the GSA recommendation -- the proponents and opponents would continue to put their particular cases on view until the 11th hour, when the Agency was asking the Senate Appropriations Committee for an appropriation for building at the Langley site.

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~~SECRET~~Chapter IIThe Concept Formalized

In the early 1950's the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) had established dispersion standards for new construction of Government buildings; but in November 1954 the new DCI, Allen Dulles,* requested from Flemming, the Director of ODM, an exception to those dispersion standards to permit the Agency to build within the radius of high danger, an area determined by the presumed results of an atomic attack on Washington's primary targets -- the Pentagon, the Capitol, and the White House. Construction of the recently approved Theodore Roosevelt Memorial Bridge across the Potomac River with its approaches just west of Memorial Bridge would necessitate the demolition of a large portion of the buildings then occupied by CIA. Additional buildings were scheduled for demolition

* On 26 February 1953 Dulles succeeded Smith as DCI; on 23 April Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell was sworn in as the new DDCI. 68/

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when the Interior Department started the major project of clearing the parkland areas of temporary structures.* The DCI considered it essential that site and building plans be formalized without delay for the construction of a permanent headquarters facility to house the Agency in the Washington metropolitan area. Accordingly he stated in his letter to the Director of ODM, "after careful consideration I have concluded that CIA could not effectively accomplish its mission from such a dispersed location." It was essential that the DCI be immediately available to the President and the National Security Council (NSC). GSA had suggested, and the Agency was considering, several federally owned properties at distances varying from five to ten miles from the White House. 69/ The Director of ODM in the Executive Office of the President told the DCI on 31 December 1954 that

as a result of the consultations we have had and also as a result of the discussion at a recent meeting of the Cabinet we are willing to concur in the exception to the

* NCPC stated in a press release of 20 August 1954 that "Temporary Office and Resident Hall Buildings will be demolished."

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current "dispersion standards" ...
In concurring in the exception I hope,
however, you will give consideration to
the possibility of locating a portion of
your agency at an emergency relocation
site. 70/

At this point new and additional emphasis had been
brought to all phases of the CIA planning effort.

The Expansion of the Planning Group, 1953-1955

The RECD had been transferred from the Office
of General Services (OGS) to the Office of Procure-
ment and Supply (OP&S) of the DDA and carried with it
the preliminary planning responsibilities for a new
building. 71/ On 20 March 1953 OP&S became the
Logistics Office (OL) with James A. Garrison as
Chief.* 72/ As of 2 October 1952 the division had a
Table of Organization (T/O) of seven, with ten persons
on duty, counting detailees; seven additional individ-
uals were processing or awaiting security clearances.** 73/

* On 21 July 1954 the name was again changed, this
time to the Office of Logistics, the name in current
(1972) use.

** In early 1953 RECD moved from Room 215 of North
Building at 2430 E Street to the second floor of Alcott
Hall in the West Potomac Park area. The move provided
additional office space for the growing number of staff
and detailed employees required to manage and supervise
the world-wide responsibilities of the division.

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For the preliminary planning of a new headquarters building, the Agency requested PBS to assign two liaison architects to RECD on a reimbursable detail; and [] and Harry M. Ambrose** from the office of the Assistant Commissioner for Design and Construction, PBS, were so designated. Peyton F. Anderson,*** Public Building Superintendent, was detailed from the Space, Maintenance, and Facilities Division (SM&FD) of OGS to RECD to provide unclassified orientation for the new architects pending their processing and security clearances. 74/ During this period [] and Ambrose briefed members of RECD on the administrative responsibilities and functions of PBS with regard to providing services to Government agencies requiring construction

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* [] subsequently became the principal staff architect and an employee of the CIA Building Planning Staff of OL, on which he served until 1959.

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** Ambrose continued as GSA liaison architect to the Building Planning Staff until his retirement in 1960 because of poor health. Ambrose died in 1960.

*** Anderson previously served as Chief of the Telephone Branch of SM&FD, OSG, during the 1949-51 period.

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of federal buildings in the Washington metropolitan area. Many GSA publications were presented and explained,* using directives and publications on site selection, physical characteristics, type of construction, material used, and liaison with state and local utilities and jurisdictions. The briefers defined in general terms the information that was to be developed by the Agency and furnished to GSA if GSA were selected to be the design and construction management agent. 75/ Charles R. Smith, an ensign on detail to RECD from the Navy Department as a civil engineer, joined the planning group in late 1953. Lieutenant Colonel Edward T. Riley, on detail to RECD from the Air Force as a civil engineer, was assigned to the planning group in early 1954. Riley was named project officer under the Chief of RECD.

This five-man group began the analysis of the previously collected data on space and special requirements. The data were compared with similar

* The principal GSA publications used were: *Guide for Space Planning and Layout*, *Instructions to Contract Architects*, *Architectural Drawing Requirements*, and *Structural, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Data*.

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planning information collected by the State Department and by NSA in the course of preparing a "space directive" for the construction of its new headquarters facilities.* Ambrose provided the Agency with a copy of the Department of State space directive dated September 1954; and this was invaluable to the RECD planning group in its early stages. This 33-page detailed document listed a total of 1,563,011 square feet of space to be constructed for 9,280 employees at 21st Street and Virginia Avenue, N.W. 76/ Meanwhile the Acquisitions Branch of RECD was engaged in extensive preliminary site surveys.**

More than 40 commercial and federal site locations within a 20-minute vehicle radius of the White House were surveyed.*** Sites in the metropolitan area,

* CIA's Finance Sub-Committee, headed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, was studying the advantages and disadvantages of "lease-purchase legislation" after receiving from the PBS a copy of a prospectus covering the new Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) building to be built near Germantown, Maryland.

*** On CIA's behalf, GSA was advertising in the area newspapers for suitable sites of 70 acres.

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offered and recommended by the PBS, were later reduced to six, each having a minimum of 70 acres. In the staff study of 28 September 1954 these sites were identified as Langley, Virginia; Arlington Hall, Virginia; Hybla Valley, Virginia; Suitland, Maryland; Beltsville, Maryland; and Bethesda, Maryland. The Chief of RECD and the Chief of Logistics (C/OL) jointly recommended to the DDA that

the DCI negotiate with the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of Army to acquire the Arlington Hall property for Agency use. ... Land areas other than Government owned be considered should efforts to acquire the Arlington Hall property prove unsuccessful. 77/

Despite the recommendations of RECD favoring the Arlington Hall location and following a personal inspection of the site, the DCI

was not completely sold on this site and requested that we explore further the possibility of overcoming the three major obstacles at Langley, i.e., transportation, sewerage disposal, and civic objection. 78/

Similarly, the DDA and members of the planning group also inspected the Bureau of Engraving and Printing with a view toward Agency occupancy in lieu of new construction, but the building was highly impractical for anticipated Agency uses. 79/

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Early in 1955 a serious effort was mounted to have the Agency locate in a proposed redevelopment area then being planned for southwest Washington. There was considerable influence behind the promotional activity for this area, with the former head of the Office of Strategic Services, General William Donovan, as attorney representing the promoter, William Zeckendorf. 80/ The DDA, however, proved adept in fending off the promoters -- as will be noted shortly, it was becoming clear that Langley was the most feasible location -- but at the same time he afforded them no grounds to claim that they were not treated courteously and fairly as his Diary shows:*

On 17 March General Donovan and Mr. Reynolds, representing Mr. William Zeckendorf, called on me to discuss the location of a CIA building in the southwest area. We spent about an hour discussing the matter. I told them that we were still interested in the southwest area but that our principal concern was how we were going to get our employees to and from the area which, at

* White, in fact, had already been told by Colonel T. A. Lane, Engineer Commissioner of the District of Columbia and a member of the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC), "that the Webb and Knapp plan [Webb & Knapp was the construction firm associated with Zeckendorf in the southwest development plan] at the moment [8 February 55] had no official status." 81/

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the moment, is already congested. Mr. Reynolds said that he would study the matter and attempt to offer us further advice. In addition, I told them that the National Capital Planning Commission had more or less thrown cold water on any idea we had of going to the southwest areas until the basic differences in concept between the Planning Commission and Mr. Zeckendorf were sorted out. Mr. Reynolds and General Donovan both thought that they would be sorted out sometime soon. I also told them that we might have our problems with the Office of Defense Mobilization and that the National Capital Planning Commission had informally indicated that they might oppose our location immediately north of Fort McNair, but on the other hand, might possibly consider our locating along the Mall, wherever the Mall is finally located. I assured them that we would not make a final decision on a site without consulting them. 82/

On 22 November 1954 the DDA established a steering committee to provide Agency guidance and general direction for the planning of the new building. The committee was to review reports and recommendations regarding plans, design, and other matters requiring policy determination and was to recommend appropriate action to the DCI. The original members of this committee were the DDA, chairman; the Chief of RECD, OL, secretary*; the DDI; the DDP; the AD/Communications;

* The SM&F Division, GSO, had been transferred to RECD/OL and renamed the SM&F Branch on 8 February 1954. 83/

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the DTR; the AD/Personnel; the Inspector General; the General Counsel; the D/Security; the Comptroller; the Chief of the Management Staff; and the Chief of Logistics. The committee held its first meeting on 22 December 1954.* White stated that the DCI was "very interested" in obtaining the necessary approvals and funds in 1955.

[] advised the committee that there were six possible sites, of which Langley and Arlington Hall were the most desirable. Because the Langley site was more accessible to most Agency employees, was well oriented to other Government agencies with which the Agency maintained extensive liaison and offered more seclusion for security than any other location, the DCI favored Langley at this point, as did the steering committee, which was under the direction of the DDS.**

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* John F. Blake, currently (1973) Director of the Office of Logistics, represented the IG, and Dr. [] represented the Office of the DDP. Subsequently a representative from the Office of the DCI was added to this group. 84/

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** The need for this formal steering committee must have been minimal. The IC files do not include the minutes of the second meeting, and the third meeting took place in October 1955! 85/

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During the steering committee meeting on 22 December 1954, White also noted that the Southwest Washington Development Project would probably mature too far in the future to be of use to the Agency. In a meeting with the DDS, the Chief of OL, and the Chief of RECD, Peter A. Strobel, Commissioner of PBS, reported that

the NCPC is very desirous of having both the George Washington Memorial Highway and the Cabin John Bridge (Circumferential Highway) constructed He further felt that if through our efforts, funds for highway construction could be approved, the Commission would undoubtedly view our use of the Langley property more favorably.

It was agreed that the PBS would make efforts to have the agenda of the next NCPC meeting include CIA's site location problems. 86/

By late 1954 [] the RECD planning officer, had prepared an outline for the development of "Definitive Requirements," with priorities numbered one through six.* 87/ The RECD/OL planning group was not formally recognized until 4 August 1955, when it became the Special Project Staff (SPS) of RECD with a T/O of three -- [] and a secretary--

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* See Appendix F.

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steno, [] The PBS liaison architects, [] and Ambrose, were attached to this staff. The (b)(6)
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T/O was increased in October 1955 to provide for two architect-engineers and an additional secretary; and on 26 November 1955 SPS became the Building Planning Staff (BPS) and a separate staff element of the office of the Director of Logistics. 88/ On 19 November 1955 the DDS terminated the Special Subcommittee on Space Requirements headed by [] the (b)(6)
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DD/OL. This group had been established on 8 July 1955 to make a comprehensive review of Agency space requirements in relation to the proposed standards being developed by the RECD Special Projects Staff. 89/ The responsibilities of this subcommittee were then assumed by BPS.

Critical Coordination Period, 1955-1956

Continued expansion and rising construction costs had made the original 1951 Agency building authorization of \$38 million obviously inadequate.* In mid-February

* Even as late as the spring of 1954, however, there were those who thought it might be possible to "build for considerably less than \$38,000,000." In March 1954 Senator Homer Ferguson (R-Mich.), who was handling CIA appropriations in the Senate, advised Dulles that it would be unwise to ask for funds for building at that time. 90/

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1955 the DDS was informed by members of the building committee that the new cost estimate was \$55 million for a structure to house 10,000 employees; and he had high hopes that the full amount would be approved by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB). 91/ The story of the subsequent negotiations with the Congress will be discussed in detail in the history of the Office of the Legislative Counsel, but some of the recollections of Walter Pforzheimer, one of the Agency's principals in these activities, are worth recording here:

Legislation authorizing a CIA building was introduced in the House by Chairman Carl Vinson (D., Ga.) of the Armed Services Committee on 20 April 1955 and, on the same day, in the Senate by Chairman Richard Russell (D., Ga.) for himself and Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R., Mass.) of the Armed Services Committee. As originally introduced, the bill provided for funds not to exceed \$6 million for the acquisition of land and \$50 million for construction. It passed the House in that form. In the Senate, the bill was considered by the Real Estate and Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services and they made some major changes in the CIA proposal. The record would indicate that, during our hearing before this three-man subcommittee, only Subcommittee Chairman, John Stennis (D., Miss.) and Senator Francis Case (R., S.D.) were present and

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Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) was absent. During the course of our testimony before this subcommittee one of the Senators complained that our cost estimates per sq.ft. were quite high. He then referred to another federal building under construction, without naming which one it was, saying it was being constructed at a considerably lower average cost per sq.ft. It took some time to ascertain what building the Senator was talking about and that that building had a much higher rate of unimproved space than we could have in our headquarters. By that time the Subcommittee and the full Senate Armed Services Committee had reduced the amount to be authorized for construction to \$45 million. The Senate Committee also felt that the price of \$6 million for the acquisition of private property, should that be required, was excessive. It reduced this figure to \$1 million. As the Langley site was still actively being considered, and was perhaps favored, the Senate Committee also added the sum of \$8.5 million available for transfer to the National Capital Planning Commission and the Interior Department for the acquisition of land and the necessary construction of the extension of the George Washington Memorial Parkway from its then terminal point at Spout Run to the Langley site. The committee added the proviso that if the Langley site were not chosen, the \$8.5 million would not be available for obligation. Finally, reflecting congressional and public dismay that World War I and II temporary buildings had not been demolished, the Committee directed that at such time as CIA occupied its new building the Administrator of GSA was directed to demolish temporary building space equivalent to that which CIA would relinquish. Mr. Dulles was dismayed at the loss of \$5 million in his construction request and he wrote the

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Committee Chairman requesting that the \$5 million be restored in conference as the budget estimates on which we had based our requests were extremely tight. The conferees adopted the Senate Committee version described above but restored \$1 million to the construction funds making a total of \$46 million for the purpose. 92/

Pforzheimer, at that time the Legislative Counsel, recorded the following in his diary on 21 April 1955:

1. This morning the Department of Defense released to the Congress the Military Construction Act of 1955 including as Title IV a request for authorization for \$56,000,000 for the acquisition of land and construction of a building for CIA. The accompanying press release contained a typographical error setting the acquisition of land figures at \$16,000,000 rather than \$6,000,000. Colonel Grogan called the Department of Defense, which attempted to rectify the error on as many copies as possible. However, copies had been delivered to the individual members of Congress. Subsequently, a corrected copy of the press release was sent to them.

2. I called Congressman Broyhill (R., Va.) and informed him of the forthcoming release of the Military Construction Act and that we were requesting a total of \$56,000,000 therein. Congressman Broyhill was appreciative of the information. He stated that he was in complete accord with our purposes in this matter and if needed he would be glad to appear before the Armed Services Committee or take up the cudgels on the Floor. He said he was particularly anxious that we get into a new building so that the

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old temporary buildings could be destroyed. Mr. Broyhill went on to state that since we had told Langley in effect "to go to hell" Langley had developed a considerable desire to have the CIA building constructed there, and County officials were going to work to try to remove the obstacles to our coming. Mr. Broyhill stated that in his opinion CIA should not be stuck with the cost of the extension of the George Washington Parkway and that he had so informed Mr. Brundage, of the Bureau of the Budget. He closed his conversation with renewed expression of complete support.

3. In addition to Mr. Broyhill, I informed Mr. Menefee, Administrative Assistant to Senator Byrd, Mr. Hook, Administrative Assistant to Senator Butler, and Mr. McNeill, Administrative Assistant to Senator Robertson, that the Military Construction Act was on its way to Capitol Hill, and that in view of their interest in the CIA building we wished them to know that Title IV contained our request for authorization. I also called their attention to the typographical error. Each in turn expressed appreciation for our thoughtfulness. I told Mr. McNeill that Colonel White was always available to brief Senator Robertson if the latter desired more information concerning our need for a building. Mr. McNeill said that the Senator's main interest was that the building be located in Virginia, but that he was taking no position as between sites.

Because it was the general consensus within the Agency that it was now the right time to approach Congress to obtain an appropriation of funds for the long overdue building, arrangements were made by

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the DDS for the DCI to make a formal presentation to the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC)* and the National Capital Regional Planning Council (NCRPC), requesting their approval of one of the several site locations that appeared favorable for the Agency building. As a result of the formal presentation a joint committee was formed consisting of representatives of the NCPC, the NCRPC, and the Agency. After considerable review and discussion with various county planning members and an analysis of site locations, a report of the Joint Committee was prepared and forwarded on 7 April 1955 to the NCPC and NCRPC for their consideration and approval.

On 3 and 5 May 1955 the NCRPC and NCPC approved the Joint Committee's report, which recommended that

the CIA application to use a site near Langley, Virginia be approved with the understanding that this development will require Federal assumption of collateral costs to make the installation operable and that a radical change of land use in the area will be entailed. 93/

* The duty of the NCPC under the US Planning Act of 1952 was to consult and advise the NCRPC and the local planning agencies in the territory affected, if US Government establishments are located in the environs of Washington, D.C.

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The committee's approval, however, also contained a provision requiring the Agency to consult with the local planning agencies, as well as the NCPC and the NCRPC, on those plans for the integration of the Agency building into the surrounding community. Within a period of about six weeks, however, the DDS recorded that NCPC representatives required further educating about Agency intentions regarding the Langley site and consequently,

[redacted] and I met with Harland Bartholomew and Jack Nolen, Chairman and Director, respectively, of the National Capital Planning Commission, at which time I briefed them on the current status of our thinking with regard to the location of our new building. Although I did not give them the full "why's and wherefore's," they understand that as of now we *do not* propose to build in Maryland or the District of Columbia, that we *do not* propose to comply with current dispersion standards, but that we *do* propose to build in Virginia at either the Winkler or Langley properties. I explained that we had requested \$8.5 million to be transferred to the Department of the Interior for the construction of an extension to the George Washington Memorial Parkway. Mr. Nolen said that the National Capital Planning Commission was responsible for acquiring the right of way and was not sure that they had sufficient funds to do it. He suggested that our language ought to make provision for the transfer of funds to them also. Told him that I would have to look into this. (Have done so with

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Lyman Hamilton, Bureau of the Budget, who, at first, was sure that Jack Nolen was wrong; however, on further investigation he determined that the National Capital Planning Commission does acquire the right of way. Accordingly, we must look into this early Monday morning and see if our legislation requires any further amendment.) 94/

The controversy over the final site selection, although basically resolved in favor of Langley, was to continue, as noted later in this history, for almost two more years; but the joint NCPC-NCRPC action late in the spring of 1955 did precipitate a noticeable flurry of activity among the partisans, both pro and con, on the Langley site issue. Some of these groups and individuals and their applications and agitations are worth noting at this point because their activities were to require the attention of senior Agency officials off and on for the next six or seven years.

Noted for their financial conservatism, the two Virginia members of the US Senate, Harry F. Byrd and A. Willis Robertson (both Democrats), were kept informed on developments related to potential Virginia sites and were generally handled with kid gloves. 95/ Each Senator has been identified as having made at least one approach to obtain contracts or concessions or

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develop contacts on behalf of constituents or potential creditors. In neither instance, however, is there evidence of attempts that went beyond the bounds of propriety. 96/ At a later stage in the story of the new building, in June 1956 when the Agency was seeking a \$10-million increase in the appropriation that had been approved, both Byrd and Robertson were reported to be "deeply concerned about and do not understand the proposed increase of \$10,000,000." 97/

The situation of the member of the House of Representatives from the 10th District in Virginia (Northern Virginia), Joel T. Broyhill, was considerably different. It has been recorded that at various times Broyhill attempted to help obtain concessions or contracts for an architectural firm, a bank, a catering service, and a jeweler. 98/ That his tactics may have exceeded the bounds of propriety is evidenced in the following report of a conversation between Broyhill and the DDS concerning the architectural firm:

Congressman Broyhill telephoned trying in every way possible to shove the architectural firm of Willgoos and Chase down our throats. I told him that the firm of Harrison and Abramovitz had

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definitely been selected and that while we were sympathetic to associating that organization with a local architect I could make no commitments at this time. I told him that I had no objection to Willgoos and Chase contacting Harrison & Ambramovitz or writing to us if they saw fit. 99/

An even more sour note was struck by Congressman Broyhill in the fall of 1959 when he telephoned White

to express his unhappiness about the fact that his friend, Mr. [R. Wade] Pearson had not been given the snack bar and vending machine concessions in our new building. ...

He insisted over and over again that it was not too late for me to direct that Berlo Caterers be given this business and he was, in fact, asking me to do so.

The Congressman was very frank to say that he felt that his constituents -- since this was his Congressional District and since this was a Republican Administration -- should be given preferential treatment over all others. ... I told him that we negotiated all of our contracts for CIA without regard to the political affiliation of competitive contractors. I also told him that the mere fact that he was interested in any contractor would certainly receive our most serious consideration but that I could not promise him that his constituents would always be favored; in fact, I was rather emphatic that they would not be favored unless they were competitive in every respect.

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While the entire conversation was quite friendly it was also rather frank, with Congressman Broyhill making no bones about his belief that his Republican constituents during the Republican Administration ought to receive preferential treatment over all others and my equally insistent stand that I felt duty-bound to insure that our contracts were fairly negotiated and administered without regard to the political affiliations of the competing contractors. I told him that we had made no determinations as yet about concessionaires other than the snack bars and vending machines and that if we later decided to have a bank, drugstore, etc., I would let him know.* 100/

In addition to those who made their appeals for concessions through their Congressmen, other legitimate Virginia business interests approached the Agency to inquire about prospects for space in, or near, the new building. Banks, savings institutions, a confectioner, and retail stores were among those represented; and the replies from the DDS informing them that it had been decided that no concessions would be available were prompt and uniformly

* On 31 March 1961 the DDS did send a letter to Congressman Broyhill telling him that except for the vending machine and cafeteria concessions and the barber shop, all to be operated by GSI and/or the Virginia Society for the Blind, there would be no other commercial concessions in the building. 101/

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courteous.* 102/ Some of those who had real estate holdings in the area of the new building were more strident, devious, and deceptive; but their efforts to "con" the Agency into support of particular developments or other projects were to no avail.** 104/

Like their counterparts in Virginia, politicians at all levels of government in Maryland exhibited an active interest in the location of the new Headquarters Building. The DDS reported that

Mr. Baynard of Senator [John Marshall] Butler's office telephoned seeking information concerning the additional \$10,000,000 which we need for our

* Following much tugging and hauling with private interests, the food service concession was granted to GSI, and that organization was also asked to supervise the establishment and operation of the barber shop in the Headquarters Building. In order to avoid any controversy with the state, the Virginia Society for the Blind was given permission to operate two snack bars in the Headquarters Building. 103/

** The *White Diary Notes* show a rather unusual applicant as follows: "Stan Grogan [an Agency spokesman] called with reference to an inquiry he had recieved from Mr. Vincent Smith of McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Inc. who wanted to meet with us and talk about the interior arrangement of our new building. Agreed with him that the architect was still drawing plans and that we had not yet reached a stage where an interview of this kind would be appropriate." 105/ The company probably hoped to set up a retail book store in the new building.

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building and very obviously fishing for information which Senator Butler might use in favor of a Maryland site. 106/*

and

Mr. Jenkins of Senator [J. Glenn] Beall's office telephoned on behalf of a constituent who wishes to operate a drugstore in our new building. I explained to Mr. Jenkins that we had no present plans for this type of installation but that we would be glad to hear from his constituent just in case something developed at a later date. 108/

Senator Beall, like others of the Maryland Congressional contingent, did let the Agency and the NCPC know that he thought more suitable building sites were available in Maryland. 109/ In this he was joined by a handful of Congressmen -- Senator Matthew Neeley (D-W.Va.), Senator Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) and Representative John McMillan (D-S.C.) who took issue with the plan to locate the Agency at Langley, favoring some other Virginia site (the Shirley highway location was specified by Dirksen, among other people. 110/

* Relationships with Senator Butler apparently were maintained on a friendly level; the DCI sent the Senator a "Dear John" letter which ended: "I want to express my sincere appreciation for the friendly and constructive attitude which you have maintained throughout the long and difficult process of reaching a decision on this important matter." 107/

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Both the Congressman from the Annapolis district, Representative Richard E. Lankford, and the Governor of Maryland, Theodore R. McKeldin, showed interest in having the Agency locate the new building at a site in Greenbelt; but there is no record of undue pressure being applied by either. Gov. McKeldin, in fact was legitimately concerned with cooperating with the Agency in the matter of the construction of the Cabin John Bridge and its approaches and access roads. 111/ Another Congressman interested in having the Agency build in Maryland was Frank W. Boykin (D-Ala.). It seems that Representative Boykin had 5,000 acres of land near Waldorf that he was willing to sell (presumably in whole or part) to the Agency.* Calls about the Boykin property apparently reached the DDS from Dulles and from Homer Grunther of the Legislative Staff of the White House. The DDS told both of them that the Boykin offer was "completely

* Boykin subsequently -- and while still a Congressman -- was indicted and convicted on charges of conspiracy and conflict of interest growing out of a Maryland Savings and Loan Association scandal. Boykin did not appeal the judgment; he paid a fine and received a suspended jail sentence. 112/

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out of the question according to our present criteria." 113/*

In addition to the interest displayed by area and other Congressional representatives, the local jurisdictions in Virginia also had a vital interest in the location of the Agency headquarters, with the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors and the Fairfax Chamber of Commerce among the most vigorous proponents of the Langley site. Sewage, water supply, and access roads were of principal concern to both opponents and proponents of the Langley site, and from 1954 until construction was well under way these issues required the personal attention of the DDS, the Building Planning Staff, the Office of Logistics, and the Legislative Counsel. 114/ In fact the DDS

reported to the Director that I had been appointed without my knowledge or consent to the Advisory Council of our Economic and Industrial Development Committee of Fairfax County and explained the restricted role I would have to play in order to avoid conflict of interest charges. The Director thought that I should by all means serve on this committee and asked me to consult with Larry

* Boykin served in the House of Representatives during the period 1935-1963.

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Houston in drafting the appropriate reply. This, I have done. 115/

It was well that the supporters of the Langley site were willing to be heard; there was persistent minority resistance from various Langley, McLean, and Dranesville area residents regarding this choice for the new building site. The most vocal of the group was a Roger D. Fisher. Beginning with "Letters to the Editor," Fisher addressed his objections to the Fairfax County Supervisors, the National Capital Planning Commission, the DCI, the DDS, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (Arthur S. Flemming), the Assistant to the President (Sherman Adams) and other White House staff members, the Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Percival F. Brundage), and a host of Congressmen. 116/ Fisher's arguments on "security," "dispersal," and sewage/sanitation were refuted time and again by responsible federal officials. The Washington newspapers, particularly the *Washington Post* and the *Times Herald*, however, chose to side with the minority opinion in

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opposing the Langley site.* The adverse publicity was countered by the senior representatives of the Agency who, as noted, availed themselves of every opportunity to appear before local citizens groups and civic service organizations in the Langley-McLean area. 117/

Before the Congressional hearings scheduled for 15 July 1955, the Agency took great pains to coordinate fully and staff adequately all requirements and to obtain whatever official clearances were necessary to the preparation of its presentation to Congress. On 14 June 1955 Dulles and White met at the White House with Governor Sherman Adams, Special Assistant to the President; Arthur Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization; General Bragdon, Special Adviser to the President on Construction; Belcher, Assistant Director of the

* Excerpts from the *Washington Post* and the *Times Herald* opposing the Agency locating at Langley are on file in the Historical Intelligence Collection. In addition, the HIC files also contain several adverse publications that are worthy of review, which were prepared and issued by the local minority group of residents from the McLean-Langley-Dranesville District.

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Bureau of the Budget; and Colonel Andrew Goodpasture, Staff Secretary at the White House, to determine the Administration's position on the proposed location of the Agency's new building. The DDS recorded the following:

1. As a result of my discussions with Mr. Dulles concerning the referenced memorandum of conversation with General Bragdon, he telephoned Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, and a meeting was arranged at the White House for 12:00 Noon on 14 June 1955 for the specific purpose of firming up the position of the "Administration" on the location of the proposed new CIA headquarters building. Those in attendance were: Governor Adams (for a part of the meeting), Colonel Goodpasture, Staff Secretary at the White House, Dr. Flemming, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, General Bragdon, Special Advisor to the President on Construction, Mr. Belcher, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Dulles, and me.

2. Colonel Goodpasture reviewed the substance of the meeting which Mr. Dulles and I had with the President on 7 May 1955 to discuss this subject. Briefly, he stated that (1) the President had indicated that we should not locate within the City of Washington, but, at the same time, pointed out that we need not necessarily comply with current dispersion standards, and (2) that he wanted us to get on the outskirts of the City, as far out as we thought we could without hampering our activities, and believed that in view of the fact that our Relocation Center was [redacted] we should be

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located in that general direction. He went on to state that the President had related his experiences during the war and felt strongly that it was not essential for the Director of Central Intelligence to be in the highly congested area of the District. Insofar as the possible selection of the Langley or Winkler properties was concerned, he indicated that the President had made no hard and fast decision in this matter but had stated that either of these sites would be acceptable to him.

3. The second point centered around the question of whether or not permitting CIA to locate at either the Langley or Winkler locations would set a precedent and thereby make it difficult to require other agencies to comply with ODM standards. Dr. Flemming spoke up and said that he had considered this matter both with Mr. Dulles and the Cabinet and had reached the conclusion that there were significant and sufficient reasons for making an exception in this instance. He emphasized that this exception should not be regarded as a precedent for other Government agencies, that CIA had acted properly in processing its request, and that other agencies desiring to do so could submit similar actions which would be considered on their individual merits.

General Bragdon made a strong pitch to have us moved further out and attempted to influence Dr. Flemming in his position. However, Dr. Flemming held a firm position and said that what he would like to get out of this would be the construction ... if necessary ... of, possibly, austere facilities [] at which we would locate some of our people and give them an intensive training program so that in the event that the CIA headquarters were

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completely wiped out they would know how to carry on. We discussed this a bit and I indicated that we already had people there and probably had room for more ... perhaps as many as 1,000 or 1,500 ... but that these would not be the people who would normally succeed in the chain of command. At any rate, we assured Dr. Flemming that we would study this matter and Mr. Dulles said, in effect, that we would do something along these lines. (This, I regard as almost a positive commitment to Dr. Flemming.)

5. The next question was how to handle this with the Congress. Mr. Dulles advised the group that Chairman Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee had suggested that we might obtain the approval of his Committee and that of Senator Stennis', the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Real Estate and Military Construction, concerning the location we finally chose. I pointed out that a good argument against this should be that since we were required by law to consult with the National Capital Planning Commission and the National Capital Regional Planning Council it seemed unnecessary to obtain the specific approval of Congress, and stated that if this were required the location itself might get to be a political football. It was unanimously agreed that we would resist any attempt by the Congress to pick the site.

6. We discussed briefly the use of "prior year" funds. Mr. Belcher remained silent during this discussion. I assured him that we were not advocating this but had merely pointed out that it was possible and would avoid a new appropriation.

7. At the conclusion of the discussion, Governor Adams turned to Colonel Goodpasture

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and asked him if he felt the President would approve of either the Winkler or Langley properties. Colonel Goodpasture assured him that the President would, and Governor Adams then said, "O.K., let's go ahead." 118/

As noted previously, Senator Byrd wholeheartedly supported the Agency's move to Virginia, as did Representative Broyhill, who believed that the Fairfax County officials would eventually overcome any obstacles either to funding or to the sewage, water, and related utility matters required for the Agency to locate at Langley. As a result of private petitions on both sides of the issue, the Agency found that the Langley-McLean area residents favored CIA's location at Langley by a ratio of 3.5 to 1. This coincided with a poll of the Dranesville area conducted by Representative Broyhill; the Congressman's poll also showed that in Fairfax County the ratio was an overwhelming 4 to 1 in favor of the Langley site. 119/ The Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, the senior government unit of the county, on four separate occasions had expressed its favorable view to CIA locating at Langley. The official planning bodies of Arlington, Fairfax, and Loudoun

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Counties, the District of Columbia, and the City of Falls Church had also favored Langley.

The hearing on 15 July 1955 before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Defense Subcommittee, was held to permit CIA to present its overall building plans to Congress. The DCI specifically indicated the desirability of the Langley site; then came statements from those favoring as well as those opposing CIA's plans.* Three long hours of testimony were involved, and because the hearings resulted in consideration of two prime locations -- the Langley site and the alternative site in Alexandria, the Winkler property** -- the DCI requested funds solely for preparation of detailed studies, plans, and specifications to be used for the selection of the most advantageous site. In addition to the DCI, several other staunch supporters of the Langley

* See excerpts from HR 7278, US Senate, 84th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Appropriations Committee. In HIC files.

** The "Winkler Tract" was located between N. Beauregard Street and Henry G. Shirley Highway in the vicinity of Seminary Road in the western limits of the city of Alexandria. See map1, inside back cover, Volume II.

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location emerged during the Congressional hearings. Among those were R. M. Townsend, the Executive Director of the Fairfax County Chamber of Commerce, and W. C. Mills, President of the Chamber of Commerce; they submitted to the members of the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations separate statements, which are summarized below:

With reference to the location of the CIA at Langley, Virginia[:]

1. The overwhelming majority of the people in Fairfax County, in which Langley is located, eagerly welcome this fine agency here in our county. We believe the vote for it would be 98 or 99 percent.
2. The Fairfax County Government, in a 6-to-1 vote of the Board of Supervisors, has gone on record heartily welcoming the CIA. The one vote cast in dissent was not in objection to the agency, but on a disagreement as to procedures.
3. The Fairfax County Planning Commission has likewise gone on record for the CIA at the Langley site.
4. The McLean Business Association, composed of twenty-three business leaders in the community adjacent to the CIA site, has formally gone on record inviting it there.
5. The Great Falls Grange, with 242 members in the area concerned, went on record March 16, 1955, welcoming the CIA to Langley. A copy of this letter is being sent to the Subcommittee today.

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6. The Fairfax County Chamber of Commerce, with a county-wide membership of 500 of the foremost business and civic leaders of the county, has likewise formally gone on record for the CIA at Langley, doing so, to the best of my knowledge, without a single dissenting voice.

7. Expressions eagerly in favor of this splendid agency's location at Langley have been voiced to us by countless leading residents of the Langley-McLean area, and inquiries among these convince us that in that area sentiment is overwhelmingly for location of the CIA there.

8. A very few of the residents of the area concerned voice anxiety that the CIA there would as they say "Injure the community". So far as we can determine, this opinion comes from only an extremely small minority, and the appended letters support this view.

9. The spaciousness of the land available, its parklike character, the high standards of the CIA, convince us that the CIA there will best aid us in preserving the attractions of the locality. We cannot believe that the site will go long unused, and the CIA is by far the best agency to be put upon it.

10. The parkway road extension has long been overdue as a transportation need. Recent Civil Defense practice tests show the grave urgency of completing it as a requirement for speedy evacuation from Washington and Arlington.

11. Fairfax County's pledge to have sewer connections ready in time to service the added population at the site represents the expediting of a facility already overdue. Accelerations of road improvements and water service by location of the CIA at Langley will greatly benefit the area.

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12. These considerations and the known high standards of the CIA in personnel, assuring us of fine new neighbors, prompt the dispatch of this information to you by the instruction of our County Chamber President, Mr. W. C. Wills, on behalf of our Directors and 500 Members.*

Another firm supporter at the hearing was Carlton C. Massey, Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Fairfax, who furnished supporting testimony in favor of CIA locating at Langley and, in addition, submitted a prepared statement indicating that

The Fairfax County Board of Supervisors has consistently welcomed the CIA to locate its office building in Fairfax County and has expressed this welcome by formal action on at least three occasions. On 8 March 1955 the board passed a motion inviting the CIA to locate in Fairfax County.

On May 4, 1955, a resolution was adopted by this board cordially inviting the CIA to use the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads property at Langley in Fairfax County, Virginia, for its future offices, and assuring the cooperation of the county government in all matters under its responsibility.

On May 18, 1955, a resolution was adopted by this board of county supervisors giving assurance that within 2 years the county would make available sewage disposal facilities to the proposed site at Langley with no part of the initial cost to be borne by the Federal Government and subject to the customary connection charges

* The Fairfax Chamber of Commerce put these recommendations into a public-relations document called "Fairfax County Welcomes the CIA." (See HS/HC 876.)

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and quarterly service charges as have been or may be established for similar service in the County.

Officials of the county have conferred with officials of the Virginia Department of Highways and the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia for the purpose of determining to what extent this State Agency may be able to provide improved highway facilities to serve this proposed installation.

The Fairfax County Planning Commission has cooperated in this connection by making its staff available for the preparation of information in connection therewith.

During the hearing the very vocal Roger Fisher was in the forefront in objecting to CIA locating in Langley. Although Fisher and proponents of the Alexandria site made a valiant effort in advocating their dissenting views,* the presentation by the Honorable Armistead Boothe, Virginia Senator from the City of Alexandria, worked adversely to their cause. When asked by Senator Chavez whether or not he desired more federal buildings in the state, Senator Boothe replied that "Not only would it be

* The President of the Alexandria Chamber of Commerce went on record with the Senate Appropriations Committee prior to the hearing, and his letter emphasized the greater economies which would follow from use of the Winkler tract. 120/

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good for CIA but also good for Alexandria...." The only site worthy of consideration in Alexandria, of course, was the Winkler property. In concluding his testimony -- his was the last formal presentation from the dissenting side -- Senator Boothe stated:

I would like to say one thing Mr. Chairman [Sen. Dennis Chavez]. I want the record perfectly clear, I am the attorney for Mr. Winkler. I want that to be known to this Committee, because I am not here representing Mr. Winkler. I am here on behalf of the city of Alexandria.

The Congressmen chose to support the Agency position and on 15 July 1955 Public Law 161 (84th Congress) authorized \$46 million for the construction of the Headquarters Building in addition to \$3 million for acquisition of land and starting of construction of the George Washington Memorial Parkway and for the development of detailed plans and specifications for the building. Because of the inaccuracies and misleading statements presented by the opposition groups at the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee's hearing,* the DCI subsequently forwarded

* The testimony of Rear Admiral Neill Phillips, USN (Ret.) who was "appearing as Representative [sic] of the Progressive Citizens Association of Georgetown (footnote continued on following page)

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a clarifying memorandum to Senator Chavez on 18 July 1955. 122/ Three days later the DCI's memorandum to the Senator was followed by a letter from White, the DDS, requesting an amendment to the language of Chapter III of H. R. 7278, the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, to the effect

that the amount of \$3 million approved by the House Appropriations Committee be increased to \$7 million to provide for, in addition to the development of detail[ed] plans and specifications, the acquisition of land and the starting of construction of the George Washington Memorial Parkway to the Langley site. 123/

The Senate Appropriations Committee did approve the \$3 million for planning that the House Appropriations Committee had previously authorized, but they also reduced the amount available for the purchase of land for the building from \$1 million to \$350,000, should a non-government-owned site be selected. In addition the committee authorized the transfer of

(approximately 900 members) and the Audubon Society of the District of Columbia (approximately 1200 members in the Greater Washington area)....[who had] also been asked to speak for the Middle States Division of the American Canoe Association" 121/ illustrates the nature of some of the misinformation that the anti-Langley forces presented to the Senate committee. See Appendix G for the Phillips testimony.

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\$4 million to acquire the land and begin construction of the parkway.

On 26 July 1955 the DCI addressed a letter to the Honorable George H. Mahon, Chairman, Defense Subcommittee, House Committee on Appropriations, in which he noted that

The Senate Appropriations Committee has now approved the sum of \$3,000,000 for the preparation of detail[ed] plans and specifications and \$4,000,000 for the extension of the Parkway, with a proviso that if CIA does not locate at Langley, a sum of not to exceed \$350,000 shall be available for the acquisition of a site elsewhere.

It is my earnest hope that the House Appropriations Committee will accept the action of the Senate Appropriations Committee.* 124/

The positions of the two Appropriations Committees were compromised; and on 4 August 1955 Congress appropriated a total of \$5.5 million** for the purposes noted above in the White letter; and almost a year later (27 July 1956) the remaining sums were

* The DCI's letter to Representative Mahon is attached as Appendix H.

** Public Law 219, 84th Congress.

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appropriated in the amount of \$49 million* to construct the building and to finish the parkway to the site. 125/

On 11 August 1955, in an effort to insure the consent and approval "of the intent of Congressional Leaders" as well as all federal and state planning authorities, the Agency entered into a contract with the firm of Gilmore D. Clarke** and Michael Rapuano, Consulting Engineers and Landscape Architects, 145 East 32nd. Street, New York, New York. A comprehensive "Report on the Proposed Location for a New Headquarters for CIA", dated 25 October 1955, was prepared and used to compare the advantages and disadvantages of the Langley site and the Winkler tract in particular, as well as other possible locations of at least 100 acres. The report covered the Agency criteria for site location; the percentage location of residences of staff employees;

* Public Law 814, 84th Congress.

** Clarke was a former member and chairman of the Commission of Fine Arts, Executive Office of the President, 1937-1950. As noted later in the history, Clarke and Rapuano also became affiliated with Harrison and Abramovitz in planning the new building.

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the impact on Fairfax County; and the adequacy of water supply, sewerage disposal, electric power, telephone, and other utility services, with many appended maps, charts, and traffic surveys.* 126/ Because the Clarke and Rapuano Report played an important role in the final decision to locate at Langley and to abandon the Winkler site, the results of the study are summarized below:

SECURITY

WINKLER SITE:

1. Too low in relation to the Shirley Highway and surrounding areas.

LANGLEY SITE:

1. At Langley CIA would occupy 140 acres of a 740-acre Government reservation. Any development for the Central

* Examined in retrospect the Clarke and Rapuano site report leaves much to the imagination. Despite mention of the fact that they visited most of the potential sites, no reasons are given for the rejection of any specific site except the Winkler tract. In fact, the focus of the report is on the only two sites which were specifically identified, the Winkler tract and Langley. Even the Clarke and Rapuano map purporting to show the sites that they visited fails to provide specific identification of such sites except for the two already mentioned. Throughout the research for this history, in fact, it has been almost impossible to find hard evidence cited by any of the responsible individuals or agencies for rejecting a prospective site.

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~~SECRET~~SECURITY
(continued)WINKLER SITE:LANGLEY SITE:

Intelligence Agency within this site will be such that a wide belt of forest land will be left around the periphery in a manner aiding to provide the desired security.

2. Higher than surrounding areas. 185 to 280 feet above sea level. Excellent screening from nearby roads.

EXPANSION POSSIBILITIESWINKLER SITE:

1. By the time construction is completed, this site would be virtually surrounded by commercial and other properties precluding any possible expansion if it should ever become necessary.

LANGLEY SITE:

1. Plenty of Government owned property available if expansion becomes necessary.

TRAFFIC SITUATION*WINKLER SITE:

1. A majority of the employees living in the District of Columbia and Maryland (68

LANGLEY SITE:

1. With the completion of the George Washington Parkway from its present

* Map 2, inside back cover of Volume II, is a copy of the roadway system map of the two sites which appeared in the report.

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(continued)WINKLER SITE:

percent) would be forced to pass through the Pentagon network at the busiest hours of the day, both morning and evening, together with the traffic going to and departing from the Pentagon. The Shirley Highway has now more than reached its capacity, particularly from a point north of the Parkfairfax interchange to the Potomac River crossings, and even if it should be widened to six lanes as far south as King Street it would still be inadequate to accommodate the concentrated peakload that would result from more than 3000 automobiles of the CIA headquarters staff during the morning and evening hours.

2. It would require an estimated three hours and eighteen minutes to empty the parking lot at the Winkler site into the Shirley Highway traffic.

3. From the long range point of view, the traffic situation at the Winkler site would become worse as time went on in view of the increased use of the Shirley Highway by other developments such as Springfield, which is growing rapidly.

LANGLEY SITE:

terminus at Spout Run to the Langley site, together with the improvements already planned to the Key Bridge, CIA traffic can be accommodated without any additional improvements. The George Washington Memorial Parkway has been authorized since 1930 and is badly needed whether or not the Central Intelligence Agency goes to Langley. Congress has made specific provision for its completion now if CIA goes to Langley. Traffic to Langley would be moving largely in the opposite direction to the concentrated flow and would avoid passing through the congested area of Washington, the Pentagon network, etc.

2. It will require one hour and fifteen minutes to empty the parking lot from the Langley site.

3. From a long-range point of view, the traffic situation at the Langley site will gain further superiority over the Winkler site with the construction of the Outer Loop Freeway and the proposed bridge at or near Cabin John.

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TRAFFIC SITUATION
(continued)

WINKLER SITE:LANGLEY SITE:

4. The above points make the Langley site satisfactory in the beginning with continued improvement as the arterial system in this general area *already planned* takes form.

PERSONNEL PROBLEMSResidences

District of Columbia, Northwest	37%
District of Columbia, Northeast	5%
District of Columbia, Southwest	1%
District of Columbia, Southeast	7%
Arlington County, Virginia	15%
Fairfax County, Virginia	8%
City of Alexandria, Virginia	8%
Montgomery County, Maryland	11%
Prince Georges County, Maryland	7%
Miscellaneous	1%

WINKLER SITE:LANGLEY SITE:

1. Inconvenient for the majority of employees who would have to travel long distances to and from the site through the congested area of Washington, through the Pentagon network at the busiest hours of the day, both morning and night, together with the traffic going to and departing from the Pentagon and over an inadequate arterial system.

1. With the authorized construction of the extension to the George Washington Memorial Parkway, very convenient to the majority of CIA employees. More convenient, in fact, than CIA's present headquarters. Traffic to and from site moving in the opposite direction from the major flow, avoiding

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The only alternative to this would be a major relocation of the residences of employees to the Alexandria area.

LANGLEY SITE:

almost entirely the congested area of downtown Washington. No necessity for any major relocation of personnel residences.

2. Adequate acreage available to insure spotting of parking lots near entrances, etc. A dignified setting of which the country would be proud is insured. Working conditions for the employees would be the most ideal.

WATER, SEWER, POWER, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, ETC.

Guaranteed at both sites and at no capital cost to the Federal Government -- Government would merely become a paying customer for services rendered.

COST

With the exception of \$8.5 million to extend the George Washington Memorial Parkway from its present terminus at Spout Run to the Langley site, the cost to the Federal Government will be the same at either site. The extension to the George Washington Memorial Parkway has been on the Statute books since 1930. Certainly it is badly needed now whether or not CIA locates at Langley. There will be few improvements made which ultimately would not be made in the course of time. If the Langley site is selected the parkway, of necessity, will be constructed sooner than it otherwise might be. The same will be true of other highway and public utility improvements. However, the extension of the Parkway and planned improvements to the Key Bridge and Highway No. 123 are the only improvements essential to accommodate CIA traffic to and from the Langley site. The cost of other improvements, most of which are already planned for this area, should definitely not be attached to the CIA project itself.

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The character of the Langley area, which will enable us to have the necessary security arrangements, is a very strong factor in its favor. CIA would like to see the present character of the area maintained insofar as possible. If the zoning board of appeals representing the people of Fairfax County upholds the zoning scheme as at present planned, there need be no cause for concern. In these circumstances the CIA headquarters cannot help but become a distinct asset to the county.

LOCATING IN VIRGINIA

The traffic situation alone, being what it is at the Winkler site, is of great significance. It is highly improbable that there are sites in Virginia other than the Langley site to which a satisfactory traffic situation would obtain and almost certainly none which would compare with the Langley site.

Clarke and Rapuano concluded their report by stating that

the fact remains that the site at Langley is, in our opinion, the best possible site we know to be available which meets the established criteria. We unhesitatingly recommend it.

The next hurdles to overcome were the NCRPC and the NCPC, both of which had to give general approval of CIA location plans before the Agency could proceed with architectural and engineering arrangements.

Copies of the Clarke-Rapuano Report were forwarded by the DCI to both organizations, and on 5 December 1955 the NCRPC met and voted 5 to 3 in favor of the

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Langley site. A temporary setback occurred, however, when the NCPC voted 6 to 5 against the Agency locating its building in Langley.

After the many planning sessions and discussions that had been held and the mass of correspondence that had changed hands before the Agency's presentations to the NCRPC and the NCPC on the Langley site,* there was a period of depression and momentary panic following the adverse decision of the NCPC. The DDS reported that following a "long talk" with Baird Evans, operator of the Evans Coffee Shop and a strong supporter of the Langley site, who wanted to "battle" the NCPC decision,

[I] told him that I could not offer him any advice at this time and that we did not know exactly what we were going to do until we received and analyzed the report from the National Capital Planning Commission. 127/

Even Dulles appears to have had some second thoughts about Langley following the NCPC's turn-down of the site. The DDS noted that "Mr. Dulles saw Chairman Vinson this morning and *was encouraged* by

* The White *Diary Notes* record such activities on 13 September, 17-21 October, 29 October, 21-25 November, and 29 November, among others.

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his indication that he would be willing to support the location of our new building in the District." 128/* Shortly after the turn of the new year (1956), the DDS "agreed with Kirk [Lyman F. Kirkpatrick, Inspector General of CIA] to sit down with Norman Paul [IG staff] and Mr. Dulles to discuss strategy on the building. I believe they feel that we should again abandon Langley." 129/

By mid-January 1956, however, there was a noticeable change in the tone of the DDS's reports on the Langley situation; and attempts by the Federal City Council to elicit Agency interest in locating within the District of Columbia fell on barren ground. 130/ In part this may have been the result of a meeting that Dulles had with Sherman Adams and Colonel Goodpasture on 5 January 1956 to discuss

the President's previously expressed view that CIA should not locate in the District of Columbia.

Both Mr. Adams and Colonel Goodpasture stated that they felt the President would adhere to his original view that CIA should locate outside of the District. Mr. Adams

* Emphasis added by SSHO.

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did not seem particularly disturbed by the fact that the National Capital Planning Commission had recommended against the Langley site by a close vote, or by the fact that certain newspapers and groups of individuals were carrying on a vigorous campaign to insure that CIA did not locate at Langley.

It was agreed that the problem of the CIA building and other CIA problems should be discussed with the President upon his return to Washington. Mr. Dulles indicated that he also felt that Congressional leaders should be consulted before any final decision of [*sic*] the location of the building is made. 131/

With this kind of support the DCI, the DDCI, and the DDS concentrated their efforts on making personal contact with NCPC members, especially several new members,* and on helping prepare the DCI's memorandum to the Chairman of the NCPC requesting reconsideration of the adverse NCPC decision. 133/

On 2 February 1956 the commission met again and voted 7 to 5 in favor of the Langley site. 134/

* One of the new members who voted favorably on the Langley site was Brigadier General David H. Tulley who had replaced Mr. Leon Zach on the National Capital Planning Commission as the Army Engineers' representative. The DDS reported "Through my efforts and those of General Cabell [the DDCI], we were able to convince him that he should reverse the Army Engineers['] vote, which he did at the meeting on 2 February." 132/

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Upon receiving the favorable NCPC decision, the Director forwarded copies of his correspondence with the NCPC chairman to approximately 20 Congressional and State leaders, including Representative Clarence Cannon, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations, and Senator Carl Hayden, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. In this transmittal to the Congressmen, the Director extended his appreciation to all of those involved during the long and difficult process of reaching this final decision, which placed the Agency in a position to proceed with plans and preliminary work in accordance with authorizing legislation and appropriations approved by Congress.

One remaining major problem confronting the Agency was noted by the CIA Legislative Counsel at the time as follows:

It would apparently be impossible to house all the CIA employees in a building which could be constructed for the \$46 million initially authorized by the Congress. It could barely be done, if at all, with the \$50 million which the Agency had originally requested from the Congress and, since the authorizing legislation of 1955, construction prices had risen about 5.7% with some prospects of a similar rise in the forthcoming

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year. At this point Mr. Dulles, on the basis of advice received from his staff, felt that he should ask the Congress in 1956 for \$10 million additional authorization as well as for the remaining \$49 million of the original authorization for the building and the Parkway. He discussed this matter with key government officials and key leaders on Capitol Hill. The latter were not very receptive at this point, although many of them expressed sympathy with our problem in response to Mr. Dulles' oral briefings and the subsequent letters which he sent them. In May 1956, Senator Russell, whose wisdom in such matters was outstanding, advised the Director that this would not be a good time to seek additional authorization, due to the fact that it was late in the session and in a Presidential election year. He felt that CIA should get as much of the authorized funds as they could in the current session, and then perhaps return in January 1957 for an additional authorization when we had firmer figures. This was basically the route that was followed. On 1 June 1956, the DCI appeared before the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee in support of the remaining \$49 million of our authorization and this was approved by the Committee and the House in the Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1957.

When the bill reached the Senate Appropriations Committee, however, Mr. Dulles had raised with them the possibility that an additional \$10 million authorization might be required. This brought the particular opposition of Senator John Stennis (D., Miss.) both at the hearing and in a statement on the floor of the Senate on 9 July 1956. He felt that CIA could certainly construct

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an appropriate building for its people with the \$46 million authorized. In addition, he pointed out that, while Mr. Dulles had cited a construction cost rise of 5.7% since the original authorization, the DCI's possible request for an additional \$10 million was an increase of more than 21% over the initial authorization. As a result, the Senate Appropriations Committee threw two serious hookers into their approval of the \$49 million appropriation. The first restriction was a directive that CIA should plan to house all of its headquarters personnel within the limits of the \$46 million authorized for construction. The second was that these funds should not be obligated or spent until the Chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission should certify that written commitments had been obtained from the appropriate local authorities for the financing and construction of roads, sewage treatment plants, public transport and other local facilities which the Commission deemed necessary to service the selected site. This latter restriction probably reflected certain doubts and questions which the Commission had raised in their reports in first turning down and subsequently approving CIA use of the Langley site. 135/

The Legislative Counsel further noted that after the "hookers"* were announced,

A study of the authority of the National Capital Planning Commission indicated to the General Counsel that

* The term "hookers" was quickly adopted and commonly applied to the Congressional caveats by Agency personnel who were closely involved in the negotiations with Congress.

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they did not have the authority which the Senate Appropriations Committee had directed them to exercise. Furthermore, involving them at such a point would open a real can of worms. The problem of the Committee directive, which would, in effect, house all of CIA personnel in a building constructed for \$46 million was also difficult. Mr. Dulles had already surfaced to the Committee the possibility that we would have to retain the permanent buildings at 2430 E Street except for the building which would be displaced by the new throughway as well as certain other permanent construction buildings in which we were presently housed. The only assurance that we were able to make was that we would vacate all of our temporary buildings. As a result, language somewhat less restrictive to that drafted by the Senate Appropriations Committee was drafted and submitted to the Key members of the Senate and House Appropriations Committee who would be involved in the compromise between the House and Senate versions as conferees. These restrictions, which appeared in the Conference Report, but not in the law itself, provided that the Agency make "every effort" to construct a building which would accommodate all its headquarters personnel within the provided amount of \$46 million and also directed that these funds not be spent in such a way as to make it necessary for the Congress to authorize additional funds at a later date. The conferees eliminated the requirement of certification by the Chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission but directed that none of the funds be obligated or spent until the DCI had obtained written commitments from the appropriate local authorities regarding the construction of roads, sewage treatment plants,

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public transportation and other local facilities necessary to service the site. With these caveats* in its Conference Report, the Congress then passed the Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1957, authorizing the appropriation to CIA of \$49 million which covered the remaining sums for the building construction and the extension of the Parkway. The bill became law on 27 July 1956. On 8 November 1956, the DDA [subsequently the DDS] sent a memorandum to the DCI stating that the necessary written commitments from the local authorities and facilities had been received and the DCI approved this memorandum on 12 November, thus complying with that particular caveat of the Congress. 137/

* The official language in the report read:

The Committee directs that the Agency make every effort to construct a building to accommodate all of its headquarters personnel within the sum provided, and directs that none of these funds be spent in such a way as to make it necessary for the Congress to authorize additional funds at a later date.

The Committee further directs that none of these funds be obligated or spent until the Director of Central Intelligence has obtained from the appropriate local authorities written commitments for the construction of roads, sewage treatment plants, public transport, and of other local facilities which are deemed necessary to service the site selected. 136/

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The first of the two conditions was a continuing one and to this date (1972) has remained a sore point for the Agency in resolving its space problems. Although there was considerable discussion regarding the need for additional funding -- including a high-powered delegation to Senator Vinson's office in mid-January 1956* -- no further action was taken in

* An excerpt from White's *Diary Notes* for 16 January 1956 says:

Accompanied Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Amory, and Mr. Paul to the briefing of Chairman Vinson's Committee in the Senate Office Building. We went into the CIA budget, the number of personnel we have, and our building situation. Aside from this the briefing was largely on the world situation. Mr. Vinson announced his intention to have such a meeting once a month, and as a result of the continued interest in manpower Mr. Dulles asked that we prepare a presentation of about thirty minutes in justification of our personnel strength. With regard to the building, Mr. Vinson feels very strongly that we should have whatever authorization and appropriation are necessary to get all our Washington people and activities into one building. Mr. Dulles suggested that he discuss this with Senator Hayden and also stated that we would want to touch base with the Executive Branch before starting any action on legislation.

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connection with the Headquarters building.*

An interesting anecdote is provided by the Curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection. It seems that at one of Dulles's early Congressional hearings,

Dulles had an artist's rendition of what the front of the building would look like. Presumably it had been prepared in the Office of Harrison and Abramovitz. One of the features of that drawing was a large pool of water in front of the main entrance which is now occupied by the grass plot. A member of Congress, in the course of the hearing, asked Mr. Dulles with some shock whether he really proposed to have a swimming pool in front of the building. Almost within a matter of minutes, on his return to Headquarters the blue pool was painted over green for grass. 139/

The Building Planning Staff, 1955-1957

In January 1955 Agency components had resubmitted their space requirement for a total of 1,646,000.

* The man who was the Agency Legislative Counsel at the time recalls that "One factor not raised in the basic study was a legal problem that was given careful consideration and was discussed in the course of Congressional hearings. This was the question as to whether we would proceed by direct appropriation for the building or work out a lease-purchase agreement. It was finally concluded that the latter route presented many difficulties and additional costs, and it was agreed to go forward by direct appropriation." 138/

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net square feet for 10,066 Agency employees. The job of reducing these estimates fell to BPS, with instructions to do further analysis and study of the requirements to bring them in line with the authorized available funds of \$46 million. It appeared to be the consensus of BPS, PBS, and the steering committee that only under the most favorable circumstances could CIA build a facility in excess of 1,500,000 net square feet for less than the authorization. 140/

The mission and objectives of BPS* were defined as follows:

In the interest of effective Agency planning for the proposed headquarters building, it is necessary to determine the requirements of every organizational element in the Agency. It is considered

* As the need for the construction of an Agency Headquarters building became apparent in the early 1950's, it was recognized that the Office of Security should also play a significant role in the building planning. In January 1952 White, then the DDA, told Colonel Sheffield Edwards, then Assistant Deputy Director for Inspection and Security, that a representative of the Office of Security should take an active part in the planning from then on. The establishment of the Building Planning Staff by the DDA on 10 October 1955 formalized this arrangement. For complete details of significant contributions made by the Office of Security, see Support Services Historical Series, OS-3, Security Program of the CIA, *Physical Security*, Jun 72, pp. 239-259, S.

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desirable that there be coordinated participation by representatives of all components of the Agency. It is necessary, however, that there be centralized Agency control and guidance by qualified architectural engineers, space analysts, and security and management officers to ensure that these requirements conform to technical architectural and engineering principles and standards, as well as principles of economy, security, and sound management.

The mission and objectives of the liaison group to BPS were defined as follows:

These officers have been charged with the responsibility of supervising, directing and coordinating the development of requirements for all types of space by the individual organization elements within the respective areas of their jurisdiction. They are each authorized to represent their respective Deputy Director in all matters related to the development of requirements and shall be the primary liaison contact with the Building Planning Staff. They shall ensure that information required by the Building Planning Staff is developed and submitted in accordance with the instructions and guidance provided by the Building Planning Staff. 141/

Several members of BPS, including Riley, McKinley, and [] visited the NSA building planning group on frequent occasions to survey and

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coordinate certain requirements of mutual interest.*
One of the first assignments given the new BPS
Project Officer, Holloway, was a comparison study
of the plan followed by the Air Force for the construction of the US Air Force Academy near Colorado Springs, Colorado. CIA was approaching the time when a decision would have to be made as to a design and construction management agent, and some suggested the need for a parallel to the "Air Academy Construction

* McKinley met and recruited [] Architect-Engineer, on such an occasion. [] had served NSA as a military officer and as a staff employee during the early planning of the new NSA Headquarters Building at Fort Meade, Maryland, from September 1953 to 9 December 1955, when he joined CIA as a contract employee to BPS/OL. After a short period of private practice, [] became a staff architect on 24 April 1962 and a CIA career employee of the RECD/OL on 24 April 1967. He later assumed the leadership responsibilities of the architect group after the resignation of [] in 1959 even though he was at that time only a WAE (When Actually Employed) employee working two or three days a week. 142/ Presently (1973) [] is Chief, Engineering Branch, RECD/OL. [] the third architect, came to the Agency at age 25 as a Junior Officer Trainee (JOT) from Princeton University in October 1957 after a short period of military service with the US Navy. He resigned in September 1960 to join the Commission of Fine Arts, Executive Office of the President, 143/ and since 1964 he has been the Executive Secretary to the Fine Arts Commission.

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Agency," which was established to administer the planning and construction for the Air Force Chief of Staff; but that Agency had its own architect-engineering, construction, administrative, and comptroller divisions, which handled all liaison, contracts, follow-up on construction, and the like. The US Air Materiel Command was not involved in the arrangement. The Air Academy Construction Agency had a T/O of 152 -- 132 civilians and 20 military personnel -- to administer the services of the architectural and constructional firms required for the \$106 million Academy project. 144/ This was a staff far in excess of that available to BPS.*

The duties and responsibilities of the C/BPS/OL were defined on 4 October 1955:

The Chief, Building Planning Staff, shall be responsible for the administration and executive management of

* Manpower available to BPS was also considerably below that available for the new \$49.7 million State Department Headquarters, which would soon occupy four city blocks as an extension of the "New War Department Building" at 320 21st Street, N.W. For this project, GSA Administrator Edmund F. Mansure awarded a joint-venture contract to three architectural firms on 16 January 1956. 145/

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all matters related to planning for the proposed Agency headquarters building. He shall be the primary Agency planning officer, and, as such, he shall provide general guidance and direction to ensure the development and maintenance of building requirements to meet established architectural and engineering standards. He shall also ensure that requirements are developed in accordance with sound principles of security, management, and economy.

In the absence of the Director of Logistics, [] was made directly responsible to the DDS. 146/

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On 1 December 1955 CIA's Congressional relations activities were transferred from the Office of the General Counsel to the Office of the Inspector General, and [] succeeded Pforzheimer as

Legislative Counsel. [] and []

[] of the Office of the General Counsel were

active in the preparation of numerous studies and legal briefs for BPS and the Agency steering committee during this period. 147/*

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* For "CIA Organizational Arrangement for the Development of Definitive Plans for a Permanent Headquarters Building," dated 4 October 1955, see Appendix I.

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Selection of the Architect and Construction Agent,
1955-1956

Because all early planning -- including the compiling of cost and special requirement estimates -- had been worked out through GSA and because the Agency did not have the large construction organization required to carry out properly the detailed planning and contract supervision, it was finally determined on 6 February 1956 that PBS/GSA would act as agent for the CIA headquarters project. 148/ This decision did not come easily, for by September 1955 senior planners were still studying the relative merits of having the Army Engineers, the PBS, or the architectural firm (once it was chosen) act in this supervisory capacity. 149/* As late as 17 February

* With reference to the question of whether the CIA directly or the GSA (as agent for CIA) would supervise construction, the Curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection has noted that

Section 401 of our basic building authorization act of 1955 was carefully drafted to authorize the DCI to provide for a Headquarters installation rather than having the usual authorization running to the Administrator of GSA, and it was passed in that form. This placed in the Director's hands the control over the design and construction of our facility. It was
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1956 the DDS and the DCI were again considering the advisability of selecting an outstanding retired US Army Engineer to take overall charge of the construction project. Lieutenant General Samuel Sturgis, Chief of Army Engineers, and four others were being considered.* Colonel Stanley J. Grogan, Assistant to the Director, described the generals under study as "professional types, aggressive, practical-minded, somewhat hard-bitten engineers, who, I think would get definite effective results in a minimum of time." 151/ The DDS and the DCI were uncertain as to the exact role such an officer should play with relation to the Architect-Engineer and particularly to PBS. On 17 February 1956 the DDS noted that "The right man in a smooth relationship could be a real asset ... failure of such an individual to win

only after considerable debate and study of the pros and cons that it was finally agreed to place this responsibility in GSA hands. 150/

* In addition to Sturgis, Generals Daniel Noce, Stanley L. Scott, Cecil R. Moore, and Hugh J. Casey were recommended to the DCI.

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complete acceptance ... could make him a definite liability." 152/

Perhaps the reality of the "definite liability" danger was of some concern to the DCI and the DDS because of an unpleasant situation that had developed in August 1955 involving Commissioner Peter A. Strobel of PBS. At a meeting on 9 August 1955 between the DCI and Edward Mansure, Administrator of GSA, the following agreement had been reached on the selection of architectural firms:

In asking the architects Harrison & Abramovitz and F. R. King to act as architects, with any other architects who might be associated with them, for the new Headquarters for CIA, Mr. Dulles requested, and Mr. Mansure agreed, that Mr. Harrison, with Mr. Dulles' approval, have the final decision as to which plans or designs would be submitted. In Mr. Harrison's absence this responsibility will be assumed on his behalf by Mr. Abramovitz or Mr. King.

This agreement was acceptable to PBS/GSA as written; it was dated 12 August 1955 and signed by P. A. Strobel, Commissioner, PBS. 153/

On the same day that he signed the agreement, Strobel -- apparently in response to real or imagined political pressures -- wrote a letter to the firm of

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deYoung, Moscovitz, and Rosenberg informing them that they had been chosen to be architectural associates of Harrison & Abramovitz. This was directly contrary to the arrangements that the Agency believed had already received the full concurrence of PBS/GSA, and on 18 August 1955 White addressed the following blunt letter to Strobel:

Dear Mr. Strobel:

I have just received the copies of your letter of 12 August 1955 to Mr. Moscovitz and Mr. Harrison which I requested after you read them to me on the telephone this morning. While I was aware that you had considered the firm of deYoung, Moscovitz, and Rosenberg as a possible affiliate to Harrison & Abramovitz on the architectural-engineering contract for the Central Intelligence Agency's building, there is no foundation whatsoever for your statement in your letter to Mr. Moscovitz that this firm had been selected by the Central Intelligence Agency.

At the various meetings on 9 August between the Director of Central Intelligence, the Administrator of General Services, Mr. Harrison, and others, including yourself, it was made quite clear that the question of affiliation and the candidates therefor would be considered but that no decision would be made without further study and discussion with Mr. Harrison. Therefore any commitment or even discussion of affiliation with any other firm is premature.

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It is essential that the precise situation be made quite clear to Mr. Moscovitz in writing at the earliest opportunity. This implies no criticism whatsoever of the firm of deYoung, Moscovitz, and Rosenberg, but would apply equally to any other firm that might have been put in this same position. The magnitude and complexity of this construction project require the most careful consideration by all concerned in the initial steps.

As you know, we hope to work out a mutually satisfactory arrangement with the General Services Administration for carrying out this project, but unless and until our respective roles are clearly delineated and agreed upon, I must request that all actions of any nature whatever by the General Services Administration with regard to this project be concurred in fully and in writing by the Central Intelligence Agency in advance.

This letter, in fact, became the basis for the formal agreement executed between Dulles and Mansure, representing GSA, on 6 February 1956. 154/*

* Walter Pforzheimer recalls that "Rarely was Director Dulles so angry as when he was apprised of Strobel's unauthorized designation of a co-architect for the building. Strobel's conflicts in this and on other occasions were brought out at Congressional hearings (U.S. Congress, House, Committee of the Judiciary. Antitrust Subcommittee Hearings, *Activities of Peter Strobel*, 1955). They are also discussed in a recent book entitled *Conflict of Interest in the Eisenhower Administration* by David A. Frier. (Ames, Iowa: Iowa University Press, 1969, pp. 91-102 and, in particular, p. 99)." 155/

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At this point it is necessary to review in some detail the circumstances and events leading up to White's letter to Commissioner Strobel. At the request of Sherman Adams, the Assistant to President Eisenhower, Major General John S. Bragdon* and Mansure called on the DCI in his office on 21 April 1955 to discuss a broad range of Government construction policies. One subject was the removal of temporary buildings, and the other was the possibility of meeting CIA's needs by building a small headquarters in the Washington area and a large "workshop" well away from the city. 156/ At this meeting Bragdon and Mansure strongly urged Dulles to select an architect at an early date. This advice was very much to the point for the potential candidates were beginning to put out feelers. In the early summer of 1955, the DDS recorded that

Eddie Mathews of Skidmore, Owings,
and Merrill was in for about an hour

* Bragdon was in the class of 1915 at West Point (the President's class). He had an impressive record with the Army Engineers; and under President Eisenhower he was appointed Special Assistant to the President, specifically as an advisor on construction.

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to discuss our building with us. He would like very much to have us select his company to do the architectural work. In view of the admonition which we received on the Hill from Congressman Mahon and Senator Stennis. I doubt if this would be a wise idea. They are pretty unhappy about what Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill have done to the Air Force Academy. 157/

In July 1955, during a meeting between PBS and the Agency, the relationships between the DDS and Strobel first came to some strain over the matter of an architect. Again the entries in the White diaries provide the details of what would continue to be an off-again-on-again relationship with GSA/PBS throughout the construction activity. White recorded:

Jim Garrison, [] and I met with Pete Strobel, Fred Poorman, and Len Hunter of the Public Buildings Service to discuss architectural services. After a good half hour of talking about inconsequential matters, Pete finally got to the point of the meeting by saying that now that we were in a position to select an architect the Public Buildings Service considered such a selection to be its prerogative. This led to a long and very frank discussion during which I told Pete that I disagreed very strongly with him, that we did not consider this to be a PBS prerogative, and that we expected to participate fully in the selection of an architect, as well as on other aspects of this building. I emphasized to him that Mr. Dulles had given the Congress his personal

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on the Memorandum of Understanding which I think is necessary in any case.* 159/

PBS followed through with a list of potential architects, and the DCI wrote Mansure on 3 August 1955:

I reviewed the list of architectural firms to which the Public Buildings Service mailed questionnaires and my representatives have examined the responses of some 57 of these firms which have been returned to date. Of these, it appears that Harrison and Abramovitz is at this time in a particularly good position to undertake this work and I am personally very much aware of their outstanding reputation. I have personally known Mr. Wallace K. Harrison for many years and believe that he, as well as his partner, are particularly qualified to deal with certain of the specialized problems involved in a building for CIA. Subject to negotiation of a satisfactory contract, I should like to select this firm to perform the architectural and engineering services for their construction. I trust that this selection will be agreeable to you as I desire to proceed immediately with the necessary preliminary negotiations. 160/

The DDS and Dulles had met briefly with Harrison on the same day, 3 August 1955. Highlights of that

* This meticulous attention to detailed record keeping was characteristic of White throughout his tenure as deputy and then chief of the Agency's Support Directorate. In fact, he continued his daily diaries as Executive Director-Comptroller.

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meeting in New York were as follows: Harrison stated that he would be delighted to undertake the project but suggested that he would like to bring some of his associates down to Washington to discuss the project in more detail. Harrison said that he understood thoroughly the possibility that problems with GSA could not be worked out satisfactorily and that he was not out soliciting new business. The DCI was leaving for Europe on 13 August 1955, so the next meeting was arranged for 9 August in the DCI's Washington office. The DDS then agreed to assemble all pertinent data for Harrison's party to scan before the meeting so that the nature of the problem would be understood. 161/

The DCI sent a plane to bring Harrison to Washington as scheduled, and included in the group were James Dawson of Harrison and Abramovitz, Frederick King of Wyeth and King, Associated Architect, and Michael Rapuano. CIA personnel participating were White, Lloyd, Garrison, [REDACTED], and Houston. White later noted in his diary that

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The briefing was designed to familiarize Mr. Harrison's party with the background of our authorization, appropriation, site

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study, etc., and to discuss the CIA/GSA/ architect relationship. In this regard Mr. Dulles made it clear to Mr. Harrison that we would defer to his judgment in the selection of any associate architect as well as the manner in which he would be associated. Mr. Harrison stated that through his long years of experience in working with other people in many projects, but particularly Rockefeller Center and the United Nations Building, he had become firmly convinced that it was necessary to have one person authorized to make final decisions with regard to design. He indicated very nicely that while he, personally, did not necessarily wish to have this authority he thought that it should be placed in one person, either himself, Mr. Abramovitz, or possibly Mr. King. He said that he would want to make this quite clear in our subsequent discussions with GSA. Mr. Dulles emphasized his desire to have Mr. Harrison make and be responsible for all such decisions and stated that he would so advise GSA representatives.

The memorandum for the record that covered the entire meeting provided more details. The group that met in the DCI's office was joined for lunch by Mansure; Strobel; Frederick S. Poorman, Deputy Commissioner of PBS; and Leonard L. Hunter, Supervising Architect for PBS. During the luncheon the building problem was discussed only in broad generalities. After lunch, Dulles, White, Harrison, King, Mansure, and Strobel adjourned to Dulles' office. The DCI opened this discussion by saying

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to Mansure, in substance, that CIA representatives had been working together on this project for some time but the responsibility for the building and the funds involved therewith rested clearly with the DCI. He stated that he had persuaded Harrison to be the architect on this project and that he wanted architectural and other services arranged in a way that would be entirely satisfactory to him.

Harrison then repeated his earlier statements to this group. He emphasized that he was not concerned about the fee or who got paid how much, but that he felt very strongly that some *one* person must be responsible for making decisions, particularly with regard to design, in the event that controversies arose. He also said that he would want the relationship of any associate architect very clearly spelled out prior to such association in order to avoid misunderstandings at a later date. Dulles emphasized that he wanted it definitely understood that Harrison would be the "boss" when these decisions were made.

Strobel suggested that with Harrison's outstanding reputation there would certainly be no

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question that his word would be the final one in the event of a controversy. Dulles pressed this point, however, by stating that he wanted to make sure that it was understood and that he would like to put it in writing. Strobel protested mildly the subordination of the associate architect and explained that GSA normally let separate contracts to the principal and associate architects. After some discussion, however, it was decided and agreed that the association, if any, would be worked out in accordance with Harrison's desires. It was further agreed that after visiting the Langley and Winkler properties further discussions would take place.

Mansure then went into quite a discourse about the various political pressures that were brought to bear on him in the selection of architects. While reiterating that he had never succumbed to the pressures of the National Republican Committee, he stated that he and his people certainly had to be on the lookout to handle them carefully; and he went into great detail, most confidentially, about pressures being put upon him by Senator Dirksen and many others. There was no question but that politics would, in

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his mind, play a part in the selection of an architect, although he put it on the basis of trying to spread the workload around as much as possible and to make sure that no one firm would get all the plums. He also agreed, however, that the system that Harrison desired could be worked out.

Following Mansure's discourse, Dulles told him that he knew that he, Mansure, was well aware of his, Dulles's, long Republican record and background; but he stated that when he took the job as DCI he determined to keep his official business and his politics separate. The DCI said that he had lived up to this religiously, had always been backed by the President, and was sure that the President would support him in this policy. He emphasized that when individuals came to the Agency for employment no one asked their politics, that it was absolutely essential that this Agency be kept completely free from political influence and pressure, and that he wanted politics to have nothing to do with the construction of a new CIA building. The meeting ended with friendly agreement that the entire procedure

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could be worked out to the satisfaction of both Harrison and Dulles.*

The party then went to inspect the Langley and Winkler properties. It was obvious that everyone, including the GSA representative, favored the Langley property. Harrison thought that it was a beautiful site for a building, one of which the Agency could be proud. He said that the Winkler property would have been just an office building on a parking lot, and he wanted to proceed with the Langley site without further delay. 163/

The group broke up after the inspection trip, and it seemed -- to the DCI, the DDS, and Harrison, at least -- that the meeting had produced definite

* Mansure raised the subject of political pressures in a subsequent meeting shortly after the one in question. The DDS reported: "Mr. Mansure ... pursued about the same line that he did in discussing this matter with Mr. Dulles, Mr. Harrison, and others when we all met a couple of months ago. Specifically, he said he was under terrific pressure from both the Republican National Committee and the Government Operations Committee to take charge of construction such as ours and that while his selection of an architect would not be a political choice it certainly would be a firm which the National Committee approved of. ... Mr. Mansure said that he didn't care whether or not GSA did the building, but that if they *did not* then he wanted to be taken off the hook both legally and politically." 162/

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agreements on working principles, primarily the agreement that there would be absolutely no politics applied to the selection of associate architects and that final authority for actual selection of associates rested with the DCI. Three days after the meeting, Strobel wrote his letter to Moscovitz -- the 12 August letter that generated White's stormy reply of 18 August.

About a year later, at the end of the summer of 1956, it appeared that most major problems had been dealt with -- or at least headed in the right direction. A last-ditch attempt by the NCPC to block the Langley site was reported by the DDS:

Attended a meeting of a committee appointed by the National Capital Planning Commission to respond to Senator Chavez' request for sites in the District of Columbia on which it might be suitable to construct our new building. As usual, Jack Nolen had drafted the paper in a vein which would make it appear fairly simple for us to locate in the District. The committee -- composed of Mr. Remon, Vice-Chairman of the Planning Commission, Mr. Hunter of the Public Buildings Service, Colonel Carlson of the Army Engineers, and Colonel Hunter of the Engineer Commissioner's office for the District ... was quite reasonable, however, and when I pointed out that it would cost \$10,000,000 more to buy land and another \$10,000,000 to take care of the structural changes

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and ornamental embellishments they agreed to put this in their report. They also agreed to put in their report that CIA had special requirements, particularly of a security nature, which the committee was unable to evaluate. Of several sites, including our present location, the National Training School for Boys, Southwest Washington, the Bureau of Standards, and Soldiers' Home, it was concluded generally that the National Training School for Boys and our present location were the most favorable. I do not believe that anything will come of this report, and, in fact, it may get back to Senator Chavez after our Bill has already been marked up by Senator Hayden's Committee. I think we are far enough ahead of them in this instance that it is not likely to cause trouble. 164/

The effort came to naught, as White predicted, and the Langley site held firm;* the construction-agent agreement had been executed; as of 5 July 1956 the architect-engineering firm of Harrison and Abramovitz was under contract, with a fee set at \$1,975,150**; and the Congress was about to

* A deed of cession was executed by the Governor and Attorney General of Virginia for that state and by the DCI (Dulles) for the US Government. This resulted from a joint effort of Garrison, then the Director of Logistics; []; and the General Counsel, Houston. It ensured the orderly cooperation of Agency authorities with the Virginia state and county governments with respect to protection and administration of the Headquarters property at Langley.

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** The contract was executed by the new PBS Commissioner, F. Morgan McConihe.

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appropriate \$49 million, which constituted the balance of the funds authorized.* The main provisions of the construction agreement were that architectural-engineering work would be performed by Harrison and Abramovitz; all sketches, plans, estimates, and specifications would be approved by both PBS and CIA; and PBS would execute all construction contracts subject to prior approval by CIA. 165/

An interesting and troublesome irritant in the selection of the architectural and engineering firm for the new building was provided by the continued pressure from various Congressmen to promote favorite firms as either principal or associated contractors. Representative Broyhill, who has already been mentioned as attempting to look out for his northern Virginia constituents,

made a special plea that a Northern Virginia architect be associated with the firm of Harrison & Abramovitz in connection with the construction of our proposed new headquarters building and requested specifically that such an associate architect be the firm of Willgoos & Chase. 166/

* Public Law 814, 84th Congress, 27 July 1956.

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Reporting on the meeting with Broyhill and Willgoos, the DDS noted that

I stated that we were sympathetic to the idea of having a "local" architect associated with Harrison & Abramovitz but that no decision in this regard, even a preliminary decision, had been reached... .

Congressman Broyhill and Mr. Willgoos indicated that they would like to go back to the General Services Administration and I agreed to advise the Congressman when we had been in touch with Mr. Floete, the new Administrator of General Services. (I believe that he then plans to try to see Mr. Floete on behalf of Willgoos & Chase.)

I contacted Congressman Broyhill by telephone on 20 February [1956] and advised him that Mr. Dulles had talked with Mr. Floete. He appreciated this advice and said that he would proceed to make an appointment to see Mr. Floete. 167/

Shortly after this episode the DDS prepared another memorandum for the record which not only noted some Senatorial interest in the architectural-engineering contracts but also some apparent collaboration with Representative Broyhill on the matter. White's memorandum read as follows:

On 1 March 1956 Mr. Dulles advised me that he had just received a telephone call from Senator Styles Bridges [New Hampshire] with regard to

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architectural services in connection with our proposed new building (the Senator has telephoned on at least two previous occasions in support of Williams, Coile & Blanchard), at which time the Senator had stated that it was his understanding that interested congressmen (presumably Republicans who are interested in this matter) would be satisfied to have the firm of Williams, Coile & Blanchard participate in the architectural and engineering aspects of our building project *provided the firm of Willgoos & Chase was also associated in some way.*

I explained to Mr. Dulles that I had not discussed this matter with anyone except Congressman Broyhill, who had brought Mr. Willgoos to see me some time ago, and emphasized that I had not brought the matter to the attention of Senators Byrd or Robertson. I also told him that we had done nothing with the General Services Administration inasmuch as he had requested that we not proceed until Mr. Floete was in office and we had had a chance to talk with him.* 168/

At the time the DCI appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee on 11 July 1956, he made another plea -- a concerted effort to have the previously denied funds restored:

* Emphasis added. An inquiry had also come from the office of Senator Gordon Allott (Colorado) in the winter of 1956 concerning the "status of our architectural arrangements for the new building," but it is not known if there was any follow-up to this inquiry or if any specific firm was recommended by the Senator. 169/

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I hope you will concur in my view that it would be false economy not to construct a building adequate to house all of our people. The basic facilities such as heating, air-conditioning, elevators, etc., are being designed to service a building which would accommodate all of our employees. In January when our final plans will be nearing completion, in the judgment of the Congress, it seems wise to request that our enabling legislation be amended in order to provide for a building costing approximately \$56 million, I would propose to make such a request along with a request for the necessary appropriation (approximately \$10 million) with which to carry out the construction.

As noted earlier,* however, Congress denied an increase in additional funds; and in appropriating the \$49 million it placed the two caveats in Senate Report No. 2580, Chapter III of the Supplemental Appropriations Bill of 1957. By the fall of 1956 the DDS was able to write to the DCI:

You will recall that in appropriating the balance of the funds for the building, the Congress laid down two conditions which are contained in the Conference Report. ...

The first of these conditions [that an attempt be made to house all HQ personnel in the new building and that

* See pp. 90-93.

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no additional appropriation be requested] is of a continuing nature. In satisfaction of the second, written commitments have been obtained from the appropriate local authorities (and private utilities) [to provide all necessary public services and utilities to the building]. ...

In my opinion and that of the General Counsel, the written commitments obtained satisfy the condition[s] laid down by the Congress. It is recommended that you approve this conclusion, thereby authorizing the obligation and expenditure of the appropriated funds, or their transfer to other Government agencies as may be necessary. 170/

Approval was granted on 12 November 1956, 171/ and on 29 January 1957 the DDS forwarded a memorandum to the Director of Logistics:

1. The attached paper was presented orally by me and discussed at the Deputies' Meeting on 28 January 1957. The Director approved of the recommendations contained in subparagraphs a. and b. of paragraph 6. His decision with regard to the recommendation contained in subparagraph c. thereof must await the outcome of his discussions with certain members of the Congress. However, on the assumption that we will not seek an additional authorization and appropriations at this time he has requested that letters be drafted to the President and the Chairman of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees advising them of our situation and plan of procedure. In this connection I have requested the Comptroller to submit these to me as soon as possible.

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2. Regardless of whether we seek an additional authorization and appropriation at this time or at some later date we definitely will proceed with our present plan for a \$46,000,000 building. If an additional authorization and funds are made available at a subsequent time we will augment our building either by adding a wing or by constructing a separate building at the same location.* 172/

* An additional problem of construction funds was under consideration about this same time, and an extract from White's *Diary Notes* indicates an awareness of the need to insure that there would be no interference with the Headquarters construction appropriation. Speaking of a meeting of the Project Review Committee, the then DDS recorded:

The Records Center Project was concurred in by everyone except Bob Amory [then the DDI] who nonconcurred. It is his belief that he can slow down the flow of documents to the Center for a while and that very shortly his Minicard system will be able to solve the whole problem without additional construction. It was the opinion of the remaining members of the Committee that the Minicard would not develop in sufficient time. (In this connection, I must advise [] to look into the Minicard problem carefully and be prepared to respond when the Director makes an inquiry, which he almost certainly will.) *It was, of course, understood by everyone that we would touch base with the Bureau of the Budget prior to undertaking this construction and that it would be handled in such a way that it would not jeopardize our new building. [Emphasis added.]* 173/

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A copy of the memorandum was also sent to the Inspector General, among other senior officials. The response from the IG, then Lyman Kirkpatrick, amounted to an almost personal attack on the integrity of the DDS; and it implied that the DCI was being advised to conceal from Congress the fact that not all of the personnel in the Headquarters area could be housed in the new building.* 174/ In fact, however, it had been made abundantly clear to the Congress, to the BOB, and to other interested parties that unless the Agency were given an increased appropriation this would be the result. In any event, the DDS was taken aback, and he recorded that

I showed Mr. Dulles the memorandum that I had received from Lyman Kirkpatrick dated 4 February 1957, subject; "Planning for the Proposed New Headquarters Building," and told him that I was not concerned about it myself, but that inasmuch as Mr. Kirkpatrick was his

* A copy of the IG's memorandum is attached as Appendix J. The subject of the relationship of the IG to other Agency components is a history in itself, but it is apparent in the research materials on the Headquarters construction that the pulling and hauling between the DDS and the IG was rather severe.

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Inspector General I thought he ought to be aware of its content. He read the memorandum, was obviously not pleased with it, and told me to forget it and proceed in accordance with our earlier discussions. He did say that he had no objection to having a Steering Committee Meeting on this matter but that in all honesty he saw no purpose in doing so. I agreed and we let it go at that. 175/

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~~SECRET~~Chapter IIIThe Design and Construction Stage

Topographic surveys of the Langley site were prepared during the summer of 1956 by the firm of Harry Otis Wright, Engineers, of Fairfax, Virginia. 176/ Soil tests, including seven borings, were completed during August 1956 by the Raymond Concrete Pile Company of Washington, and these reports were submitted to the construction agent, GSA, and the architects, Harrison and Abramovitz (H&A). * 177/

As of 31 December 1956 the Agency's space-occupancy position for the departmental area was 1,486,450 net square feet occupied at more than 40 locations. 178/ BPS was again charged with the task of recommending the best method of reducing Agency

* Test boring proceeded even though the basic site of 131.563 acres at Langley was not officially transferred to CIA until 15 March 1957, and all agreements were accepted and signed on 5 April 1957. See Appendix K for site acquisition data and site location.

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headquarters requirements when compiling the next "Space Directive."*

The Design of the Superstructure, 1956-1958

Members of BPS visited the offices of the architect-engineer in New York at frequent intervals during the design stage of the planning. On one such visit [] Anderson, and Ambrose reviewed some 15 to 20 schematic sketches related to site grade and other site conditions. The necessity for the preliminary site investigation to establish subsurface conditions was apparent. BPS had arranged for a contract whereby from seven to ten auger borings were made in designated locations. Harrison insisted that the diagrammatic drawings for this phase be done in his New York office because he and Abramovitz were necessarily very much involved.

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In addition to the site planning, Harrison further indicated that H&A must know what was going

* Whether or not the BPS "best" method would be acceptable seems doubtful. The DDS reported that in a Deputies' meeting regarding possible adjustments to get more square footage, "... the Director indicated that he didn't want to go 'all out' on austerity." 179/

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into every space in the building. This led to a further briefing regarding relationships of Agency components and space characteristic requirements, and in May 1956 H&A had in their office coded organizational charts, cluster diagrams, and the coded Space Directive -- components to office level. It appeared that weekly meetings, either in New York or Washington, with PBS, H&A, and BPS representatives would be necessary to effect expeditious completion of the diagrammatic drawings. 180/

On 15 November 1956 the Acting Commissioner of PBS wrote to the DCI outlining the various meetings and special studies completed to date, all of which covered the general scheme to be followed. H&A had submitted a tentative schedule of work, which PBS felt was realistic, considering the scope of the design project. The schedule was as follows:

- (1) Diagrammatic drawings: to be submitted 7 December 1956
- (2) Tentative drawings: to be submitted 30 January 1957
- (3) Working drawings: to be submitted for review 26 August 1957

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- (4) Corrected final drawings and specifications: to be submitted 4 October 1957
- (5) Advertise for bids: 18 October 1957
- (6) Open bids: 29 November 1957
- (7) Award contract: 4 December 1957 181/

It then became necessary to expedite security clearances through SECRET for more than 40 persons of the New York firms of H&A, Wyeth and King, Clarke and Rapuano, Syska and Hennessy, and Edwards and Hjorth. 182/

In the early sketches done before the diagrammatic drawings, the proposed building consisted of irregular and rectangular block-type wings and a cafeteria. Two of the wings contained a basement, a ground floor, and six stories; the other wings, a ground floor and six stories. The cafeteria had a ground floor and one story, and the auditorium had one story. Each wing had a mechanical penthouse. The construction was to be concrete with spread footings, and the exterior was to be finished in face brick and concrete with stone trim at the main entrance only. Windows were to be projected steel

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sash with DSA glass* and no screens. Ceilings in the proposed building were to be suspended acoustic plaster. The corridors were to have fixed partitions with concrete masonry units. Interior finish called for plaster on masonry units and painted masonry units. The new building was also to have all-weather air conditioning, surface-mounted fluorescent lighting fixtures, and asphalt tile floors. Movable partitions were to be constructed of wire stud with gypsum lath and plaster. Early plans for laboratory areas did not include furniture or equipment.

The total gross area of the proposed building, exclusive of the boiler plant, was 1,845,000 square feet, and the total volume was approximately 24.2 million cubic feet. The net area was allocated as follows:

	<u>Thousand Square Feet</u>
Agency space	1,135
Cafeteria	55
Custodial, etc.	<u>45</u>
TOTAL	1,235

* Double-strength "A" quality glass.

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The following breakdown of the estimated costs for the proposed building 183/ was furnished in late 1956:

Building Construction, including air conditioning	\$34,405,000	
Elevators and Escalators	1,500,000	\$35,905,000
Boiler and air-conditioning plant		1,800,000
Mechanical distribution		200,000
Outside utilities, water tower & fire lines		255,000
Special Requirements (see below)		1,285,000
Emergency Generators		500,000
Roads, Parking & Site Development		1,635,000
Reservations		228,000
Contingencies		1,692,000
General Expenses:		
Drawings and Specifications	2,040,000	
Supervision	360,000	
Office Expense	100,000	
		<u>2,500,000</u>
TOTAL ESTIMATED COST		\$46,000,000

The Special Requirements indicated above were roughly defined as follows:

Cellular Floor System, in part	\$ 150,000
Pneumatic Tube Systems	350,000
Nitrate Film Storage	35,000
ADT Alarm Systems	200,000
Auditorium	150,000
Laboratory Space	200,000

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Radio and Microwave Antenna	50,000
Incinerators and Chutes (security)	105,000
Private Elevator	45,000
	<u>\$ 1,285,000</u>

George Johnston, Thaddeus Crapster, and Daniel Sella of the Architect's office met with PBS on 11 February 1957 to review and discuss the cost estimates for the building. It was agreed that a building of 1,235,000 net square feet, according to the diagrammatic sketches of 24 January 1957, could not be constructed within the limits of the appropriated funds. The DCI wanted to proceed with the planning for the maximum building possible within the approved funds. He recognized that the requirements were such that a further reduction of the Agency space would seriously impair the basic functional unity. If some design features were changed or eliminated, however, the necessary reduction could be less extensive than would have been required if all of the proposed design features were retained.

The planners therefore suggested that any features that might be more costly than normal should be re-evaluated with a view toward more economical design -- for example, the rounded corners of the

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ground and first floor walls; the cantilever at the first and third floor slabs; and the precast concrete frames for windows on the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth floors.* In addition it was agreed that revised estimates should be prepared showing several alternative considerations, including the possible elimination of the auditorium and the passage from the main building to the bus loading area, change of the cafeteria design, decrease of the seventh floor setback, a different type of air convector unit under the windows, and the elimination of several passenger elevators.

The planners were generally agreed that it would be more desirable to construct a building based upon the sketches, and they considered it extremely regrettable that the development of the project was so severely restricted by the availability of funds; but some of the economy suggestions were incorporated

* The Agency planners were also under some pressure from GSA to cut costs. In late December 1956 the Director of Logistics, James Garrison, informed the DDS that GSA was dissatisfied with the tentative drawings prepared by H&A because "they feel the exterior is too plush." 184/

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in the next submission of diagrammatic sketches, and even with these modifications the building could remain one of which the architect could be proud. 185/

The Agency had the first of two appearances before the Fine Arts Commission (FAC) on 24 January 1957.* Before the first presentation, Crapster, H&A's Project Architect, spent three or four days on several occasions with BPS and studied the functional relationships of the major components of the Agency. A site model with two to five stories and block-type wings of varying widths was discussed. The "park-like" character -- a "campus-type" setting with several connected buildings in close proximity -- was considered desirable and acceptable, but it required more expensive construction.** A statement

* Among the engineer-architects engaged in design and planning of the Headquarters Building, the following had been, or were to become, members of the Fine Arts Commission during the dates indicated: Gilmore D. Clarke (1932-50), Wallace K. Harrison (1955-59); and Michael Rapuano (1958-62). Clarke served as Chairman of the FAC from 1937 to 1950.

** See Appendix P, Figure 10, for a picture of the "Block-type buildings" on an early site model of the Langley tract.

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from the Commission of Fine Arts Seventeenth Report
to the President follows:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Presenting the preliminary plans and drawings for the proposed Central Intelligence Agency headquarters building near Langley, Virginia, Mr. Max Abramovitz of Harrison & Abramovitz, architects, stated that the security required by the Agency prompted the architects to design a large compact building to be erected in the center of a large wooded area. Having discussed the features of the plan and site, the members of the Commission, on 24 January 1957, gave their general approval of them. An intention to use sculpture in relation to architecture was noted with the hope that this feature would be carried to completion.

After viewing a model of the proposed building and discussing the design of the architectural features presented at the 19 December 1957 meeting, the members approved the design as submitted.* 186/

* The foregoing narrative probably has oversimplified the difficulties which developed between Harrison and Abramovitz and the PBS when the building authorization was limited to \$46 million rather than \$56 million. At best the position of the DDS was difficult, as he led negotiations designed to reduce the overall costs but yet retain as many of the desirable engineering features as possible. From January 1957 through June of 1957 there was a heavy volume of correspondence and meetings among H&A, GSA/PBS, and Agency representatives. One effect of the design changes was to delay the preparation of working drawings by H&A and, automatically, the bids for construction contracts. 187/ The bids, in fact, were opened 13 months later than had been tentatively planned -- on 18 December 1958 rather than in November 1957. 188/

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As another of the minor irritants related to the efforts on the new building the National Capital Planning Commission tried to interject itself into the picture again in mid-1956 when it suggested that it would like to review the new building plans. The DDS, as usual, was under the gun to respond to the NCPC; and as the following comments show, he took a dim view of any such NCPC review:

I told [] that I did not care to have Mr. Nolen [Director of the NCPC] review the plans, but assumed that we would have to show them to the Commission sooner or later. (I don't think that we are ready yet, and we *should not* make our presentation in a manner which would indicate that we are asking for the Commission's approval.) 189/

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Talked to Larry Houston about the interest of the National Capital Planning Commission in reviewing the plans for our new building. It is his opinion that legally we are not required to go back to the Commission at this time. ... We agreed that we would drag our feet on this as much as possible since I believe strongly that nothing except possible adverse publicity would come out of such a presentation. 190/

I talked to [] about Jack Nolen's suggestion that we come before the National Capital Planning Commission and told him that I had no intention of taking the initiative in this matter and wished to avoid going

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before the Commission as long as possible. I feel that we should take the line that we have not gone into successive stages of planning which would affect the development of the National Capital, and, therefore, there is no reason for us to go back to the Commission at this time. However, if the Commission still wants us to come, then it should address a letter to us on the subject. 191/

On 22 March 1957 the steering committee approved "Headquarters Building Space Directive D" dated 12 March 1957. This 101-page document listed in detail the space requirements for each office, division, and staff-level component for a total of 1,010,050 net square feet. A similar report listed the component elements to be housed elsewhere in the metropolitan area for a total of 435,200 net square feet. "Space Directive D" became the planning instrument to be used by H&A for the submission of working drawings. 192/

For many months the component liaison officers to BPS, with the assistance of other staff members, were preparing planning papers and staff studies to determine the desirability and priority of certain special requirements. Several of these special studies were Cafeteria Concession of BPS);

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Auditorium, Hall of Honor, Conference Equipment, and Exhibit Hall* ([redacted] of OTR); Building Supply Services ([redacted] of OL); Printing and Graphics Reproduction Services ([redacted]; Security and Security Definitions, Restricted Areas, Secure Areas, Vaults ([redacted]; Banks, Post Office, Drug Store, Gas Station, Barber Shop, and Dry Cleaning Facilities ([redacted] of BPS); Secure Telephone Facilities ([redacted] of RECD); Communications Equipment and Services ([redacted] of BPS); Medical Equipment and Services ([redacted] of BPS); and Library and Mail Handling Equipment ([redacted] Liaison Officers of BPS). The steering committee was required

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* With reference to an Exhibit Hall, the curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection reported:

The auditorium was also supposed to be a hall of honor and exhibit area. Unfortunately, the lack of funds did not permit this and only the bare auditorium was built. At one point, the DDCI, General Cabell, discussed with Mr. Pforzheimer the need for a special "trophy room" in which could be placed honors and awards which the Agency and its individual employees had received from various governments and the like as well as being sufficiently secure to show various types of Agency gadgetry. Space again made this impossible. 193/

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to determine policy on these special studies, and its recommendations were relayed to H&A for inclusion in subsequent plans and cost estimates. 194/ At the same time that the occupancy of the new building was reduced from 10,000 employees to 7,600 by "Space Directive D," parking spaces were reduced from 4,000 to 3,000. 195/

The "Tentative Drawings and Preliminary Outline Specifications" -- more than 100 of them -- were not received until 2 August 1957. This submission included the "Project Directive," a 15-page GSA form that outlined in detail the descriptive data for the project based on the tentative sketches. The project directive was an estimated and itemized list of all work to be accomplished and all materials to be used, with costs shown for each item at each stage of the project. It listed the estimated cost of alternates, options, and substitutions. The comprehensive document represented the combined work of the many planners up to this date. 196/

A set of intermediate working drawings, more than 500, and the first draft of the superstructure specifications, more than 600 pages, were finally

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received on 3 February 1958. These plans with their supporting documents were reviewed, marked up, and checked by the planners, PBS and BPS, with 51 pages of comments, all of which were returned to H&A on 5 March 1958. With this action, the plans and specifications having been corrected, the intermediate working drawings became the final approved working drawings and specifications for the headquarters building project. 197/

The steering committee then approved all actions to date at its meeting of 7 March 1958; and later, on 29 March 1958, the committee members visited the site to observe the clearing and grading work then in progress. 198/

The Building Planning Staff, 1957-1960

In a 17 December 1957 memorandum to the Chief of BPS, the DDS described his visit to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. In the new headquarters building there he had been impressed with several items that he thought should be included in the Agency's building. He noted that the SAC seal was tastefully displayed in the lobby,

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that closed-circuit television was used throughout the building, and that the special projection equipment used in several of the large and small conference and briefing suites was quite impressive. [redacted] was instructed to discuss these items and the sound-proofing and floor-loading studies with H&A on his next visit to the architect's office. 199/ [redacted] would be discussing the ground-floor window problems, the security fence, parking facilities, the "red" telephone system, the pneumatic tube system, and protective construction methods with Abramovitz, Crapster, and Ambrose. At about the same time, [redacted] with Roy J. Tuttle, an engineer with Syska & Hennessy, was having a series of meetings with representatives of the area public utility companies, with Commissioner J. A. Anderson of the Virginia State Highway Department, and with officials of the Fairfax County government. 200/

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[redacted] prepared a staff study concerning BPS's continuing relations with the architect-engineers (A&E) office. Regardless of the quantity and thoroughness of the written material, as well as briefings and tours given the A&E key people, many questions arose

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during the course of the work. Members of BPS made frequent trips to New York and did much to expedite the A&E's work, but there was need for an Agency employee with a well-rounded knowledge of the over-all Agency organization and procedures who could consult with the A&E's key people on a daily basis. An experienced Agency man, at the GS-13 level or above, who knew where to get information and who would recognize the ramifications involved in any question of organizational relationship or procedural matter, would do much to expedite the progress of the A&E and enable the work to proceed smoothly without irritating delays. The A&E had been given all information necessary for the performance of his contract on a "need-to-know" basis, and he was provided with adequate secure areas, storage facilities, and other security safeguards.

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[redacted] were being considered for this TDY assignment to New York for a 9- to 12-month period. 201/ It was later determined, however, that the purpose of this assignment was mainly to safeguard the Agency material being used and the detailed

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drawings and specifications being developed; consequently [] of the Office of Security were given this assignment in lieu of a member of the BPS. The TDY began on 6 August 1956 and was terminated on 31 July 1957. 202/

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The BPS continued to operate as a staff of D/OL until July 1960, when it again became a staff of RECD. [] became Chief of RECD at that time; and, although he retained his responsibilities for the new building, [] became Chief of BPS.

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The death of [] and resignations of [] and the return of [] to the Air Force added to the problems of continuity in bringing the new building into being.

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In addition to [] only two other staff members, a GS-11, [], and a GS-05, [] had continued in work pertaining to the new building.

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Their contribution was recognized in a 1961 IG Survey, which stated:

The services of these two individuals represent value well beyond that indicated by their grade, for they serve not only as working members of BPS, but as points of reference for innumerable questions. 203/

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The spirit of cooperation and determination on the part of the individual members of BPS over the years was probably one reason why the group had been able to accomplish so much with so few people. The *Survey* continued:

While we do not believe that there is clarity in the organization and assignment of responsibility, we do believe that the Chief of RECD and the Chief of BPS should be complimented for the spirited effort of the members of the staff. 204/

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(b)(3) CIAAct [redacted] who was formerly with the Management Staff, assumed the position of Chief of BPS in late August 1960 following the death of

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[redacted] In addition to his secretary, [redacted] and an assistant, [redacted]

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also supervised seven persons in a unit which was located in the Recreation and Services (R&S) Building and which was physically separated from his office. The R&S unit seemed to have had no name other than the "Deep Freeze" -- so named because of continuous heating and ventilating problems. Another member of

[redacted] a civil engineer, who was the Agency representative at the building site. When [redacted] became chief of BPS he also retained his responsibilities as DDS liaison officer

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after replacing [] in that job, and he served as the focal point for the representatives of nine different DDS components. The new chief of BPS also assumed personal responsibility for coordination of the actual move to the new site.

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According to the proposed table of organization,*

three members of the Deep Freeze unit -- []

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[] an apprentice draftsman, and

[], a clerk -- were theoretically

detailed from the Space Allocations Section; two

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engineers -- [] (electrical) and

[] (mechanical) -- were detailed

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from the Utilities Engineering Branch; and []

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[] an architect, was detailed from the Construc-

tion Engineering Branch. The seventh member of the unit was a GS-05 clerk obtained on a rotating appointment from the Interim Assignment Section of OP while awaiting final clearance.

Although this group was concerned with a wide variety of problems and projects related to the new building, the majority activity was fitting the

* At this time there was no formal T/O.

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components, equipment, machinery, and furnishings into the allocated space as defined by the space directive. Members dealt with problems of location of power outlets, telephone and other communications systems, alarm systems, heating and ventilating problems, and electrical problems pertaining to special equipment. The unit was undermanned and without any reserve strength. The workload was not expected to increase greatly, however, and the staff managed the remaining problems of the building completion as somewhat separate from the actual move.

It was inevitable that engineering personnel and others familiar with the building would become heavily involved in the actual move. Afterthoughts by various components, organizational adjustments, and problems that no one had anticipated tended to pyramid as the move date approached. The Deep Freeze unit would need additional manpower in advance of and during the move.

It should be noted that the space assignment and space utilization procedure (the

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system*) that was adopted for the orderly planning of contract changes and new building occupancy required the constant close attention of people with a deep personal interest and with an architectural and planning background. Because occupancy of the new building was scheduled to begin by the fall of 1961, it was necessary to have professional architects who could command respect when dealing with Agency organizational elements, and [] the only professional architect on the staff, had been assigned to work at the site, replacing []

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It was also essential that in planning the move there should be electrical and mechanical engineers on the staff; their expertise was needed for updating information that had been accumulating since 1956. With the exception of the "Walnut Activity" and 10 or 15 partially completed information

* See Appendix L for a description of the "[] System" and the National Capital Professional Achievement Award citation "To the Outstanding Young Architect," 25 February 1960.

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** The Walnut Activity was the name used for the DDP Computer Center to be located on the ground floor of the new building.

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drawings, no itemization or equipment layouts for utility requirements had been completely identified. In general, consideration had been given almost exclusively to space assignment and space utilization.

In addition to architects and engineers, the staff needed people with planning ability; the design work had been "fixed" by the contract drawings and specifications, and there was a real need for assistants with building planning experience and with knowledge of the components' space and mechanical requirements. Further there was a need for clerks with visual-aid and drafting experience to keep the space layouts up to date, to keep space assignment records and organizational space totals, to run the Ozalid machine (500 to 1,000 prints monthly), to repair and replace acetate sheets, and to answer questions and take messages. Workers with these minimum skills were also needed at the site, in the office of the chief of BPS and in the office of the Movement Coordination Group. 205/ By the end of 1960, then, BPS was woefully understaffed to cope with the move scheduled to begin in the fall of 1961.

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~~SECRET~~The Construction Period, 1957-1963

The first significant construction contract was for the clearing and grubbing of the site. This meant the removal of trees and brush from about half of the acreage and the clearing or removal of dead trees and underbrush from the rest of the tract. The contract bid opening date was 12 September 1957. Morrison and Johnson, Inc., of Bethesda, Maryland, had the low base bid of \$31,450.* Work was started in October 1957 and completed in March 1958. By this time another contract had been let for grading the site to bring it to the proper elevations determined by the site planners and for the installation of site drainage structures to carry off the accumulation of surface water. Under this contract, preliminary roads, site parking, and storage areas were being graded and given a gravel-surface treatment to accommodate the building contractor's supplies and equipment.

The summer and fall of 1957 were marked by long dry spells ideal for construction work, but

* The high bid was \$102,000! 206/

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almost as soon as the clearing and grubbing operations started, heavy rains began to fall. The weather continued to be unfavorable most of winter of 1957-58, although perhaps not unfavorable enough to block completely the public relations ploy that the DDS had in mind:

I also told him [] that I wanted to make every possible effort not only to let the grading contract as soon as possible, but to have some grading actually done before Congress returns to town on the first of January. 207/

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Although snowstorms were the worst for the Washington area in many years and the spring and summer rainfall in 1958 was well above normal, the grading and drainage contract was substantially finished by October 1958.* The excavation and foundation contract, with a base bid of \$2,289,000, was opened on 9 October 1958; and on 21 October 1958, the notice to proceed was issued to the Roscoe Engineering Corporation and the Ajax Construction Co., Inc. of Washington, D. C., as a joint venture.

* The low and high bids for grading and drainage were \$460,000 and \$1,113,000, respectively. The low figure was less than half the amount (\$1,030,000) that had been allocated. 208/

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A question about one of the contractors had developed, but the DDS noted that

I reported that after further examination of the bids for the Excavation and Foundation Contract the architects, Harrison & Abramovitz, the Public Buildings Service, and the Building Planning Staff had concluded that we should go ahead and award the Contract to the low bidder. General Cabell said that [] had some reservations about one member of the firm and asked me to check it out before making a final decision. (Since I had not heard of this I checked it with [] who said that the information was correct but that he, representatives of our Office of Security, and the Public Buildings Service felt that there were not sufficient grounds for denying the firm a contract. I asked him to prepare a memorandum to me along these lines.) 209/

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Up to this point the contracting work had been performed on the site as a whole. Now the job of excavating and pouring the massive concrete foundations for the Headquarters Building itself was a major step into reality. It was estimated that from nine months to a year were saved by making three separate contracts for the preliminary work described above so that while the work was in progress A&E and BPS were preparing the complex and detailed plans required for the main building. It might be pointed out that

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even as the plans and work proceeded, Agency representatives were frequently harassed regarding the need to incorporate features intended to provide protection from atomic blast and/or fall-out. After considerable badgering for his reluctance to move into positive programs of this nature, the DDS finally displayed asperity at a particularly bizarre proposal that had somehow survived the first reading. In his *Diary Notes*, White recorded that:

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Milton Buffington was in to see me about the Burkholder proposal to mine basalt underneath our building, thereby providing a bomb shelter. I am afraid this matter is getting out of hand and the Department of Defense seems to be taking over. Buff has been to the meeting with [redacted] who works for Norman Paul but in [redacted]'s office. [redacted] is putting a great deal of pressure on us so that we will accept this proposal without further delay. [redacted] is a former Congressman from West Virginia (Democrat) who applied for a job here some years ago and finally got a job with the National Security Agency. The Republican Administration saw to it that his job at NSA was eliminated and that he was separated from the Agency.) I called Norman Paul and expressed my concern about this proposal. I told him that we thought this was a unique proposal, that we were very much interested in it, but that we must first determine the feasibility before we could talk about acceptance and the submission of

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legislation which would be necessary. Norman agreed and at my request said that he personally would chair the next meeting which was to be within the next day or two and attended by [redacted] Senator Robertson's Administrative Assistant, Mr. Burkholder, and the Chief Geologist of the State of Virginia. 210/

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Although construction work on the site had been under way for more than a year, equally important work had been started off the site in Langley area. The new four-lane George Washington Memorial Parkway leading to the site's north gate-house entrance had been completely graded. Piers for the several bridges on this parkway were completed. The entire Bureau of Public Roads parkway project was paved and ready for use early in 1960, well in advance of CIA's actual moving date; and as early as July 1958 construction work had been started to widen Virginia route 123 leading to the south gate-house entrance.

The preliminary and continuing negotiations related to the access roadway situation -- particularly the problems of the George Washington Parkway and the Cabin John bridge -- were complex. The Agency was involved with the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Public Roads, the National Park Service,

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the Atomic Energy Commission, and the highway commissions and engineers of the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, and Fairfax County. 211/ Some of the difficulties were ironed out by the "old school tie": White did not hesitate to draw on his broad military acquaintanceship to influence the various engineering contingents, many of which were headed by former general officers or colonels, and at other times there was an opportunity for some *quid pro quo*. In March of 1961, for example, the DDS's *Diary Notes* stated:

General Clarke, the District Engineer, and Mr. Aitken, his Highway Supervisor, were over for lunch; however, General Clarke and Mr. Aitken are very much concerned about the traffic problem in connection with getting to and from our new building. They feel that the selection of Chantilly particularly is going to jam up the roads very much and that we may have some congestion. They are looking for some support to get the Chain Bridge double-decked and to get another bridge built at the Three Sisters Island location. I told them that we would certainly give them full support and that this was in our interest, but they should not put us in the position of not having made an adequate transportation study at the time we selected this site. Gen. Clarke and Mr. Aitken said they both fully appreciated

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this and that their emphasis would all be on developments since the site was selected.* 212/

Fairfax County officials were proceeding with the plans for extending water and sewer lines, and the pumping stations required for these facilities were under construction. Plans for the electric power sub-station to supply the Headquarters Building were well along by the spring of 1959.** A contract had been let for the erection of the security fence in August 1958, and by the middle of November the site was under security patrol and security badges had been issued to the contractors. 215/

The problems of physical security during the construction of the new building were highly complex. Between the fall of 1958 and February 1961, for example, *bona fides* were obtained for about 15,000

* In the fall of 1961 Clarke requested -- and received -- a letter from the Agency in support of his position on the need for a bridge at Three Sisters Island. 213/

** In addition to the supply of electric power from the Virginia Electric and Power Company, Agency planners also modified the original construction plans to include an instantaneous emergency generator (diesel). White authorized a change order in August 1960, noting that it would cost about \$50,000. 214/

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construction workers -- this in addition to the requirements to plan building security, badging, guard force, and the host of other security projects with which the Office of Security was charged. 216/*

By the early summer of 1959 the excavation foundation work was nearing completion.** The main building contract -- that is, the superstructure

* It was not until after the building was occupied, however, that serious attention was paid to the potential security risk posed by the four privately owned tracts of land adjacent to the new building area. Shortly after becoming DCI (29 November 1961), John A. McCone ordered that a study of the feasibility of purchase be undertaken. 217/ Consequently, White appointed a committee to review this matter; and their findings disclosed that the building was vulnerable to penetration by surveillance. Photographs taken in the wooded area adjacent to the front of the building indicated the feasibility of identifying personnel, with the possibility of identifying documents if they were held in a manner advantageous to the potential enemy. After considerable coordination by the DDS and the DCI -- with Congressional committees, the Fairfax County Executive, and the Bureau of the Budget -- acquisition of the perimeter property was accomplished by the mid-1960's at a cost of approximately half a million dollars. (See Appendix K.)

** NSA had already occupied its headquarters at Fort Meade, Maryland; and the AEC had moved into its new building at Germantown, Maryland, during the spring of the previous year. McCone had succeeded Admiral Lewis L. Strauss as Chairman of the AEC, and President Eisenhower had laid the cornerstone for the nearly completed Department of State building. 218/

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contract -- had been advertised on 18 December 1958, and bids were opened on 25 February 1959. Thirteen bids were received, and on 25 March the contract was awarded to Tompkins-Jones, a joint venture of the Charles H. Tompkins Company and the J. A. Jones Construction Company. The base bid, including seven alternates, was \$33,287,600, somewhat less than had been expected.* The contract had gone on the construction market at an opportune time; economic conditions were favorable to the Government and to the Agency.

Some superstructure work started in May 1959. The contractor's first efforts were directed toward organizing his work forces and executing the numerous sub-contracts required for the project. Shop drawings -- completely detailed plans based on the contract

* Of the \$54,500,000 appropriated, \$8.5 million was transferred to the National Park Service for the extension of the George Washington Memorial Parkway to the site. The superstructure and site work contract for \$33,287,600 discussed above, the contract with the Otis Elevator Co. for \$1,122,669, plus other fees and contingency requirements approximated \$43 million, leaving an unobligated balance of approximately \$3 million. This latter amount, which was considered "no year funds," was used for acquisition of additional land (see p. 156, footnote) and construction of the new printing plant at the site. 219/

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drawings and used for fabricating and installing structural steel, duct work, plumbing, and electrical and mechanical facilities -- were being prepared.

The forms for the ground-floor concrete walls and for the first-floor slab of the north half of the building were nearly completed by mid-summer.*

The contractor had erected field construction offices on the site for his personnel, Government representatives, and representatives of A&E. Government and A&E representatives were on the site every working day and checked each step in the construction to see that the work was done according to the plans. They also reviewed all shop drawings. Samples of material were submitted in advance for testing to ensure that specification requirements were met. 220/

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This group managed the project to its completion. [] represented the Agency until he was replaced by [] in August

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* See Appendix P, Figure 13, for illustration of this early construction on the north half of the building.

** [] is currently (1972) Chief, Architectural Design Staff, Logistics Services Division, OL, on detail from RECD/OL.

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1960; Scott, in turn, was replaced by [redacted]

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[redacted] in January 1961. [redacted] was a graduate civil engineer who had served two years in the US Army and had joined the Agency in October 1960.

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Although he had only about three months' experience with the organization, he handled the job with competence and assurance. The project officer's office adjoined that of the three representatives of the A&E firm, who handled his telephone messages. He initiated actions with the representatives of the architects on adjustments and changes and signed documents when the estimated cost was less than \$1,000. At times the project officer could exceed this figure after telephone confirmation from the Chief of BPS; but for most higher cost items he prepared the paper work and brought it to headquarters for approval and signature by [redacted] 221/

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The building contract called for completion of the building by the middle of 1961, but a reasonable amount of delay, frequently caused by conditions beyond the contractor's control, was expected on a project such as this. For example there was a strike in the steel industry in August 1959. Had this

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strike continued for an appreciable length of time, it would have materially affected progress and delayed completion. There was every reason to believe, however, that the building would be completed some time during the last half of 1961. By a letter dated 9 July 1959, Tompkins-Jones had been formally directed to proceed with the work. Actually they had started preliminary work during May on the basis of an informal arrangement with PBS. The contract time started on 11 July and, unless extended by changes or extra work, would expire on 29 July 1961. As of 30 September 1959 this contract was 3.52 percent complete. The contract for the excavation and foundation was more than 95 percent complete by the end of September 1959. Meanwhile BPS was reviewing all space layouts for the purpose of adjusting them to fit changes in the Agency's requirements. 222/

As of 31 March 1960 the superstructure contract was approximately 20 percent complete. The contractor was slightly behind schedule, but except for the month of March the winter weather had

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been reasonably favorable for his operations. There had been a considerable number of relatively small change orders, and as of 31 March 1960 it did not appear that completion of the contract would be extended materially. In fact such excellent progress was being made that a portion of the concrete roof of the north penthouse had been poured. As was customary when the highest point on the construction project was reached, the workmen held an impromptu flag-raising ceremony, and for a day or two a flag flew from this roof-top.

Progress in the spring of 1960 was marred by the only serious accident that occurred during the entire course of the construction. In the words of the DDS:

There was an accident today at Langley; apparently a cable broke allowing the scaffolding at the power building to fall. Ten people were hurt, seven of them very seriously. At this point one of the ten has died and another remains on the critical list. 223/

Work had been started on the excavation for the auditorium building, which was a separate hemispheric structure near the front of the main building

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but connected by a tunnel.* Structural steel had been delivered to the job for the curved roof** of the cafeteria building. Plantings for the three large and two small court areas that are enclosed by the building had been completed. This landscape and planting contract was undertaken early in the project so that all trees and shrubs requiring large balls of dirt would be set in place before the courts were entirely enclosed, 224/ and throughout the construction period there was constant concern

* A story, perhaps apocryphal, is told that when Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, the DDCI (3 April 1962-28 April 1965), first saw the shape of the auditorium he is reported to have commented to the effect that he had admired things like that ever since he was 16 years old, but he thought that they always came in pairs.

** In his comments to the SSHO (10 Feb 71) on the construction activities, Walter Pforzheimer noted that:

The curved roof of the cafeteria ... brings to mind an interesting highlight arising out of the *Washington Evening Star* sending periodic flights over the building to photograph the progress in its construction as a newsworthy item. In their issue of 13 June 1960, they printed one of these early views and caused us some laughing embarrassment by their caption, which noted, "The crescent-shaped objects at left are decorative water-falls." Actually they were the curved steel girders, not yet installed, which hold up the roof of the cafeteria!

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about preserving the "campus" -- to the point where in one instance it added \$60,000 to the bill!*

By the end of September 1960 the superstructure contractor had completed an additional 34 percent of his work. This brought the building contract to a status of 54 percent complete. The contractor was slightly behind schedule, but this was mainly a continuance of the earlier delays. The north half of the building was expected to be ready for occupancy

* The DDS recorded in his *Diary Notes*:

Met with Jim Garrison and [redacted] to discuss landscaping changes at the new building. There are three large areas in which trees are growing in a considerable depression. Water collects to such an extent that drains are plugged up; consequently, the areas are not only unsightly but in all probability the trees are going to die before we move into the building. Mike Rapuano of Clarke and Rapuano admits that his people made a mistake in trying to preserve these trees. It is now estimated that it will cost some \$60,000 to rectify it, especially in view of the fact that there is not sufficient dirt available to fill in all three of the holes. I authorized [redacted] to go ahead and negotiate to fill in one of them -- for which we do have ample dirt -- and to contemplate, at least for the moment, on filling in the other two if and when we construct an auxiliary building, at which time we will again have plenty of "fill" available without buying it. 225/

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by September 1961. It was almost completely enclosed, and plastering of the interior walls was proceeding on the lower level floors. Except for the seventh-floor roof of wings 1 and 2 and the penthouse roof, all of the structural slabs had been poured for the south half of the building, and precast concrete window panels had been installed up to the fourth-floor level. The structural steel covering for the cafeteria roof had been erected and installed.

The BPS had reviewed space assignment layouts for floors two through seven in the south half of the building. Plans were being developed with the telephone company to begin installing equipment for the north half of the building. Space layouts were being used by Agency components to plan requirements for unitized furniture, location of floor outlets, and determination of the necessary types of telephone service. 226/ Normal telephone installation was complicated by the additional requirements for a secure internal system and an intercom among the Director, the Deputy Directors, and the Office/Division Chiefs. Both the Offices of Security and Communications were concerned with the problem. 227/

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As of 5 December 1960 the DDS had approved a "freeze" on contract plan changes that had been reviewed and approved by all components and the steering committee. A review of the justification for change proposals would be postponed until occupancy had been completed. 228/

The superstructure contract was 78 percent complete as of 31 March 1961. The work had been delayed because of bad weather, but occupancy of the north half of the building, to begin in September 1961, would not be affected appreciably. The entire building was now enclosed, and plastering had been completed in the north half. The structural dome for the auditorium had been erected, and the floor slab had been poured. The main entrance marque was structurally complete. The BPS had produced information and revised contract drawings involving partition revisions, medical, X-ray, and projection equipment, and the instantaneous generator for the signal centers. The plans for furniture layouts were retemplated from standard to unitized furniture. Telephone service orders and wiring diagrams were completed for 50 percent of the north half of the building. Special

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requirements for power were reviewed, and service fitting location plans for 75 percent of the north half of the building were sent to the PBS construction engineer, [] 229/

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As of 30 September 1961, Tompkins-Jones had brought completion of their construction contract to 96 percent. The "official estimate" for completion of the work remaining in the south half, furnished GSA by the contractor, was February 1962.

At the same time BPS produced additional information and contract changed drawings and made a final review of all furniture layouts, telephone service orders, and wiring diagrams. Other special requirements and layouts for power and service fitting locations were sent to the construction engineer of PBS, bringing the BPS work submission total to 86 percent. 230/

The Laying of the Cornerstone, 3 November 1959

On 24 September 1958 the DDS had submitted for the DCI's approval the proposals that the Building Planning Staff had prepared for the official cornerstone laying ceremony -- a ceremony that would not, in fact, take place until well over a year later, on

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3 November 1959. Simple as it may appear, the planning and execution of the cornerstone ceremony was time-consuming and tedious and fraught with the perils of protocol violations! 231/*

The cornerstone was to be designed by the Architect-Engineer, and decisions had to be made on the size, shape, type of stone, style of cutting, sizes and types of lettering to be used, and placement. Also it had to be determined whose names should appear on the stone; this would have some effect on the design of the stone. It was decided that those whose names were to appear on the stone were President Eisenhower, the DCI, the DDCI, the DDS, Franklin Floete (General Services Administrator), F. Moran McConihe (Commissioner Public Buildings Service), Wallace K. Harrison and Max Abramovitz (Architects), Frederic

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* On protocol, pre-Women's Lib vintage, a memo from the DDS to the Executive Officer, Office of the Director, noted that an allocation of reserved seats should be parceled out among employees at the EO's discretion but "...the Director is anxious to see some of the women employees of the Agency in attendance in order to highlight the vital role which women play in the Agency." 232/

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R. King (Associate Architect), and Charles H. Tompkins Co., J. A. Jones Construction Co. (Builders).*

Once the matters of design and names were resolved, the question of the contents of the box to be deposited behind the stone had to be determined. This posed various problems, including the question of whether or not classified documents would form part of the contents; they were excluded.**

The question of principal speakers for the cornerstone-laying ceremony was effectively resolved by the decision to keep the affair simple. The USAF band would provide music: a prelude, the National Anthem, and a postlude. The DCI would make a few brief introductory remarks, and then President Eisenhower would make his address. For the invocation and benediction,

it was decided that it would be appropriate if the Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, Chaplain of the U. S. Senate, were to give the Invocation and

* Appendix P, Figures 11 and 12, display photographs of the cornerstone and the stone laying ceremony.

** Appendix M provides details on both the problems of selecting materials for the cornerstone box and the fabrication of the box itself.

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Benediction. Somehow, Col. White, to [Rev.] Harris' amazement, located the Reverend somewhere in the deep South to issue the invitation. The length of the Invocation far exceeded any staff study CIA had ever prepared and threatened to keep us there until darkness fell. 233/

Among the groups and individuals who had to be invited as special guests were the chairmen and members of Congressional committees concerned with CIA, members of the National Security Council, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Administrator of General Services, the architects (Harrison and Abramovitz), consultants to the architect, key officials of other agencies associated with CIA, and representatives of the press. On the platform for the actual ceremony were the President, the DCI, the DDCI, the DDS, former DCI's Hillenkoetter and Souers, Mrs. Walter B. Smith (the widow of the former DCI), the Administrator of General Services, the Commissioner of Public Buildings Service, and the Reverend Mr. Harris. Other special guests, the architects, the contractor, and various CIA officials had reserved seats set aside in the audience.

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Much of the equipment that was needed for the ceremony -- the speakers' stand, chairs, comfort stations, and the public address system -- was provided by the National Park Service on a reimbursable basis; and Park Service employees were made available (also on a reimbursable basis) to assist with the arrangements. The south parking lot and some of the roads at the building site required a gravel surface; and in anticipation of the large crowd, local police were asked for assistance in handling automobile traffic. An ushering service composed of some of the Agency's most attractive young ladies was set up, and a stopping point for chauffeur-driven cars to discharge their passengers at a point near the seats was arranged.

A contractor's assistant was required to assist in handling the cornerstone; the tools and equipment were also provided by the contractor. It is interesting to note that although it appeared that the President and others who participated were cementing the cornerstone into place, the "cement" actually was a non-holding mixture of sugar and water, and the box in place was only a temporary one. As soon

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as the guests had departed from the 1959 ceremony, the cornerstone and the box were removed and were permanently put into place a year later.

There was little question but that the printed program of the cornerstone ceremony should be rather impressive; the basic questions involved the content. Such a brochure usually serves as a means of recognizing the contributions made by firms and individuals whose names, because of custom and space limitations, are not inscribed on the building cornerstone. These would include the consultants to the Architect, such as Syska & Hennessy, Edwards & Hjorth, Clarke & Rapuano, Frederick W. Post, and others. Consideration was given to the Architect listing the members of his staff who took part in the work on the CIA building; GSA was consulted to determine whether some of their officials should be listed; and it was also suggested that, within the limits of security, consideration be given to recognition of the work of CIA personnel who served in various capacities in connection with the planning of the building.

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In the printed program* the comments about the architects were brief, stating only:

Architects for the building are Harrison & Abramovitz with Frederic R. King, Associate Architect. The building is being erected by Charles H. Tompkins Company and J. A. Jones Construction Company, Joint Venturers. The Public Buildings Service of the General Services Administration is the contract agent for the building and is supervising the work.

Pictures of the President and the Director, a reproduction of the rendering of the building, a description of the building, and a list of the documents placed behind the cornerstone were also suggested for inclusion in the program brochure. In view of the active employee interest in the new building some 15,000 programs were printed. In addition to the printed programs, engraved invitations requesting an R.S.V.P. were sent to the special guests.**

The planning of press announcements was coordinated with James Hagerty, White House Press Secretary.

* Copies of the printed program and other related materials from the official ceremony are available in both HIC and in the document files of the Historical Staff (see HS/HC 327).

** Appendix N is a copy of the invitation.

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It was customary for the White House to release such announcements rather than to put the responsibility on the sponsoring agency. In addition the details of arrangements for accommodations for the newsreel, television, and other reporters were worked out with Mr. Hagerty and the Secret Service. The DCI presented engraved silver trowels to the President, to the Honorable Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, in commemoration of their participation in the ceremony; and two trowels went to the CIA collection, one used by the President and the other by the DCI. In addition, a sixth engraved trowel was retained by the DCI.

As recommended by the planners, a "package" containing the following items was sent to each overseas station and base: a copy of the program, the DCI's remarks, the President's remarks, the invocation and benediction, selected press coverage of the event, and a few photographs of the ceremony.*

* A copy of this package is available in the document files of the CIA Historical Staff (see HS/HC 327).

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The cornerstone laying ceremonies were held on 3 November 1959,* and after the invocation Mr. Dulles made the following introductory remarks:

The laying of this cornerstone marks an important stage in the growth of the Central Intelligence Agency. We will soon have a home of our own, in these inspiring surroundings high above the Potomac.

The Agency was established 12 years ago by the same Act of Congress which created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. Thus the Central Intelligence Agency was recognized as one of the important elements in our national security structure.

World War II and its aftermath and the international communist threat had already brought home to us that our vital interests were at stake in places as distant as Korea, and Laos, in Africa and the Islands of the Pacific, as well as in this Hemisphere and in Europe.

Since then, our country's ever expanding responsibilities have increased the need for better information from the four corners of the earth and for sound analysis of that information.

The law creating the Agency was voted by a Congress in which there was a Republican majority. It was sponsored

* The cornerstone and the cornerstone box were placed in their permanent locations in a brief ceremony presided over by the DDS on 2 November 1960. 234/

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and signed by a Democratic President. For the past crucial years it has had the unfailing support of a Republican President and a Democratic Congress.

Facts have no politics.

Our charter, in the carefully drafted provisions of the National Security Act, has undergone no changes. It provided that, under the direction of the President and of the National Security Council, the Agency shall correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and perform such additional services of common concern in this field as the National Security Council may direct.

Wisely this legislation provides that we should have no domestic internal security functions. Yet the scope of the jurisdiction granted is ample. Our work is broad and comprehensive enough to enlist the interest and to inspire the devotion of those who choose, and are chosen, to enter upon it.

Laws can create agencies of government; they cannot make them function. Only the high purpose and dedication of all serving them can weld them into effective instruments for our national security.

In this work of intelligence we must not forget human beings are largely the creatures of their beliefs. As individuals we tend instinctively, and sometimes wistfully, to become attached to causes, to theories, to solutions.

If they be sound and enduring, based on the deep moral strivings of man and the highest conception of our national

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interests, let us cling to them. But in the field of our relations with our fellowmen abroad, let us assure ourselves, through accurate intelligence that our attachments to policies are soundly based.

It is the particular duty of this Agency to help perform this function in a world where change is the rule rather than the exception. This task must be carried out fearlessly, without warping to meet our prejudices or our predilections or even the tenets of existing policy.

As we build a new edifice in which to house, to concentrate and coordinate our work, we must rededicate ourselves to this high purpose.

The guiding motto to be inscribed on the face of this building will be the words taken from the Gospel according to St. John: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

The President of the United States has graciously consented to lay the cornerstone.

President Eisenhower responded to the introduction with these remarks:

America's fundamental aspiration is the preservation of peace. To this end we seek to develop policies and arrangements to make the peace both permanent and just. This can be done only on the basis of required information.

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In war nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, disposition and intention of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements and attitudes prevailing in the world. They are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you are a part.

No task could be more important.

Upon the quality of your work depends in large measure the success of our effort to further the nation's position in the international scene.

By its very nature the work of this agency demands of its members the highest order of dedication, ability, trustworthiness and selflessness -- to say nothing of the finest type of courage, whenever needed. Success cannot be advertised; failure cannot be explained. In the work of Intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity. Their inspiration is rooted in patriotism -- their reward can be little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country, and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts. I assure you this is indeed true.

The reputation of your organization for quality and excellence, under the leadership of your Director, Mr. Allen Dulles, is a proud one.

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Because I deeply believe these things, I deem it a great privilege to participate in this ceremony of cornerstone laying for the national headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency. On this spot will rise a beautiful and useful structure. May it long endure, to serve the cause of peace. 235/

In addition to White, the DDS, and other Agency personnel who had planned the ceremonies, kudos went to the Honorable Elwood R. Quesada, head of the Federal Aviation Agency, who on short notice arranged for rerouting the National Airport traffic away from the site during the ceremony; the Secretary of the Interior, the Honorable Fred A. Seaton, for his most helpful suggestions and the assistance of the National Capital Parks authorities for on-site traffic control and parking; the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department for orderly flow of offsite traffic; the Commanding General of the Military District of Washington, Major General Charles K. Gailey, for arranging the movement by bus of 5,000 guests to and from the ceremony -- a monumental task; the Commanding Officer of the US Army Communications Agency, Colonel Walter A. Kneyse, for arranging on short notice the field land-line communications system, highly essential

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to the smooth running of the ceremony; the Chief of Protocol, the Honorable Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., for countless suggestions on the seating plan, the ceremonial order, and all other phases of the ceremonies; the Chief of the US Secret Service, U. E. Baughman; the Chief of Police of Fairfax County, Major William L. Durrer; and the Chief of Police of Arlington County, Major William G. Fawer. Many others were involved in this effort, and appreciation was extended to them by the DCI and DDS.

The Occupancy of the Building, 1960-1962

The actual transfer operations were planned by BPS with the assistance of the DCI, the DDI, the DDP, and the DDS liaison officers, and representatives from subordinate offices and divisions. The coordination of the plans and the move schedule with the three contract movers fell logically to BPS. Some concern over the load being carried by the Chief of BPS was expressed in the June 1961 report of the IG's survey of OL:

In addition to his over-all duties the Chief, BPS is supervisor of the "Deep Freeze" unit, coordinates the planning and execution of the move,

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and is liaison officer for nine DDS representatives. As the date approaches for the actual completion of the building and the move, we believe that the Chief, BPS will run out of time and that some of his responsibilities should be redelegated. 236/

The DCI approved the tentative moving schedule contained in the BPS *Monthly Report* dated 11 January 1961. He specifically agreed that he and his immediate staff would be among the last elements to move into the new quarters, quarters that might not be ready until early December. He also agreed to the publication of a series of information bulletins to keep employees posted about the status of the construction and the anticipated move. The DCI also asked that a study be made of the feasibility of inviting the families of Agency employees to inspect the new building on a given week end in June or July. 237/

In addition to the information bulletins, a booklet concerning various aspects of the move and containing a questionnaire regarding personal problems that the move might create was issued on 19 May 1961 to the 7,300 people scheduled to move to the new building. Although BPS helped prepare the booklet,

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the responsibility for interpretation and action on the data resulting from the questionnaire was assumed by the Office of Personnel. These data disclosed, for example, that of 6,400 employees who responded to the questionnaire only 110 anticipated personal problems that were related to the move.* OP also

* Had the Office of Personnel sent out its questionnaire in its original form, the responses might have been considerably different. The DDS noted that

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[redacted] telephoned to say that he was very much concerned about a report he received from his Administrative Officer growing out of [redacted] meeting in which it was announced that a questionnaire would soon be circulated, inquiring as to whether people wanted to move to the new building or not.

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[redacted] feels very strongly that this is wrong and that it would cause a great deal of trouble insofar as the Office of Communications is concerned. I have since discussed this with Emmett Echols and [redacted] and disapproved their questionnaire as drafted. I feel very strongly that we must assume that our employees are going to go with us and that if we distribute a questionnaire asking them whether they would like to stay in town we are going to cause ourselves a great deal of trouble and do ourselves very little good. I have directed that the Office of Personnel amend this questionnaire and that they also modify their proposed notice so as to eliminate the duplication which would otherwise exist between their notice and the flier we are preparing in the Building Planning Staff. 238/

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assumed responsibility for conducting a survey to determine numbers of parking spaces required at the new building, numbers planning to use public transportation, and numbers requiring assistance in joining or forming car pools. These data were subsequently used to obtain public transportation service for Headquarters Building employees.

Space changes and moves of components remaining in Washington were coordinated by [REDACTED] a special assistant in the office of the chief of RECD. Problems of coordination for the move -- as separate from, but closely related to, the problems of completing the building -- were increasing. The chief of RECD and the chief of BPS decided that an officer with an assistant and with clerical help would be assigned to coordinate the planning and execution of the move. 239/ During the summer of 1961 two officers, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] from the Management Staff of the DDS, were assigned to BPS to assist [REDACTED] with the coordination and planning operations required to move the Agency into the new building. 240/

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On 17 August 1961 D/OL held the second of two meetings to discuss and align the functional responsibilities that had been assigned to, or had gravitated to, the major component liaison officers. The roles to be filled by officers and elements of OL were examined to determine if they met the anticipated needs for assistance, information, and guidance. Despite the "Master Plan for Relocation of Agency Components" -- 16 annexes, four appendixes, and three tabs, all of which had been assembled by the OL Planning Staff and approved by the DDS on 13 July 1961 -- this meeting exposed areas that still required clarification of responsibilities.

Presumably one of the subjects for consideration at the OL meeting concerned the status of the DDP elements. Even though Richard Helms* had advised the DDS in September 1960 that he was very pleased with the plans for the DDP space allocations --

We will have optimum flexibility for moving units within the space assigned, while preserving sound standards of privacy for intelligence officers and of working conditions generally. These have been our main targets in the planning phase for the building. 241/

* Currently (December 1972) the DCI; then the Acting DDP.

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-- by June 1961 the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) expressed some reservations about locating DDP elements in the Headquarters Building.

In a 24 June 1961 memorandum to the DCI, McGeorge Bundy, Presidential Advisor for National Security Affairs, requested that the DCI review and comment on the PFIAB proposal that "... the relocation of the CIA clandestine services [be] in another place." The PFIAB also suggested to the President that "... it may be appropriate to house in the new building some of the non-clandestine functions of the Central Intelligence Agency which are now scheduled to be relocated to other buildings in Washington." 242/

Dulles's response to the PFIAB suggestions followed by a few days the OL meeting on the moving plans, and its direct and unequivocal tone made clear that a reshuffling of DDP space was not about to be imposed on OL or BPS. A summary of Dulles's remarks follows:

a. Ever since the project for a headquarters building was first initiated, we have been reviewing the feasibility and the security of our program for its occupancy and the

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selection of personnel to occupy it. We consider the plans which have been made to be feasible. We do not consider it feasible to secure quickly an appropriate alternate site for the clandestine services.

b. All of our clandestine personnel will not be moved to the new headquarters building. All truly clandestine operations involving contact with undercover or secret agents, American or foreign, are, and will be, carried out elsewhere. Facilities are available for this purpose. We propose to improve and increase such facilities.

c. We do not consider it now feasible to house the major part of our clandestine services personnel, other than those under deep cover or abroad, outside of the building. We will however continue to make every effort to increase cover arrangements, domestically and abroad, in order to reduce the relative number of clandestine personnel in headquarters or in identifiable field offices abroad.

d. We plan to take advantage of the move to the new building to review and to improve our operational security practices, particularly those having to do with persons under deep cover.

e. As new personnel come aboard who have had no prior identification with CIA, we endeavor to determine at the outset whether or not their anonymity should be guarded and from the very beginning take the necessary steps to accomplish this. This existing program will be followed aggressively.

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f. About 65 per cent of the space in the new building will *not* be occupied by the clandestine services. We have endeavored to assign to this space in the building those categories of non-members of the clandestine services who have had the most thorough security checks.

g. In many countries of the world, and to many secret and security services of the world, CIA has become a symbol of one important phase of the American initiative to combat international communism and a rallying point for those who wish to organize to uncover and thwart communist intrigues. Adverse publicity, such as attended the Cuban episode, is obviously harmful. But the image of a strong, effective and vigilant U.S. intelligence service is an asset and dignified publicity to this end is better than silence. Further, it helps to bring defections to our side and it has helped us to help other friendly foreign services to help themselves. The image of an American Intelligence Service that is being fragmented and "running for cover" because of recent adverse and passing publicity will not be encouraging to our friends abroad and will bring satisfaction to the Kremlin which for years has made CIA a major target. This was not the type of organization the Congress publicly created by the Security Act of 1947.* 243/

* Of 9,700 Headquarters employees in the summer of 1961, 2,500 were to be located outside of the new building -- [redacted]

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The PFIAB accepted the Director's judgment and said nothing further about the dispersal of DDP personnel.

A footnote to the story of the new building that might be mentioned at this point concerns Dulles's great personal interest in the building activity, an interest which sometimes caused his subordinates considerable anguish. The DCI's insistence that the Biblical quotation, "And Ye Shall Know the Truth and the Truth Shall Make You Free," be fixed in stone at the entrance as the Agency motto apparently met with no objection; 244/ there is no indication that much, if any, attention was given to his suggestion that

we consider naming our auditorium at the new building the "Donovan Memorial Auditorium." He [Dulles] thought that General Donovan's estate might make a contribution for the Memorial and that we might otherwise raise money for this purpose. 245/

Nor did his desire for "a large and luxurious conference room with a 'view'" appear unreasonable. 246/

Dulles's rather sudden interest in having a dwelling for the Director of the Agency constructed at the Langley site was less easily ignored. In

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the summer of 1959, soon after the idea seems to have germinated, the DDS discussed the matter with the General Counsel;* and the latter was of the opinion that such a residence would create very unfavorable publicity. 247/ In the spring of 1960, after the DCI himself had raised the question with the House Appropriations Committee, the General Counsel prepared a written memorandum noting the difficulties such construction would present; but

the Director ... was quite exercised and apparently unhappy about the General Counsel's memorandum pointing out the difficulties, if not the impossibility, of building a residence for the Director of Central Intelligence at Langley. 248/

In the early winter of 1960, the DCI continued to express high interest in the matter of a residence on the campus:

He [Dulles] again raised the question of a house for the Director near the new building and said he felt very strongly that there should be such a house even though he might never live in it. He said that in increasing numbers he is required to see people at his house simply because they do not wish to be seen visiting a government building. He thinks that this house should be big enough to

* Lawrence R. Houston.

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have conferences of eight or ten. He also thinks that it would be much better from a security standpoint to have the house near the new building so that direct telephone lines could be strung, etc. (I have asked Jim Garrison and H. [redacted] to prepare a paper on this also.) 249/

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Despite the DCI's effort, however, his proposals for an official residence never came to reality.

In addition to the already mentioned "Master Plan for Relocation of Agency Components," 47 "Special Relocation Bulletins" (SRB's) were issued on various subjects, specific and general, in the period from 16 August 1961 through 18 June 1962. 250/ The SRB's were printed on a special blue paper to distinguish them from other memoranda, and according to the recollection of one witness,

They were written in a prose style that not even a mother could love, and it was inevitable that sooner or later a parody would appear -- and appear it did. On blue paper and in the same form as the regular "Relocation Bulletins," some prankster produced a "Relocation Bulletin" on the use of the toilets. It was very funny to everyone who saw it, except the senior personnel in the DDS and General Cabell. All copies were immediately sought out for destruction. I seem to recall that Security was asked to find the perpetrator of the horrendous feat but, as I think the

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author was a member of the Office of Security, I do not believe he was ever surfaced.* 251/

The Headquarters Building was originally scheduled to be completed by the spring of 1962, but sufficient progress had been made on the north half of the building to permit the first phase of the move -- that of some DDI elements -- to begin on 19 September 1961. This permitted all components in the area of the Roosevelt Island Bridge approaches to be moved by 21 October.**

* The Historical Staff has been equally unsuccessful in its attempts to locate a copy of this infamous document.

** Mr. Pforzheimer, Curator, HIC, recalled that:

At the time of the first move, I think the far end of the DDP part of the building was still partially open so that heavy equipment could be brought in. This resulted in another story about the building which is a fond memory to many of us. As cold weather approached, and that far end of the building was still partially open, the building became infested with the cutest collection of field mice you ever saw. In the course of serious dictation, sober-minded DDI'ers would be interrupted by piercing shrieks [sic] from their secretaries which would herald the fact that another mouse had just appeared. In the Historical Intelligence Collection we were
(footnote continued on following page)

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Three separate PBS contracts were let to accomplish the move of CIA furnishings and equipment to the headquarters location. Merchants Transfer and Storage Company was awarded the first and last contract. The Roy M. Hamilton Company of Cincinnati, Ohio, was the other contractor.

The building planners must have breathed a collective sigh of relief once the DDI elements began to move into the new building. Beginning in 1957 and continuing even after the completion of the move, the DDI, Robert Amory, engaged the planners in a series of disputes over the space allocations and floor plan layouts for the DDI area. The DDI did have legitimate reasons for objection to the location

continually setting mousetraps with devastating effect, including the fact that the Curator's extremely squeamish secretaries would not empty them, and that task fell on the Curator himself. Not only was the building open at the far end, but the cafeteria was not yet open, and everyone was eating out of the vending machines or "brown bagging it." Thus the mice had a never ending supply of food. The mice also had the habit of chewing through telephone wires and once chewed their way through the special gray phone wires creating a security problem which resulted in having to have the mice cleared! Thus, do legends grow. 252/

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and layout of the OCR library, but he had less justification for vacillation about the desirability of including or excluding various of the DDI components in the new building -- at one time or another OBG, FBIS, FDD, and the map library were all involved in the discussions. That the equanimity of the DDS was obviously disrupted by the DDI's indecision became apparent in the early discussions of utilization of space in the new building. Specifically the DDS noted that he

Had a discussion both on the squawk box and later in the day with Bob Amory about the new building. Bob is, in my judgment, somewhat irrational about his desires to close up the library deal, put the Office of Basic Intelligence back into the building, etc. At his suggestion that we thrash the whole thing out with the Director I readily agreed, at which point he backed water considerably. I told him that I was fed up with his threatening to go to the Director at any time he didn't get what he wanted in connection with the new building and that I wanted him to understand fully that I was prepared to meet with him and the Director at any hour of the day or night, without any advance notice, on his or any aspect of the building. I also told him that the DD/I area was

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slower than any other component in supplying the information that we needed to pass on to the architect and that unless we got his information very soon it would be necessary to stop work on the building again. 253/

Among the other annoyances which, at one time or another, the DDI brought to the attention of the DDS or the DCI were the following:

(1) "Very strong opposition" to plans for ground floor windows.

(2) Use of asphalt tile rather than more expensive flooring in the library.

(3) Delay in moving -- if not total exclusion -- of NIS personnel and Biographic Register into new building.

(4) The receptionist at the northeast entrance to the new building.

(5) The morning rush hour traffic pattern over Key Bridge, temperature in new building, and empty vending machines.

(6) Security's objection to the use of organizational component signs on office doors.

(7) Credit Union hours and need for US mail boxes. 254/

The emphasis on the DDI complaints is not intended to imply that the other directorates had no problems at the time of the planned move to the new building.

The question of adequate space for the DD/P contingent was the subject of serious discussion from 1959 until

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the actual move. The basic problems with DDP were to determine the actual number of bodies that were to be accommodated and whether or not the whole of DDP should be moved into the new building, even at the expense of space for the DDI or DDS.* 255/

The cafeteria was not completed until 28 February 1962, but in October 1961 necessary kitchen facilities were available to permit a limited operation in the table-service dining area. Vending machine rooms were put into operation on the floors being occupied. As components moved into their new quarters, they found that new unitized furniture had replaced all Class "C" furniture,** and had been pre-positioned with telephones in place ready to be

* Perhaps because the DDS, White, was in charge of the overall planning for the Headquarters construction activity, space and other problems of the DDS components appear infrequently in the *Diary Notes*. In January of 1961 a request from [redacted] Director of the Office of Communications, for additional space was rejected. 256/

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** As a result of year-end savings during 1960 and 1961, these funds totalling \$1,298,900, were applied along with \$340,000 obtained from the Director's Special Projects Fund (subject to DDS recommendation and DCI approval) for procurement of unitized furnishings.

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cut over to the new numbers. For mechanical and security reasons, certain facilities were not available until the entire building was occupied. These included the pneumatic tube and conveyor systems. Although incinerator chutes were being made available for depositing classified trash during the period of interim occupancy, the material could not be burned in the building until later. The north parking lot, with spaces for approximately 1,375 cars, and a portion of the south parking lot, of similar capacity, were available for use. 257/

Concurrent with the start of phase one of the move -- on the night of 18 September 1961 -- the new headquarters telephone switchboard facility was put into service. For a short time telephone operators were instructed to respond to all incoming calls by saying, "Central Intelligence Agency" instead of "Executive 3-6115." This change in procedure attracted significant attention; extensive publicity was already being given by the news media to the CIA relocation, and this new departure from secrecy was rich grist for the journalistic mills; the previous method of answering calls was resumed after a few weeks. 258/

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By 13 November 1961 the move into the north half of the building was completed, and by 15 May 1962 the entire move had been accomplished. Problems of winter weather, security escorts, communications, transportation, supplies and supply operations -- new modular furniture, rugs and drapes, and other specially ordered equipment -- as well as the mail* and courier distribution schemes, all had been overcome to a large extent. 259/ Decorating and decor, including both the planned sculptures for the main entrance area and interior office and hall colors, hangings, and the like, were a continuing problem throughout the planning and construction phase. 260/ Heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems also presented problems. On 12 June 1962, however, the DDS directed D/OL to inform Public Buildings

* Relocation Bulletin No. 33 was issued to clarify a general misunderstanding in connection with mail distributed to the new Agency building. Actually Langley is the local name for a part of Fairfax County and has no political or corporate identity. Some mail received during this period of time, which was addressed to Langley, particularly when posted in the Washington Metropolitan area, would be sent to McLean as the nearest post office. The McLean postmaster reported, however, that most "Langley Mail" went first to the Langley Air Force Base at Hampton Roads, Virginia, and was then forwarded to McLean. Bulletin No. 33 corrected the problem.

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Service, GSA, and have them take appropriate action to correct the problems with minimum delay.* 261/

When the move was in its initial stages, the presence of the DCI-to-be, John McCone, who was not noted as a particularly patient or tactful individual, provided an added fillip for the planners and movers. Reportedly "very well pleased with the building" on his first visit to the site, 263/ he began to throw his weight around even before taking over as DCI. Furniture had to be switched, he wanted to have a closed circuit TV to the White House, he asked for comparative construction costs with the new AEC and State buildings, and he complained that the movers were defacing the walls. 264/ The new DCI and his staff moved to the new building on 29 November 1961, the day he was sworn in. He occupied temporary quarters on the third floor until the seventh-floor suite was ready in the first week of March 1962.** 265/

* In October and November 1962, there were still complaints about various items -- including air conditioning -- that needed attention. 262/

** See Appendix O for a February 1962 description of the new building, including the site and all major facilities.

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A minor crisis was reported on the day after McCone's swearing in:

We [the DDS and John S. Earman, the Executive Officer/DCI] also had a considerable discussion about transportation for the old and the new Directors tomorrow, 30 November [1961]. This had been quite a problem. I talked to Mr. Dulles and made available the old Chrysler which he preferred to one of the Mercurys or other cars. Unfortunately, as soon as the new car was turned over to Mr. McCone, it broke down and I understand that he was considerably upset about it. We have done a lot of telephoning and are trying to rush his new Cadillac in from Detroit which [sic] I hope will be available to him Sunday afternoon or the first thing Monday morning.* 266/

The BPS Site Project Officer, stated in his monthly progress report for February 1962:

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1. COMPLETION & EMPLOYEES

0.12 percent of the superstructure contract was completed this month, bringing completion to 98.68 percent against an estimated normal of 100 percent. At the end of February there were 175 employees on the building contract compared to 295 at the end of January. All elevators, the escalator, and dumb-waiters have been accepted except four in Core B. The

* From his first day in office, McCone also was very much concerned about the parking arrangements -- including the esthetics thereof -- and the availability of parking space at Headquarters. 267/

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Otis Elevator Co. adjuster expected all to be ready for service by 21 March 1962. It will be necessary later to make these elevators available in order that they may be integrated into four "programs": night, morning rush hour, day, and evening rush hour service.

2. SITE DEVELOPMENT

The planting of trees and landscaping is 85 percent completed. The contractor, Greenbrier Farms, Inc., has a work force of 12 men on the project. Demolition of the "Tomkins-Jones" two story office building has started. The 13,200-volt temporary line that fed the South half of the building was removed and the road from the South parking lot to the South-west entrance is now open to traffic. 268/

Summary and Conclusions

The A&E office at the building site was closed on 2 February 1962; the auditorium roof tile installation was finally completed during May 1963; and the final payment for architectural and engineering services was made to H&A on 24 October 1963. 269/

The total construction time for the project, including change orders, corrections, and omissions, was six years and one month, from October 1957 to November

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1963.* At a total cost of about \$43.7 million,** the Agency had acquired a new, modern building with just over 1.3 million gross square feet (gsf) of space, including some 837,000 net square feet (nsf) of "office-type" space. In the spring of 1963, the new building housed nearly 7,300 personnel, and at that time office-type space averaged 122 nsf per person.*** 270/ Less than ten years later, by October 1972, office-type space had been reduced to 111 nsf per person.**** 271/

* See Appendix P, Figures 14 through 38, for photos of the Headquarters Building.

** Includes the cost for the Headquarters Building construction, clearing, excavating, grading, roads, utilities, powerhouse, parking lots (including the first part of West lot), cafeteria, auditorium, and fencing (security and property line).

*** This average excludes 121,082 nsf of "special use" and "storage" space and the 421 personnel using such space. These were presumably GSA, GSI, C&P Telephone, and other service personnel.

**** The available office-type space was reduced from 837,000 nsf in April 1963 to 720,212 nsf occupied by 6,444 Agency personnel in October 1972. The availability of office-type space was reduced as "other-type" space -- principally for computers and other special use machines -- increased more than fourfold over the 1963 figure.

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In both 1963 and 1972, the average office space per person in the Headquarters Building was below that for personnel located in most of the other principal buildings being occupied by Agency personnel in the Washington area.* By 1972 there were even sharper distinctions between the average office space available within and without the Headquarters Building -- in the Rosslyn (Arlington, Virginia) area, for example, the average nsf per person was 150 in Ames Building, 129 in Key Building, and 146 in Magazine Building. 272/

On an unadjusted basis, estimates of the comparative cost per square foot (psf) for the construction of the new building were in keeping with costs for the construction of both the Atomic Energy Commission headquarters building and the new Department of State building -- \$19.75 per gsf for AEC, \$23.04 per gsf for New State, and \$23.64 per gsf for the CIA building. 273/ Adjusted estimates of the foregoing costs indicated that since the AEC contract

* In 1963, for example, the number of nsf of office-type space per person in buildings where 100 or more Agency personnel worked was: South Building, 140; Westout, 121; Matomic, 122; Alcott Hall, 151; and Quarters Eye, 148.

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had been let in June 1956, construction costs had risen 14 percent; and the adjusted price psf for June 1959 (when the CIA contract was let) would have been \$22.72. Estimates of costs for the Agency Headquarters Building, when adjusted downward to exclude major site preparation and thus show a cost comparable to that for New State, resulted in a figure of \$20.64 psf. 274/ Even though the final cost per gross square foot for the Agency building exceeded the estimate of \$23.64 per square feet -- the cost ran closer to \$25.70 -- it was estimated that the new facility would result in annual savings in excess of \$1 million that would otherwise have been required for rental property. 275/

As mentioned earlier, the Congressional limitation on the appropriation for the new building insured that additional space for housing Agency personnel in the Headquarters area would be a continuing problem. In the spring of 1960, in fact, the DDS

asked Jim Garrison and to prepare as soon as possible a paper which would clearly justify the need for the auxiliary building. 276/

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In any event, no additional appropriation was forthcoming; and by the early spring of 1963, following a year of sorting, shuffling, and adjustment to the new building, there were at least 2,500 personnel in the Washington area to be housed outside of the Headquarters Building. They occupied 13 buildings having a total area of about 430,000 nsf.* By October 1972 this number had reached 4,600 persons employed in 19 buildings, with an area of approximately 1.3 million nsf. Among the other properties that were leased for Agency use in the mid-1960's and/or early 1970's were the Ames, Key, [redacted] Magazine, and Broyhill ("Blue U") buildings in Arlington County, Virginia**; and the [redacted] Building 213 in the Washington Naval Yard in the District of Columbia -- the building which houses the National Photographic Interpretation Center --

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* This figure excludes space for the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

** The name "Blue U" was derived from the vivid blue color of the building at 1000 N. Glebe Road. For many years it was the headquarters for the Office of Training.

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CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Support Services Historical Series

SUPPLY DIVISION
1951 THROUGH 1970

~~Secret~~

OL-15

September 1972

Copy 1 of 4

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
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THE SUPPORT SERVICES HISTORICAL SERIES

OL-15

SUPPLY DIVISION
1951 THROUGH 1970


by*Revised and Updated**by*

September 1972

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John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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This history is based in large part on the personal reminiscences of [] Chief, Supply Division, April 1970 - March 1971 and a career supply officer since 1952. If the report sometimes appears to be too laudatory of the Division's efforts, perhaps it is attributable to the generally high morale that frequently saw Division personnel -- in [] [] field jobs and in Headquarters assignments -- overcome unrealistic deadlines, apparent shortages of supplies, and continuing shortages of personnel to achieve the basic goals of the Logistics effort.

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~~SECRET~~SUPPLY DIVISION1951 THROUGH 1970I. Introduction

The Supply Division was established in April 1951 as a component within the Office of Procurement and Supply under the Deputy Director of Administration, presently (1971) identified as the Deputy Director for Support.* With the establishment of this Division, the supply functions that were being performed in many different components of the organization -- and in each of the Directorates -- were consolidated in a stable structure under a single office head.

From its origin, the Supply Division grew in size and in relative importance in the Office of Logistics structure. It is probably best known as that element within the Office of Logistics that is most directly involved with materiel support of Agency operations,

* See Figure 1, Supply Division, Organization Chart, 1951, p.2.


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FIGURE 1

Organizational Chart - Procurement and Supply Office, Supply Division

June 1952

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As will be noted through

this history, many changes have taken place within the structure and mission of the Supply Division with the objective of providing the most effective and efficient support to the customers.*

Prior to the establishment of the Supply Division, the Agency's system was a melange of several unrelated, ineffective, and hard-to-manage operations. Following careful review and study under the direction of the Director of Logistics and the Chief of the Supply Division, there was established a vastly improved, uniform system tailored largely after the procedures and systems used throughout the Department of Defense (DOD).

While acknowledging the debt owed DOD, it should be recognized that in many respects the Agency's supply system is unique among Government agencies. Chief among these differences are [redacted]

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* See Appendix A, Chronology.



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The supply system grew from a mixture of manual-
system techniques to a punch-card system, which was

* See Chapter II.

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initiated late in 1952 and completed in 1953. That situation prevailed until approximately 1959, when the first computer operations were brought into play. The computer system initially established was an improvement over the punch-card system, but it was not truly an efficient computer operation -- it might best be identified as a conversion of mechanical techniques from the punch-card operation to the use of computer equipment. The faults found in this 1959 system resulted from the failure to study the system in depth, particularly to provide for a proper feasibility study with appropriate functional reviews.

Although the new system was an improvement, it did not satisfactorily meet the total requirements; but, with some minor modifications, the system remains in operation to date. A new supply system as part of the entire logistics system is presently (1971) the objective of a task force composed of representatives of the Office of the Deputy Director for Support (DDS) and the Office of Computer Services (OCS).

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The requirements for the new system have been coordinated in all facets with the Office of Logistics and with Supply Division. The target now set for the implementation of the new system is 1 July 1972. This new system should bring to bear on the present Supply operations all of the benefits and capabilities of third-generation computers. It is hoped that the new system will eliminate many of the present manual operations and will give better, faster, and more accurate service to the Agency's operational activities.

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II. 1951 Through 1955Origin of Supply Division

Before April 1951 the functions of supply were carried on by individual components located in the individual Directorates and in the Office of General Services. The physical depot operations were being performed in four different locations in the metropolitan area; the administrative and management supply functions were being performed in some instances within these warehouse complexes, and in other instances in the offices of the administrative directorates.

The warehouse activities were located in the Briggs Warehouse,

[redacted], Bethesda, Maryland; the Rosslyn Warehouse, [redacted] (b)(1)
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[redacted] Rosslyn, Virginia; the M Street Warehouse, [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted] Washington, D. C.; and in the Wisconsin Avenue Ware-

house, [redacted] Washington, D. C.

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In April 1951 the decision was made to consolidate all the supply functions as a single component -- Supply Division -- in the Office of Procurement and Supply and under the Deputy Director of Administration. With the establishment of this Division, the various functions performed in all of the decentralized locations and in other components of the organization were brought together under the

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administration of one office. Since the origin of Supply Division its mission has not materially changed. 1/* The current (1971) mission is as follows:

- (1) To provide materiel support to Agency operations worldwide.
- (2) To formulate and administer policy for the operation of the Agency supply system worldwide.
- (3) To train personnel for supply operations and to provide trained personnel required for supply and general logistics activities worldwide.

Similarly, the functions of Supply Division have been essentially unchanged for many years:

- (1) To forecast materiel requirements to the maximum extent possible by the use of issue experience, operations and plans programs, and other plans and bases available. This Division must take action on materiel moving into the Agency logistics system in quantities and at the time as justified by available information and planning data.
- (2) To fill from resources (depot stocks), from procurement through commercial sources, or from other Government agencies the requirements for materiel requisitioned by operating components.
- (3) To operate domestic depots.



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* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix J.

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(5) To provide technical guidance and assistance to Agency components as required in establishing and operating Agency supply functions.

(6) To establish and maintain routine operating liaison with other Federal agencies, with the District of Columbia, and with adjacent Government officials on matters pertaining to materiel acquisition, transportation of materiel, and vehicle registration and documentation.

(7) To establish and maintain liaison with commercial firms in matters such as booking and shipment of materiel; packing and packaging techniques; and warehousing procedures, systems, and equipment.

(8) To effect maximum utilization of excess property available from other Government agencies -- that is, from General Services Administration (GSA) or from the Department of Defense (DOD) excess channels.

(9) To maintain a constant review of materiel assets to determine those items which may be excess to organization needs and to coordinate these reviews with Agency technical components and potential users. To make determinations as to the disposition transfer of materiel and to dispose of any unserviceable materiel within the above assets.

(10) To monitor the Agency motor vehicle program, maintain a Consolidated Table of Vehicular Allowances (CTVA) for all Agency components, and to maintain the Central Agency Vehicle Records.

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Consolidation of Physical Storage Facilities at

In May 1952 a survey of the Supply Division warehouse facilities in the Washington metropolitan area was initiated. The findings of this survey, relative to security problems and efficiencies in operations,

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justified the recommendations that a single depot was required.

In May 1953, accordingly, the Director of Logistics, James A.

Garrison, approved the acquisition of the

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This

consolidation of the stocks and the physical operations was an improvement over the previous arrangement. The receipt, storage, issue, packing, crating, inspection, surveillance, and shipment of Agency materiel in the Washington area was now consolidated under one roof. With this new alignment, the need for the other warehouse activities no longer existed, and the other properties were

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disposed of in the natural course of events.

Consolidation of Administrative Functions

With the consolidation of the physical operations of Supply Division completed, the next task was to consolidate the administrative and management functions of Supply Division. These functions (previously located in various buildings, the warehouses themselves, and -- in some instances -- in the operating components of other Directorates administering the fractured supply system) were brought together under the Chief of Supply Division and as a component of the Office of Procurement and Supply. These consolidated administrative and management functions were relocated in the "Quarters Eye" building located along Ohio Drive between the Potomac River and the Tidal Basin in Washington, D. C. It was soon evident to all concerned that the centralization of the Supply Division administrative and management function in one location meant that meeting the materiel support requirements for operating components could be achieved with greater efficiency.

Before mid-summer of 1952 the mission of Supply Division was primarily that of supporting Headquarters activities; there was little responsibility for overseas support except to give packing,

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crating, and shipping assistance to the Office of Communications for its overseas requirements. By July 1952 the Division was assigned responsibilities for providing materiel support to Agency activities all over the world, using all available methods and modes of transportation. It was decided in the summer of 1952 that Supply Division could do a better job and further improve its operational support

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Establishment of East Coast Depot

The East Coast Depot was established in 1952

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Depot. These commodities were primarily administrative, house-keeping, janitorial, and maintenance items and some spare parts for appliances and vehicles and some construction items. This

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Introduction of Federal Item Identification Numbering System

As stated earlier, the hodge-podge of identification systems presented many problems; and before any effort would be made to

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* For example, the number of shipments increased from in 1964 to in 1970. Statistics prior to 1964 are not available.

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mechanize the manual system it was necessary to determine what system should be used for item identification and item numbering. The system initiated by the DOD -- and subsequently adopted by the other agencies, including the civilian agencies -- was identified as the Federal Item Identification Numbering (FIIN) System. This system established a uniform numbering system with a uniform description pattern for all items of personal property used by the Government agencies. In the early summer of 1952 the decision was made by the Chief of Supply Division to adopt the FIIN System. The details of the FIIN System are contained in Appendix H, Agency Supply Catalog, and clearly illustrate the mechanics of the system and the benefits to be derived from this type of a numbering and identification technique.

In order to convert all existing records in the manual system (which had used multiple numbering techniques), it was necessary to corral all available personnel who could be used for this catalog conversion. The people selected were given concentrated on-the-job training, and then they proceeded to change the existing stock number techniques to the new system. Considerable time, including overtime, was put into this task to meet the target date of

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1 October 1952 for the complete conversion to the new numbering system. It was discovered in the process that there were many Agency items that were nonstandard in either the military establishment or other Government agencies, and the Agency therefore devised its own technique for assigning interim numbers within the pattern of the FIIN System. The techniques established in the beginning continue to this date (1971). The target date of 1 October 1952 was met, and all manual records were converted to the FIIN System.*

Conversion of Record Keeping System to Electric Accounting Machines

The next step in the development of the supply system was to convert the many manual records maintained throughout Supply Division into an organized system utilizing the punch-card technique and the Electric Accounting Machines (EAM). After the FIIN System was established, this facilitated considerably the conversion from the manual records to the EAM punch-card system. In October 1952 basic procedures were written for the processing and recording of all personal property actions involving the supply activities to be

* For details of cataloging "Agency Peculiar" items, see Appendix H.

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recorded with the punch-card system. The basic procedures adopted were modeled very much after the system for supply operations used in the Department of Army activities with some minor modifications to meet the Agency's unique requirements. The most significant modification that had to be introduced into the Department of Army system

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After completing the procedures to be adopted, the next course of action was to convert to punch cards the information contained on the manual cards. The Office of General Services provided the machines and personnel for the EAM System, and Supply Division provided the day-to-day activity documents, properly coded, for recording by the Machines Records Division. The conversion was scheduled to be done in phases, by categories of property reflected on the records by warehouse activities. This operation began about 15 October 1952; and -- while the day-to-day business was carried on as usual -- the

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conversion was completed by May 1953. The manual records for all storage locations and property accounts were discontinued as of 1 May 1953. From that time on, all recordings of activities were processed by the punch-card method and recorded in the EAM files. The management reports and documentation were prepared by the Machines Records Division on a scheduled basis to satisfy the operating requirements for management in the elements within the Supply Division as well as in the Office of Finance.

At about this time, May 1953, the General Services Office was liquidated; and the Machines Records Division became a responsibility of the Office of Finance, which -- in turn -- reported directly to the Deputy Director for Administration. In May 1953 the Machines Records Division was located in Alcott Hall, a temporary building on Ohio Drive near the Potomac.

Introduction of Financial Property Accounting

The next significant event in the history of Supply Division was the establishment of the program known as "Financial Property Accounting" (FPA). This program was established as a result of a directive forwarded to the Agency from the Executive Office of the White House.^{5/} The Hoover Commission, which was set up by

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the Office of the President in the late 1940's, spent two to three years in the study of the operations of many Government agencies. They zeroed in on the fact that Government agencies did not have an adequate system of property management, and one of the major weaknesses identified was failure to include in the controls and record keeping procedures a requirement for data on financial value of property. Such financial controls would serve to make all managers more aware of their responsibilities for the personal property under their control. The law resulting from the Hoover Commission recommendations required that all property records be priced and expressed in terms of dollar value as well as in quantitative terms. This introduced a new concept in property accounting throughout the Government. As for CIA, the Executive Office of the White House directed that FPA be established for the Agency's property; and in the event the Agency felt it would have any difficulty in setting up the appropriate procedures, it was directed to call upon the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) for professional assistance in establishing an appropriate system.

It was determined that the Agency could establish a system to meet the new requirements without outside assistance, and top

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
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management preferred to do exactly that. Accordingly, the Deputy Director for Administration (who would in 1955 be identified as the Deputy Director for Support) established a task force composed of senior representatives from the concerned administrative and operational offices to study the problem.* The initial task force discussed the problem in general terms and established broad principles which they believed were workable and could be adopted within the Agency. The next stage was to establish a working-level task force to prepare and write up the detailed procedures to accomplish the implementation of the FPA system.**

The working-level task force labored for a period of 60 days to design the essence of the FPA system. Forms were designed, codification patterns were established, new property documents

* Names of all members of this task force are not available; however, the following personnel are known to have participated: Maj. Gen. Eugene M. Foster USA (Ret) representing Audit Staff; Col. L. K. White from the DDA's office; Mr. Lyle T. Shannon from DDP; and Mr. James A. Garrison from the Office of Logistics.

** The working-level task force was composed of



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were designed, and instructional guidelines were prepared to acquaint all concerned with the specific details of the FPA system. The Office of Finance was required to establish a system of General Ledger Accounts for the recording of various actions, and these data were to be taken from the EAM records with copies of daily transactions provided as backup records for the Office of Finance files. The procedure also provided that there would be periodic (at least monthly) reconciliations of the General Ledger records of the Office of Logistics. Differences that were not the result of mechanical errors were to be brought to the attention of the Office of Logistics or the Office of Finance, as appropriate, to provide research and corrective action. This new procedure was introduced in the spring and early summer of 1953 and became fully effective at Headquarters and the domestic depots on 1 July 1953.

During the first 60 days of operations, several problem areas were identified. Remedial action was taken, and the procedures were modified to overcome the problems. By September 1953 the procedures were working relatively smoothly; and the system, basically, satisfied the initial objective for FPA of personal property. In the fall of 1953, the requirements of the FPA for the Headquarters

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and the domestic depots having been satisfied, the decision was

made to

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In the period from September 1953 through the spring of 1954, FPA procedures modeled after the Headquarters system but maintained on a manual recording system, were established in the main (b)(1)
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[redacted] For logistical and financial purposes

these stations were thereafter identified as Type I FPA stations. 6/

Development of Agency Catalog System

The next stage in the development of the supply system was for the Office of Logistics and the Supply Division to provide a catalog system and to publish appropriate catalogs for the use of

operating components of the organization. These catalogs were needed to assist in requisitioning materiel and to advise operating components of the categories and types of items that were available through the Agency logistics system. In November 1954 the design of a catalog publication was prepared, and -- utilizing the facilities of the EAM in the Office of Finance -- the first supply catalogs were printed and distributed to all of the Headquarters components and to the major overseas stations and bases. The catalogs were prepared in sections, identified according to commodity groupings, and gave specific information on the items contained in the system. The first catalogs were of some assistance, as there had been no catalogs prior to this time, but they still left a lot to be desired.

The introduction of the catalog system* and the publication of catalogs opened the door to the next stage, which was to study ways and means to improve the catalog to make it more useful and informative for all concerned. After some research and examination of various techniques used in other organizations, the Remington Rand Corporation was brought in for consultation; and they proposed

* See Appendix H.

a Flexi-Print (removable strip line) technique that required printing from plates that were photographic images taken of the strip-line panels.

This technique was a vast improvement over the EAM print-outs; and it provided an arrangement whereby the catalogers who prepared the publication were able to establish line lengths, arrange item groups, and provide for photographic inlays where appropriate. This Flexi-Print system made it possible to bring the Agency catalog up to a standard which, at that time, was equal to the techniques used throughout other Government agencies. The new technique also provided the catalogers with the opportunity to make individual changes within one line, or in a segment within a line, and replace the strip without having to retype a whole page as had been the practice with the EAM catalog printing system.

The Flexi-Print system remained in effect until about 1967, when computer-produced magnetic tape was introduced for type setting and preparation of the plates that were then used for printing the pages of the catalog. Just as the Remington Rand Flexi-Print system was a great improvement over the EAM-produced catalog, this new system represented a vast improvement over the Remington

system. Two employees in the Printing Services Division of the Office of Logistics were responsible for the development of the computerized type-setting technique, the EPIC system, which made the change possible.* The EPIC system provided the capability for rapid changes and for print-outs and reproduction on very short notice; and as a part of the present EPIC system, a program was developed using the IBM Selectric MTST machine, which made it possible to record the catalog directly on magnetic tape that is then fed directly to the computer. Again the Agency's current (1970) catalog publication compares favorably with systems that are used within other Government agencies. Early in 1970, Supply Division reached the stage where it published and distributed to all Agency components current catalogs for all commodity categories. This was a "first" since the cataloging system was introduced in 1954, and Supply Division was in the position of being able to maintain and update catalogs and publish changes as required.

* Development of the EPIC system was actually a joint effort between the printing expertise of PSD/OL and the computer technology of the Office of Computer Services (OCS). The two men within PSD credited with development of EPIC are Mr. George Z. Kunkel and Mr. Ballard Jamieson. They were assisted in their efforts by [redacted] from OCS.

~~SECRET~~Operations of the Building Supply Branch

Included in the original Supply Division mission was the operation of a supply activity for administrative items (office supplies) for personnel located in the Headquarters buildings. This entity, identified as the Building Supply Branch, operated ☐ separate (b)(3) CIAAct building supply points; three of these were major operations, and the remaining ☐ were located in smaller outlying buildings. Servicing these many facilities presented numerous problems, and there was a continuing problem of physically staffing the supply rooms. After considerable discussion of the problem, it was decided that the best way to accomplish the job would be to set scheduled hours for operating the supply rooms and to use a minimum of people in the supply rooms for a maximum coverage. This technique was applied at all locations except the three major supply rooms, and it proved to be an improvement. (b)(3) CIAAct

Another problem that was recognized by the Supply Division was the requirement for certain types of operational equipment -- cameras, tape recorders, portable typewriters -- that were not normally provided through the building supply rooms. The requirement for these selected items was usually on a crash basis, where

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individuals required the item or items for special projects or Temporary Duty (TDY) assignments. To satisfy this requirement, it was decided in the mid-50's to open an area in one of the large supply rooms located in the R&S Building on Ohio Drive that was identified as an operational supply center. Limited quantities of these special items were available for issue to individuals on a loan basis, with the understanding that the items would be returned immediately upon completion of a project or a TDY. This speeded up the entire process and proved to be a very efficient arrangement. The systems described above for the Building Supply Branch remain in operation to date (1971), but the functions were transferred from the Supply Division to the Logistics Services Division in October 1962.

Station One Operation

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In January 1952 the Agency had a requirement for a unique installation

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The primary component engaged in this activity was the Technical Services Division (TSD) of the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP), and the activity required a facility with

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limited storage space relatively close to the Headquarters area.

This facility was involved in a unique kind of business and curiosity within the community was unwelcome. It was decided to establish such a facility;

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to accomplish the

program objectives of TSD. The Supply Division's role was to perform logistics functions in relation to the overall mission. The operational control of the facility rested with TSD.

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It could best be described as an installation engaged in research and development. The activity continued in operation until June 1958 when it was closed and the Agency's inventory assets and technical equipment were relocated at other Agency facilities.

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~~SECRET~~III. 1956 Through 1960Establishment of Supply Management Branch

As time went on, the capabilities and the mission of Supply Division continued to expand and the volume of activities performed by all of the depots rose steadily. As the mission became more complex, it became obvious that the area of supply management needed serious study and revision. This responsibility was diffused through the Stock Control Branches within the respective depots, but there was no consolidated supply management unit.

Under the then existing system the personnel engaged in stock control activities and the daily processing of customer requisitions were also expected to establish and revise levels, to determine reorder points, to initiate replenishment actions, to be constantly alert to slow-moving or non-moving stocks, and to review and approve disposal actions for items no longer needed. With this scope of responsibilities and the daily activities of processing and editing of customer requisitions, the tendency of the personnel in the stock control activity was to concentrate on customer requisitions and keep them moving, and -- in turn -- to relegate the supply management duties to a relatively low priority. Under the new system

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all of the foregoing functions were to become the responsibility of a Stock Management Section.

This required review of project administrative plans, forecasts of materiel requirements, and constant analyses of statistical data that would provide a guide to the increases or decreases in the supply requirements. Over the years the Stock Management Section developed considerable expertise in dealing with supply management problems.

Another part of the problem in the supply management area involved financial asset limitations, which had to be properly used in relation to the statistical data leading to specific levels and replenishment actions. The limited financial assets had to be balanced against requirements. The funds for the supply management operation are identified as the Property Procurement Allotment (PPA), which is a corpus of dollars taken from the actual funds budgeted by the operating components for materiel and transferred to the Office of Logistics. The operating components' budgets were reduced by this amount, and in turn they received what was identified as Property Requisition Authority (PRA). The principle of this system is that for every dollar of PRA a dollar is included in the PPA. This technique provided the funding mechanism by which Supply Division was and is

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(1971) able to maintain stocks in the inventory to satisfy customer requests and to procure nonstocked items immediately upon call, as opposed to the prior system which required that each and every customer requisition would result in an individual procurement action, thereby causing long delays from date of requisition to customer's receipt of materiel. Although this system has met the needs over the years, it is not a complete answer to the Agency's property funding requirements. Regardless of the professional management techniques applied, each fiscal year an imbalance occurs between the amount of PRA "on the books" of requisitioning components and the monies available in the PPA, and this balance is invariably in the favor of PRA; for example, the property requisitioning components have more PRA than Supply Division has actual money in the PPA to pay for supplies and equipment. This situation has become particularly acute since the Agency's all-out involvement in South Vietnam and Laos. Frequent decisions from the White House have resulted in the expenditure of funds not included in the Agency budget. Usually the Agency is reimbursed for these expenditures, but long after the fact. Such unforeseen requirements make the management of PPA a thankless and frustrating assignment. As the

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end of the fiscal year approaches (the months of May and June), the thrashing about to keep Supply Division, and particularly its depots, operating and at the same time honoring customer requirements is an ulcer-producing experience.

Management Staff Study for Computer Application

In the spring and summer of 1957 the Management Staff, headed by Mr. John O'Gara, embarked upon a feasibility study in the Office of Finance and in the Office of Logistics to determine the adaptability or applicability of a computer operation for the systems being maintained for Logistics and Finance. The study was conducted by personnel from the Management Staff, with some personnel from the Office of Finance and no representation from the Office of Logistics. The team presented the purpose and objectives of the study to the Director of Logistics, who authorized them to proceed but requested that the Supply Division designate one man to provide guidance and keep informed of developments.*

The man from Supply Division also provided necessary data in terms of statistical background, defined procedures and processes

* was assigned this task.

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used in the supply system, and gave general assistance to the task force wherever possible. After collecting, presumably, all the information and data needed, the task force established that it was feasible to convert the Office of Logistics' Materiel system to a computer operation and submitted what later proved to be a rather incomplete system design. It was determined that the specific computer configuration to perform the task should be the RCA 501 system.

The Office of Logistics was then presented a position paper that proposed to proceed with this installation on the basis that the recommended computer system would effect considerable improvement over the existing system and result in extensive manpower savings by eliminating many of the manual tasks -- and the personnel performing these tasks with the punch-card system. Neither the Director of Logistics, Mr. Garrison, nor the Chief, Supply Division,

however, was enthusiastic about some facets (b)(6)
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hours per week) was insufficient -- after implementation of the system, indeed, Logistics personnel were obliged to work on week-ends in order to complete the weekly programming schedule. Mr. Garrison made these reservations known to the Deputy Director for Support, but the DDS endorsed the position of the Management Staff and approved action to procure the RCA 501 Computer system. The task force was then directed to work with the Office of Logistics in the actual implementation of the proposed computer system. 7/ This did not come to pass until late 1959 and early 1960. *

Initiation of the Property Type II System for Field Installations

The Financial Property Accounting (FPA) system was established in 1953 for Headquarters and the Type I system was established for major field stations -- the majority of the field stations operated under what was known as Detached Station Supply Procedures. **

* See Chapter IV.
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** A handbook entitled "Detached Station Supply Procedures" was published in July 1955. This publication was subsequently retitled Field Handbook [REDACTED], and then on 26 April 1960 it was rescinded in its entirety by Field Notice [REDACTED]. Stations operating under these procedures were considered a Consolidated Memorandum Receipt (CMR) Account at Headquarters, and their records were maintained by Supply Division.

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In the spring of 1957 it was determined that the Type I system was too cumbersome for some of the installations so designated, but on the other hand the Detached Stations procedures were not sufficiently sophisticated for some of the larger stations. As a result, a new level, subsequently termed Type II, was developed and implemented by Supply Division. Essentially the Type II procedures reduced the recording frequency and document processing requirements of the Type I system and at the same time provided adequate property and financial accounting controls.* To qualify for the Type II system, installations were not assigned a supply support responsibility beyond their own geographic limitations, whereas Type I facilities had, in addition to their own station, an area responsibility to support other stations or bases. In addition the Type II installations were not normally expected to carry any inventories other than the expendable items required for day-to-day activities. All of the equipment (nonexpendable) items at a Type II installation were considered as Property In Use. Conversion of stations began in 1958 and continued

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* The complete details for this procedure are contained in , "Field Property Accounting Procedures, Type II Accountable Installations."

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for a period of about 18 months. For example, [] was converted from Type I to Type II procedures in 1959.8/ At the other end of the spectrum, [] was converted from Detached Station status to the Type II procedures in 1958.9/ As a result of the conversion program, by the end of 1960 all stations were operating under either Type I or Type II procedures, and the Detached Station concept had virtually disappeared.*

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This dispersion of assets presented many problems, particularly when there were critical requirements with short deadlines.

Senior personnel of Supply Division were required to maintain a constant liaison with key military personnel in the Office of the

* See Chapter IV for the rebirth of the concept that would ultimately become known as Type III Property Accounting Procedures.

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
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
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
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items in Agency stocks without reference [] channels, and
once the materiel was packed and ready to be shipped, the Agency
could exercise appropriate priorities to move shipments either by
surface or air to overseas destinations. The volume of activity of
the Depot from 1964 to date is shown in Appendixes D through G.*

Establishment of Mail Order Systems for []

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Supply Division, with its domestic depot operations, was now
in a good position to provide efficient and rapid response to Agency
requirements for all major materiel support. In 1959 further review
of the supply operations and the system in operation was requested
by the Director of Logistics, and it indicated a need to improve the
handling of small customer requirements rapidly, preferably by a
mail order technique similar to those of Montgomery Ward and
Sears Roebuck. []

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[] with
ready access to excellent commercial and US Government facilities
for materiel support, were ideal facilities for a mail-order business.

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* Statistics for years prior to 1964 have been destroyed.

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In setting up the mail-order procedures it was decided to confine this service to the small, individual requests for materiel of an expendable nature required in support of an overseas station and having a critical deadline. The technique devised consisted of authorizing the overseas stations operating under [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct submit letter requests -- including a fund citation and spelling out the item or items needed -- through US mail channels. Upon receipt of the requests, either the [redacted] would go to the (b)(1) most available local source, including retail outlets, to acquire (b)(3) NatSecAct item or items. The materiel would then be packed and shipped via the fastest means, parcel post in most cases. Usually the deadlines were met, but occasionally there were slight delays.

This procedure also circumvented the FPA system by treating these items as a direct expense, thereby reducing the documentation and paperwork normally required. The mail order business established in 1959 remains in effect to this date (1971); and in 1967 the arrangement was further expanded so that stations in all areas

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~~SECRET~~IV. 1961 Through 1965Introduction of the Computer System

The feasibility study on the use of computer equipment for the Supply Division* was reviewed and coordinated by various components in the Support Directorate, and in late 1959 the decision was made to convert the Agency's supply system to a computer-driven operation to replace the EAM punch-card system that had been in existence since 1953. With this decision made it followed that to implement the conversion and facilitate the switch-over there was a need for a considerable systems review and analysis of the supply operations as they then existed.

The Machine Records Division, the Office of Finance, and the Office of Logistics designated available personnel to work as a special task force to accomplish the following:

- (1) Conduct of the systems review.
- (2) Preparation of appropriate flow charts of the existing system.
- (3) Preparation of flow charts of the proposed computer system.

* See Chapter III, p. 45 ff.

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(4) Preparation of appropriate implementing procedural instructions.

(5) Redesign and modification of the documents and processing forms required in the day-to-day business of running the supply system.

This task force spent from late 1959 until the latter part of 1960 developing the various system flow charts, procedural instructions, and forms. Late in 1960 the implementation was initiated on a phased basis by commodity categories. Parallel operations on the EAM punch-card system continued for a 90-day period until it was safely determined that the computer system was performing what had been expected and that the controls for balancing purposes and for determining the accuracy of the new system satisfied the appropriate management levels. By early 1961 the RCA 501 equipment was being utilized for the operation of the Headquarters supply system, and the EAM system was discontinued.

Experience has established that this conversion was an improvement over the punch-card (EAM) system, but it was not truly a conversion that utilized to the fullest the real capabilities of the computer equipment. The conversion might best be identified as a modification or improvement; basically it was a conversion that represented a change of hardware and not a total conversion to the computer system.

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The cause of this incomplete system conversion was the lack of personnel qualified to perform a thorough feasibility study and a thorough system analysis.

To have properly performed the task, the problem should have been surfaced at the highest level in the Agency so that it could have received the appropriate support and cooperation of all components that participated in or played a role in the supply system. Because of the nature of the Agency, the supply system is not solely the responsibility of the Office of Logistics. The very technical nature of many commodities involved in the supply system required coordinated action between the Supply Division of the Office of Logistics and technical components in the various Directorates. For example, the management program for communications materiel is coordinated with the Office of Communications; unique items are under the technical cognizance of the Technical Services Division in the DDP; security items are in the realm of the Office of Security; and medical items are the responsibility of the Office of Medical Services. These technical components provide the Office of Logistics with engineering know-how, program replacement planning, requirements, and technical advice. Personnel in the technical components also coordinate on

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supply management review actions in relation to technical items.

The conversion of the system from the punch-card to the computer system provided essentially the same reports and operated very much in the same manner as previously but with one additional major benefit -- Supply Division did have greater and faster accessibility to management information, and the preparation of reports to assist top management in decision making was expedited. There were, however, many facets of the new system that did not fully utilize the capabilities of the computer equipment. Primary among these was the time-lag between the submission of data and the actual receipt of the print-out. To be an effective management tool, data must be current, ideally available on a daily basis. The systems design imposed upon Supply Division at this time provided the managers with monthly and biweekly printed reports. Thus the data could be as much as 14 to 28 days old at the time the manager received his report. This meant that the manager had to total the intervening transactions manually in order to obtain the current status.

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In 1960 the Building Supply Branch operations* were reviewed by direction of the Chief of the Supply Division. The purpose of the review was to determine whether or not further improvement could be made in the operations targeted toward the objective of a further reduction of the manpower assigned to that activity. The man who made the study, [] visited the GSA's similar (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct activities and also two military facilities in the metropolitan area that conducted the same type of supply operations. It was interesting to note that in the GSA operation and also in the two military operations self-service (honor system) activity had been established. The self-service system used open shelves and counter stocks for common administrative office supplies. The customer, after selecting his articles, went through a check-out counter and presented his credentials, identification, or a similar instrument that established his bona fides. In the GSA operation a shopping-plate concept was applied because the self-service stores under GSA serviced multiple agencies in the Washington area, and the cost of

* See Chapter II, p. 39 ff.

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the supplies was billed to the consumer agency. The GSA operation was studied further and was discussed with the personnel who operated the program; their comments were most encouraging. They indicated that the consumption rate of supplies did not increase, that personnel were not hoarding these supplies, and by-and-large the system was working very efficiently and effectively.

With this background in the self-service system the decision was quickly made that the supply-room operations in the Agency's outlying buildings should and could be converted to a self-service (honor system) operation. No increase in consumption was anticipated, and there was a definite possibility of reducing man-hours involved in the operation. In the spring of 1960 Supply Division introduced the self-service system and arranged with the components occupying the outlying buildings to open the supply rooms in each building for a set number of hours per day to service all Agency personnel in the building.

The Building Supply Branch of the Supply Division was charged with the responsibility of visiting each of the supply rooms weekly for the purposes of stocking the shelves, straightening out the area, and taking action to supply unusual items (not normally in supply

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rooms) to specific customers in the buildings. This change in operations was another forward step in the improvement of the customer service provided by the Supply Division.

Establishment of New Criteria for Property Expendability (\$50)

Before 1962 materiel in the supply system was identified for accounting purposes in two major categories: expendable property that was consumed, lost its identity in use, or had unit value of less than \$10; and nonexpendable property -- identified as those items of materiel which were nonconsumable, retained their identity, and had a unit value of \$10 or more. The Chief of Supply Division determined in 1962 that the problem should be examined thoroughly to determine whether or not the \$10 criteria, which imposed considerable record keeping on a worldwide basis, was valid and if there was some way this could be alleviated or rectified.

Supply specialists looked at the problem and attempted to establish precedents used in other Government agencies, but the study revealed that this problem was handled in many different fashions throughout the Government. None of the practices carried on by other agencies really seemed to answer the objectives of Supply Division. After considerable discussion it was determined

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that the keeping of property records for items of a nonexpendable nature under \$50 was not warranted. This amounted to keeping records for the sake of record keeping. In the study, statistical data were collected to determine what impact a \$50-criteria would have on the system. The study revealed that the increase in the expendability criteria from \$10 to \$50 would reduce the record keeping and the documentation at Headquarters [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] approximately 59 percent and (b)(1) [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct at the same time would only reduce the monetary value of financial assets of Property In Use by approximately 3 percent. With this overwhelming fact surfaced, the decision was easy; it was made immediately. The next catalog publication sent to all users called this change to their attention.

The change was welcomed by all activities when they realized what this meant in terms of reduction of the administrative paper-work and record keeping. As a followup to this change, the Chief of Supply Division directed that as soon as any of the Logistics careerists overseas at the time of the change returned to Headquarters, they were to be interviewed to learn if the reaction was as favorable as had been anticipated. In every instance the individual interviewed

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replied very favorably and thought it was probably the greatest single change that had taken place since the Financial Property Accounting system was instituted in 1953.

Transfer of Inter-Departmental Requisitioning Section from
Procurement Division to Supply Division

In late 1964 Mr. Alan Warfield, Director of Logistics, requested that the functions and responsibilities of the Inter-Departmental Requisitioning Section (IDRS) of the Procurement Division be surveyed in detail to determine if this activity really belonged in the Procurement Division or could be operated more effectively in the Supply Division. The study involved briefings, development of flow charts, and step-by-step procedural charts. When the procedures in operation in Procurement Division were compared with the flow charts and with the revised procedures and documentation that would be followed if the activity physically were relocated in the Supply Division, it was very clear that some overall improvements would be realized. On 1 April 1965 Mr. Warfield approved the transfer of this responsibility and the transfer was made forthwith. 13/

Shortly after the transfer, Supply Division changed the unit identification from the Inter-Departmental Requisitioning Section

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to Inter-Departmental Support Section (IDSS). The new identification was a more appropriate title inasmuch as the duties and mission of this activity were far greater than that of property requisitioning. This Section was and still is (1971) the support entity that funnels requests from components throughout the Agency to other US Government agencies for materiel, services, the use of military facilities, tests and developmental research work in the various military technical research laboratories, and other unique service requests. It was quite plain that the term "requisitioning" as applied to property was a very limiting identification; the services provided by this Section have expanded drastically since they were relocated in the Supply Division.

Transfer of Freight Traffic Branch to Supply Division

Early in 1964 the Chief of Supply, Mr. [] raised (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct serious questions about the arrangements for transportation of shipments from our domestic depots. In order to ship materiel from any of the depots at that time it was necessary to collect all the information -- weight, cube, number of pieces -- and relay this to the Freight Traffic Branch of the Transportation Division, which -- in turn -- obtained the booking and scheduling for movement services,

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coordinating as necessary [redacted]

(b)(1)

When the bookings and schedules were firm, this information was (b)(3) NatSecAct

passed back to the individual depot, which would then target their shipments to be packed and ready to move on the dates indicated.

This was a cumbersome, inefficient system that had been in existence since the origin of the Office of Logistics with the responsibility for the movement of shipments charged to the Chief of Transportation Division.

This problem had been discussed several times in previous years and had been the subject of in-depth studies on two different occasions. The recommendations of the studies were that the function of transportation of shipments from the depots should be the responsibility of the depots. [redacted] presented his approach (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct

to the Director of Logistics and requested permission to make one more study in the hope of convincing the Director that the system could stand drastic overhaul. The Director of Logistics approved the study, and [redacted] directed the study of the operations in (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct the Cargo Branch of the Transportation Division. The study was completed in about sixty days.

The technique used in the study was to discuss the individual job responsibilities of each member of the Cargo Branch and relate

these to the statistical volume of movements made by the domestic depots. The facts in the study established that the efforts of the Cargo Branch of the Transportation Division were directed primarily to shipments being made by the [REDACTED]. More than 95 percent of the documentary and manpower effort in the Cargo Branch was (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct dedicated to the movement of shipments from and through [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. About 3 percent of the documentation and manpower effort was used in the movements of materiel by the [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct [REDACTED] and a very small percentage represented assistance to the [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct on unusual problem areas.

Putting these facts altogether, the inevitable was quite obvious -- the operations would improve considerably, the documentation would be drastically reduced, and the files could be consolidated by relocating the Cargo Branch of the Transportation Division in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to perform its duties from there. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Among the recommendations that were included in the study was the proposal that the Chiefs of the [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct be authorized to arrange their own scheduling and bookings through [REDACTED] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct and that in all instances the same arrangements should prevail for

the [] activity. The recommendations of the study were approved by the Director of Logistics. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The [] were then given the authority and responsibility for scheduling and booking shipments through any and all modes and channels -- []

[] This represented a significant change for [] (b)(1)
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct because with the consolidation Supply Division was able to use common files between the depot activities and the new Freight Traffic Branch (formerly the Cargo Branch).

It was possible to reduce documents significantly, and the personnel who had occasion to contact one another on transportation matters between the depot and Freight Traffic Branch were all quartered in the same facility. This provided immediate and ready personal contact to ask and answer questions that greatly expedited the entire transportation process.

This situation remained in being until 16 December 1964 when Mr. Warfield determined that from a command standpoint the Cargo Branch of the Transportation Division, which was located in [] (b)(1)
[] (b)(3) NatSecAct

He issued an order transferring this activity with all its personnel

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and responsibilities to the Supply Division under the command

responsibility of the Chief of Supply through the Chief of the [REDACTED] (b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

[REDACTED] As stated previously, the result of this action was excellent, and in retrospect it is hard to understand why this action had not been taken many years earlier. The improvement in the service subsequent to the change has been exceptionally noticeable, and personnel were reduced from 37 employees to a total of 29.

Transfer of Central Control and Distribution Branch

In the spring of 1965 Mr. Warfield requested another management review of the operations between Procurement and Supply Divisions to determine what functions, if any, might be improved by relocation and consolidation. This study was performed by a team representing the Director's immediate Office and the Planning Staff.* The areas examined did reveal some weaknesses and problems. The most significant one was that of considerable duplication between the Supply and the Procurement Divisions with customer requisition files, followup and expediting, and customer contacts

[REDACTED] (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct

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being performed from both Divisions. The inability to give quick and accurate answers in response to inquiries on the status of requisitions was perplexing. There were many situations in which the status of requisitions dragged and lapsed for unreasonable periods of time, and the task force recommended that the Office of Logistics establish a single unit where customer requisitions would be received, registered, scheduled, controlled, and expedited through components in the Office of Logistics. In addition this entity would be the reception point for all [] (Logistics) incoming cable and dispatch traffic on matters related to materiel support. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

The decision was made to establish the activity physically in the Supply Division. That portion of the [] located in the Stock Control Branch that related to customer requisition receipt, registration, voucher assignment, scheduling, and the like was combined with the Procurement Division's Control and Services Section to form a new activity that was named the Central Control and Distribution Branch (CC&DB) of the Supply Division. The responsibilities of the new Branch are covered in detail in Supply Division Instruction (SDI) 45-62 published in December 1967. 15/ (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

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This consolidation of functions was another progressive step in management improvement within the Office of Logistics, and the new entity was a focal point where a customer could -- by cable, dispatch, telephone, or personal visit -- get specific and complete information on the status of any items on any requisition. Not only was there a single point within the Office tasked with the problems of expediting through any and all components of Logistics and conducting appropriate followup with vendors to establish delivery time for materiel on order, but also the consolidation of files in one location resulted in a significant reduction in documentation and customer requisitions were handled much faster and more expeditiously than before.

The new objective adopted for the operation of this Branch was to strive to keep the customer informed about the status of his requisitions at all times thereby precluding the numerous after-the-fact inquiries that resulted in correspondence-cum-correspondence. Supply Division's working experience with this new entity since 1965 indicates improvement in the servicing and handling of customer requisitions.

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Development and Introduction of the Type III Property System
for Field Installations

In February 1965, at a meeting held at the [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
[redacted] and chaired by the Deputy Director for Support,
Colonel L. K. White, several administrative support problems were
discussed in very broad terms. In attendance were the senior
support officers from each principal DDS component, and [redacted] (b)(6)
[redacted] represented the Office of Logistics. Among the subject (b)(3) CIAAct
discussed were the Type I and Type II Property Accounting and FPA
systems. There was a general feeling that even though the Type II
system had done much to reduce problems of administrative clerical
detail at [redacted] field stations, it should be examined (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
for still further possible reductions. The Assistant Deputy Director
for Plans, Mr. Thomas Karamessines, made a presentation in which
he indicated that many of the overseas stations under the DDP could
best be described as "fly-speck" stations, [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
and no support personnel assigned. He was addressing himself to
the problems at stations of this size, and he was hopeful that wherever
feasible, the Support Directorate would find it possible to reduce the
administrative functions that were presently charged as a responsi-
bility to these stations. Mr. Karamessines made his pitch to all of

the Support personnel in attendance, and his message was loud and clear. The Deputy Director for Support requested those attending the seminar to give serious thought to ways and means to accomplish to whatever degree possible the objectives that Mr. Karamessines had cited.

Within the supply area Type II property and FPA systems were reviewed with the idea of finding simplifications that would assist the small stations. It became quite clear, however, that even a simplified system could present some administrative burdens that might be unwarranted at the smaller stations. The question was studied by qualified supply specialists, who determined that they could make some considerable reduction in the procedures of the Type II system. A new set of procedures was developed and published in April 1965; it was identified as the Type III property procedures; they are given in Field Handbook (b)(3) NatSecAct

In essence these procedures provided a jacket-file record system for the field stations or bases; and the accountability for the property at the Type III stations -- the very small stations -- was to be maintained at Headquarters, specifically in the Supply Division of the Office of Logistics. The computer system was used in a

manner that corresponded to the Headquarters Property In Use record keeping; and on a cyclic basis each of the Type III stations received annually a computer listing of all of the nonexpendable items that had been issued to or acquired by the stations during the past twelve-month period. The stations were requested to validate the accuracy of this computer report, sign the report, and return it to Headquarters.* This new procedure was well received by the DDP components, and as of the current date (1971), approximately ☐ stations have converted from the earlier Type II system to the new Type III. From all reports they are pleased with the new arrangements and with the reduction in the administrative workload that was achieved by the new system.

(b)(3) CIAAct

* In principle, the Type III system is similar to the Detached Station concept in use prior to 1960 (see Chapter III). The primary differences are in the frequency of reconciliation (annually in the case of Type III versus semiannually for Detached Station) and the format -- Type III utilizes the computer print-out whereas the Detached Station relied on individual, manually produced, documents.

V. 1966 Through 1970Closing of East Coast Depot

In early spring of 1966 the Director of Logistics, then Mr. George Meloon, decreed that Supply Division should study the feasibility of closing the East Coast Depot activity, thereby saving approximately \$265,000 a year. Supply Division was directed to perform the study with the assistance of representatives from the Office of Logistics' Administrative Staff and the Budget and Fiscal Branch.

The entire operation was thoroughly investigated and the results of the study indicated that the functions being performed by the East Coast Depot could very well be assumed [redacted] with (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct any great interruption or deterioration in service. There were, however, certain unique services being performed by the East Coast Depot [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct [redacted] which would have to be discontinued.* The Deputy Director for Support requested that the appropriate Headquarters

* [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

components be advised of the plans to close the East Coast Depot. The Headquarters offices for both the covert and overt activities raised no objections to the discontinuance to the Depot -- the services had been taken on initially by the East Coast Depot on a very informal basis as a result of personal contacts.

In the process of determining that the East Coast Depot could be closed, Supply Division also established the fact that one particular service being performed at the East Coast Depot would require special arrangements. This was the mail-order letter requisition service (a la Sears Roebuck) referred to earlier in this paper. It was decided that this service could be continued by setting up a new unit at the *

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

The closing of the East Coast Depot was justified by the findings of the study; the procedures to effect the closeout were prepared, and a timetable was established for the complete and orderly phase-out not later than 30 June 1966. In March 1966 the Director of Logistics submitted to the Deputy Director for Support a proposal that recommended that the phaseout be done in the following manner:

* For a detailed discussion, see Chapter V, p. 89 ff.

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(1) Cessation of East Coast Depot operations and the deactivation of the Depot to be effective 30 June 1966.

(2) The [] ceiling positions authorized for the East Coast Depot to be retained by the Office of Logistics to provide for any additional staffing that might be required either at Headquarters or specifically in the [] facilities to continue the mail-order requisition services previously performed for overseas stations. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

(3) That the Office of Logistics, through the Special Support Assistant, Deputy Director for Support (SSA-DD/S), initiate action to revise the pertinent field notices and directives advising the overseas installations that the services would be discontinued, and also to advise all of the components [] of plans to discontinue services at the East Coast Depot. (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

Although the objective was to complete the phase-out not later than 1 July 1966, it was not until 23 July 1966 that the Deputy Director for Support officially approved the proposal. This approval is noted in a memorandum from the Director of Logistics to the Deputy Director for Support dated 3 July 1966. 17/ The Deputy Director for Support concurred in the proposal but decided that he would ask for the Executive Director-Comptroller's approval; and he accordingly forwarded the proposal to the Executive Director-Comptroller asking for his concurrence in the phase out. The Executive Director-Comptroller, then Colonel L. K. White, approved the proposal on 4 August 1966, and the activity was then scheduled for closing not

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later than December 1966. This was accomplished in accordance with that schedule, and on or about the first of December 1966 all operations had ceased [REDACTED]

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(b)(3) NatSecAct

A unique problem not originally anticipated developed in the phase-out. The problem involved the actual separation of the

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

odd such employees, including the guards assigned to the Depot, all had to be relocated or released in a manner that was acceptable to the local Civil Service authorities. Some few of the employees who were qualified elected to retire; some were relocated in other Civil Service positions in the area; but many of the employees were separated and not re-employed by other Government agencies in the area. This presented the problem of severance pay for those employees who neither retired nor were rehired by other Government agencies. These employees were entitled, according to the local Civil Service's regulations [REDACTED] to a severance pay based upon their years of service and their salary scales. The severance pay had to be paid by the Agency as part of the close-out arrangement. This severance pay amounted to approximately \$163,000,

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which in essence reduced the anticipated gross savings from \$265,000 for the first year to the \$102,000. Each year thereafter, however, the savings to the Office of Logistics and the Agency was approximately \$265,000.

Looking back on the operation of the East Coast Depot and the supply system as it exists today, it is clear that the quality of service being rendered has not suffered in the least by closing of the Depot. When the problem was thoroughly analyzed, the only


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Establishment of Special Projects Unit at [REDACTED]

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Closing the East Coast Depot in December 1966 presented the requirement for an alternate facility to perform the mail-order activities previously carried on by the East Coast Depot. It was decided to establish the capability as part of the [REDACTED]. Th (b)(1)
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new unit was identified as the Special Projects Unit (SPU) and was

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
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FIGURE 2

Organizational Chart - Office of Logistics, Supply DivisionDecember 1970~~SECRET~~

Supply System Review for Conversion to New Computer Setup

The Support Information Processing System (SIPS) Program that was initiated in 1964 has, since that time, utilized the assigned personnel in preparing material for the ultimate conversion of the present logistics system to a new, total management information system. Initially nine people with backgrounds in the various supply disciplines were detailed to the Materiel Resources Section (MRS) of the SIPS group. Until early 1969 those personnel were engaged in collecting information, studying and analyzing logistics operations, discussing details of the various systems and subsystems in use at that time, and developing new concepts in order to prepare for the ultimate establishment of a computer system that would utilize to the fullest degree the third-generation equipment that was to be used for the new system. In early 1969 the Deputy Director of Logistics, Mr. John F. Blake, was advised by the Director of the SIPS Task Force that the MRS was having difficulty in assimilating the information that it had previously received or had collected in its operations review. MRS was not satisfied with its progress in relating that information to the requirements of the new system or to the concept for its design.

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To overcome this problem the Director of Logistics, then Mr. George Meloon, directed that two senior supply specialists with automatic data processing (ADP) background and training be assigned as a special task force to work with the Deputy Chief of the Supply Division in compiling a package that included all of the requirements for the new Agency supply system. This two-man task force of set out to talk with (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct people in all elements of the Supply Division as well as with those in other technical Agency components that were directly affected by the supply system. Its mission was to collect information and develop concepts that would represent the kind of integrated operation visualized for the new computer system. The task force was charged with the responsibility of assimilating the information and coordinating the requirements with those other components, which included the Office of Communications, the Technical Services Division, the Office of ELINT, and the Office of Medical Services. The two-man task force worked for a period of about 18 months to complete the total package of system requirements.

In the late fall of 1970 the last portion of the concept and requirements package was released to MRS. From all indications, any

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question or problems that required clarification or further explanation have now (1971) been resolved; Supply Division is waiting, as is the rest of the Office of Logistics, for the MRS (through the SIPS Task Force) to present the preliminary systems design proposal. It is hoped that the proposed system will encompass all of the requirements submitted by the Office of Logistics for the logistics materiel system and will provide a system that utilizes the full capacities of the so-called third-generation computer hardware. The tentative target date set for completion of the system design is July 1971, with the system programming completed and some degree of system implementation to begin in the spring of 1972.

Establishment of New Criteria for Expendability (\$200)

As stated earlier in this paper,* the change in the criteria for expendable items to \$50 was a progressive step. It resulted in considerable reduction in the documentation, record keeping, and other administrative requirements. This matter was studied again in late 1969 and early 1970, and the proposal was made that the level of expendability be increased to at least \$100 and, if possible, to the

* See Chapter IV, pp. 72 and 73.

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\$200 level. The statistical data that were collected to support the position were very significant.

Establishing the level at \$200 would result in a 49-percent reduction in current record keeping and documentation with only a 6 1/2-percent reduction in the dollar value of the Financial Property In Use Accounts on a worldwide basis. The increase in the level of expendability to \$100 would result in approximately 27-percent reduction in record keeping and documentation with relatively the same reduction (6 1/2-percent) in monetary value of the Property In Use Accounts. The decision to set the criteria at \$200 was made and coordinated with the Office of Finance. The recommendation was submitted by Supply Division to the Director of Logistics in the spring of 1970. The Director of Logistics concurred in the recommendation and forwarded it to the Office of the Deputy Director for Support. This proposal was approved and was implemented on 1 July 1970.18/

This change represented another progressive achievement in the record keeping and the administrative documentation requirements -- minimizing record keeping wherever possible, still complying with the basic intent of maintaining only those records needed to do the job effectively, and still satisfying the legal requirements for property accounting.

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VI. Support for Special Programs
and a Note on Personnel

The foregoing pages have traced the organizational development and evolving responsibilities of the Supply Division from 1951 to the present (1971). To complete the story and to provide a more pragmatic view of the Supply Division, this chapter offers some selected highlights of the Division's role in major operational projects; and it concludes with a brief word on the realities of professional life in the component.

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Supply Support to the Cuban Operation (JMWAVE)

Although logistical support for the Cuban operations is covered in a separate history,* it is only fair to indicate in the Supply Division history that the impact of that activity was extremely significant.

As the project developed and grew, it caused two major problems:

* See Historical Staff, Support Services Historical Paper by James S. Burwell, Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba, March 1960 - October 1961, OL-7, April 1971 (S).

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(1) It increased the workload throughout the Supply Division to satisfy the requirements for materiel.

(2) The project levied requirements on the Office of Logistics for qualified supply specialists in all areas and subspecialties of supply.

The details of the magnitude of the materiel support rendered to the JMWAVE project are contained in the JMWAVE history. The volume of the materiel and urgency of the demand required to support the project created a massive impact upon the Supply Division. In addition, the personnel requirements that were levied added further complexities to the problem. At the same time that the Division's workload increased to support the project, there was a constant demand for Supply Division personnel to be detailed to both JMWAVE headquarters and to field installations. At the peak of the JMWAVE operations Supply Division had a total of 27 personnel detailed to the JMWAVE operation.

Special Support to

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

In October 1962 the United States and the Soviet Union became involved in an international crisis over the building of missile sites and the positioning of missiles on the island of Cuba. Unlikely as it might seem, the Supply Division of the Office of Logistics played

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a major role in support of US policy.

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Note on Personnel

This history would not be complete without some mention of the personnel problems of the Division over the years.*** In

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

*** A complete discussion of personnel within the Office of Logistics is covered in a separate history prepared by Miss Marie E. Wenck. See Historical Staff, Support Services Historical Paper, OL-12 Personnel and Training in Logistics, November 1950 - December 1969, February 1972 (S).

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addition to training people to perform specific jobs within Supply Division, the Division also has a concomitant responsibility to prepare personnel for assignment as logistics officers in the various area divisions as well as assignments to the Agency's overseas installations. On the average, Supply Division furnishes 75 percent of the personnel filling logistics slots at field installations.* Planning the rotation of personnel is particularly difficult as the Division is often unable to anticipate the fluctuations in Agency requirements. An excellent example of this occurred during the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961 when some 27 personnel from the Division were ultimately used to support that operation. Again in 1965 the decision to beef up support activities at the Vietnam Station had a great impact on the Division because it furnished the majority of the reinforcements. Complicating this picture is the fact that although the Division currently (1971) has a personnel ceiling of [] of this number only (b)(3) CIAAct some [] are considered to be qualified for assignment outside the Division. In the past five years (1965-1970) the Division furnished each year approximately [] qualified supply and logistics officers (b)(3) CIAAct to other Agency components.

(b)(3) CIAAct

* Currently (1971) the Office of Logistics has [] overseas slots.

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Available statistics reflect a personnel ceiling of [] in (b)(3) CIAAct July 1954, and over the years this has declined to its present level of []. * This decrease of some 15 percent is significant when (b)(3) CIAAct balanced against the fact that the Division also assumed the duties of the Cargo Branch and the Vehicle Section in 1964 and those of the Inter-Departmental Requisitioning Section in 1965. While the functions of the Division have continued to expand, the number of personnel available to accomplish these tasks has shown a continuing decrease. Significantly, this attests to the ability of the Division's personnel to perform their mission efficiently.

* See Appendix C.

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Appendix AChronology

Prior to Apr 51	Supply was a function of components in individual directorates and in the Office of General Services.
Apr 51	All supply functions are consolidated under the Supply Division, Office of Procurement and Supply, Deputy Director for Administration (DDA).
Midsummer 52	Responsibility of the Supply Division is expanded to include not only support for Headquarters area but materiel support for Agency activities world-wide through use of all available methods of transportation.
Midsummer 52	East Coast Depot is established, <div data-bbox="760 1050 1334 1201" style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 354px; height: 72px; vertical-align: middle;"></div> (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
Jun 52	<div data-bbox="747 1218 1325 1354" style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 356px; height: 65px; vertical-align: middle;"></div> (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
Early Summer 52 - 1 Oct 52	Agency records for item identification and item numbering are converted to conform to Federal Item Identification Numbering (FIIN) system.
10 Oct 52-1May 53	Manual records of Supply Division are converted to Electric Accounting Machine (EAM) punch-card system.

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May 53 [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

[redacted] is approved. Stocks and operations of four warehouses in Washington, D. C. area are consolidated.

1 Jul 52 Financial Property Accounting (FPA) system is adopted. Henceforth all property records are to be priced and expressed in terms of dollar value as well as in quantitative terms.

Nov 54 First supply catalogs are printed and distributed.

Spring and Summer 52 Management Staff's feasibility study of Offices of Finance and Logistics to determine the applicability of being maintained for OL and OF is prepared. Despite OL reservations, Management Staff's recommendation to procure RCA 501 computer system is approved and a task force is assigned to work with OL to implement system.

1958-60 Type II Financial Property Accounting (FPA) system is instituted to replace Detached Station Supply Procedure.

Apr 58

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Late 1958-early 59

A mail-order business is set up sc (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
fill small, individual requests for
materiel of an expendable nature re-
quired in support of an overseas
station and having a critical deadline.

Late 60

RCA 501 computer system is imple-
mented to replace punch-card EAM
system for greater efficiency in
supply operation.

Spring 60

Self-service supply system is intro-
duced to outlying buildings in Head-
quarters area.

Oct 62

[redacted]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

16 Dec 64

[redacted]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

? -1965

Central Control and Distribution Branch
of Supply Division is established as a
single unit for the receipt, registration,
scheduling, control, and expediting of
customer requisitions to the Office of
Logistics. It is also made the recep-
tion point for all incoming OL cable
and dispatch traffic related to materiel
support.

Apr 65

Type III property procedures are (b)(3) NatSecAct
spelled out in [redacted] providing a
simplified system of property accounta-
bility for use in small "fly speck" field
stations.

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Dec 66

The East Coast Depot is closed out
and its functions are shifted to [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

Early 67

Special Projects Unit is set up at
[REDACTED] to assume mail - or (b)(1)
functions formerly handled by East (b)(3) NatSecAct
Coast Depot. Service is broadened
to include Latin American stations.

Spring 70

(b)(1)


(b)(3) NatSecAct

1 Jul 70

The level of expendability is increased
from \$50 to \$200. This measure re-
duces recordkeeping and documentation
significantly and satisfies the legal
requirements for property accounting.

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~~SECRET~~Appendix BSupply Division Chiefs

	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	(b)(6)
			(b)(3) CIAAct
	September 1951	October 1952	
	October 1952	February 1954	
	February 1954	May 1955	
	September 1955	September 1958	
	September 1958	February 1963	
	February 1963	September 1963	
	September 1963	September 1964	
	September 1964	July 1966	
	November 1966	April 1970	
	April 1970	April 1971	
	April 1971	May 1971	
	May 1971	Present	
		(February 1972)	

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~~SECRET~~Appendix CSupply Division Personnel Ceilings


<u>As of</u>		(b)(3) CIAAct
21 Jul 54		
18 Aug 55		
27 Jan 56		
13 Jan 57		
17 Jan 57		
29 Mar 57		
2 Apr 57		
8 Sep 57		
2 Aug 58		
17 Dec 58		
30 Mar 59		
30 Apr 59		
16 Jul 59		
11 Apr 60	(b)(3) CIAAct	
10 Jun 60		
1 Jul 60		
1 Oct 60		
Aug 61		
Oct 61		
27 Aug 62		
26 Feb 63		
1 Aug 63		
3 Sep 63		
31 Jan 64		
18 Mar 64		
1 Oct 64		

a/ Cargo Branch and Vehicle Section of Transportation Division transferred to Supply Division during this period.

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3) CIAAct

29 Mar 66
1 May 66
15 Jan 68
Sep 68
Sep 70



a/ Inter-Departmental Requisitioning Section of Procurement Division
and the Administrative Services Section, also of Procurement
Division, were transferred to Supply Division during this period.

Appendix D

	<u>Value of Inventories - Totals</u>	<u>US Dollars</u>
<u>Fiscal Year</u>		<u>East Coast Depot</u>
1961		(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
1962		
1963 a/		
1964		<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 50px; display: inline-block;"></div> (b)(3) CIAAct
1965		
1966		(Closed December 1966)
1967		
1968		
1969		
1970		

a/ Until late 1963 accountability for property was centralized at Headquarters, and the value of all Depot inventories was carried on the records of .

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

~~SECRET~~Appendix E

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Number of
Line Items Requisitioned

Fiscal
Year

1963 a/

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

East Coast
Depot

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(Closed
December 1966)

a/ Records prior to 1963 are not available.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Appendix F

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Number of Shipments

Fiscal
Year

1964 a/

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

East Coast
Depot

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct

(Closed
December 1966)

a/ Records prior to 1964 are not available.

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Appendix G

(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct

Tonnage Shipped

Fiscal
Year


1966 a/

1967

1968

1969

1970



East Coast
Depot



(Closed
December 1966)

(b)(3) CIAAct

a/ Records prior to 1966 are not available.

~~SECRET~~Appendix HINTRODUCTION TO THE SUPPLY CATALOGPURPOSE

This publication outlines the principal features and concepts of the Federal Cataloging Programs as adopted by this Activity. It also states policy and management techniques regarding the supply system.

BACKGROUND

Public Laws 152 and 436 directed all Military and Civil Agencies to "provide for an economical, efficient supply management organization through the establishment of a single cataloging system, the standardization of supplies, and the more efficient use of supply testing, inspection, packaging, and acceptance facilities and services".

This Activity plays a minor role in developing this single system but has the advantages of the improvements made by others. By tailoring our system to conform to the Federal Cataloging Program we are assured the savings resulting from Government wide purchasing, standardization, and supply management.

DEFINITION

A catalog means many different things to different people:

- a. To the man on the street a catalog means Sears Roebuck or Montgomery Ward, a price list of products for sale.
- b. To the librarian, it is an index to books and publications.
- c. To the college or university a catalog is the official publication of faculty and courses of study.
- d. To the head of a business organization, it is one of the essential tools with which he can effectively and efficiently manage his business.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The objective of the Federal Cataloging Program is to produce a "common language of supply" having:

- a. One Name
- b. One Description
- c. One Classification
- d. One Stock Number for One Item

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A "common language of supply" in turn facilitates:

- a. Discovery and Consolidation of Duplicate Items
- b. Interchange of Supplies
- c. Standardization
- d. Reduction of Inventories
- e. Reduction of Storage Space
- f. Reduction of Recordkeeping

MODERN CATALOGING

Becoming more specific, we see that "Modern Cataloging" changes some of the old concepts of:

- a. Classification
- b. Stock Numbering
- c. Identification

In the past, each service developed and utilized its own classification, stock numbering, and identification policies and format. The resultant inconsistencies and differences have been eliminated, to a great extent, by the Federal Cataloging "common language of supply".

In covering this "common language of supply", we will touch briefly on the following:

- a. Federal Supply Classification System and Codes
- b. Federal Stock Numbers
- c. Local and Interim Stock Numbers which apply only to this Activity

FEDERAL SUPPLY CLASSIFICATION

The Federal Supply Classification is a commodity classification designed to serve the functions of supply and is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to permit the classification of all items of personal property. In order to accomplish this, groups and classes have been established for the universe of commodities, with emphasis on the items known to be in the supply systems of the Federal Government.

~~SECRET~~FEDERAL STOCK NUMBER

A Federal Stock Number consists of an eleven digit number, the first four of which denote the Federal Supply Group and Class. The remaining seven digits are commonly referred to as the FIIN; the term FIIN being the abbreviation of Federal Item Identification Number. The FIIN is serially assigned as items are identified. Thus the FIIN is assigned to identify one item of supply, and no other item will be assigned this same FIIN.

However, the FIIN is not used alone in supply and merely constitutes the seven digit stem of the Federal Stock Number to which the Federal Supply Classification code is prefixed. As far as supply in the field is concerned, the FIIN alone is practically a valueless number; therefore, the term will seldom, if ever, be used in cataloging publications, records, inventory reporting, or for that matter in any normal supply operations.

Instead, we will use the complete Federal Stock Numbers to represent items of supply.

NOTE: Federal Stock Numbers are assigned by the Department of Defense (Defense Logistics Services Center). The Federal Stock Number is used by all Military and Civil Agencies.

INTERIM STOCK NUMBER

An interim Stock Number is a stock number assigned by Headquarters to items of supply only after it has been determined that a Federal Stock Number is not available for the item at the time it is processed, or for items that are peculiar to this activity. The Interim Stock Number is generally temporary in nature and normally will be converted to a Federal Stock Number. Items peculiar to this Activity will not be processed in the Federal Cataloging Program and will remain under the assigned Interim Stock Number.

Headquarters uses two types of Interim Stock Numbers: (1) the six digit stem is assigned one time, and (2) the six digit stem is assigned possibly once in every Federal Group.

Interim Stock Numbers in the series H00 through H09 have the six digit stem assigned one time as does the Federal Stock Number. This series of numbers is used when assigning Interim Stock Numbers to items that must be ordered before a Federal Stock Number is available. This series is also used for items of a sensitive nature which were manufactured solely for this Activity. In the latter instance, these are not actually interim numbers, but are used to identify the item throughout its life in the supply system.

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The structure of the Federal Supply Classification, as presently established, consists of 76 groups, which are subdivided into approximately 581 classes. Each class covers a relatively homogeneous area of commodities, in respect to their physical or performing characteristics, or in the respect that the items included therein are such as are usually requisitioned or issued together.

The Federal Supply Classification utilizes a four-digit coding structure. The first two digits of the code number identify the group, and the last two digits of the code number identify the classes within each group. Code numbers are so assigned as to make it possible to expand the number of groups and classes as that becomes necessary. In most instances gaps have been left within each group, between the numbers assigned to adjacent classes, to permit the insertion of new classes in logical sequence, when necessary, because of technological advances or to accomplish other desirable additions and changes. These Classification Codes are identified on pages 17 through 34 of this publication, in numeric sequence. Beginning on page 35 these same classifications are arranged in alphabetical sequence.

TYPES OF STOCK NUMBERS

The primary application of the Federal Supply Classification code number is in the Federal Stock Number. The Federal Stock Number for an item of supply consists of the applicable four-digit Federal Supply Classification code number plus the seven-digit Federal Item Identification Number.

Knowing what a Federal Stock Number is, the question arises, "Is this the only kind of stock number we will use for our items of supply?". There are four basic kinds of stock numbers (in Federal format) that apply. These are:

- a. THE FEDERAL STOCK NUMBER, such as, 5820-249-6590
(All digits; no letters are used)
- b. THE INTERIM STOCK NUMBER, such as, 5820-H03-3579
5820-H99-0239
(Digits and letter, letter representing
a Headquarters assigned number)
- c. THE LOCAL STOCK NUMBER, such as, 5820-L44-0004
5820-L77-0023
(Digits and letter, letter representing
a Field assigned number)
- d. THE "WASH" STOCK NUMBER, such as, 5905-W00-0001
1005-W00-1234
(Digits and letter, letter representing
a Headquarters assigned number for one-
time use)

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Interim Stock Numbers in the H99 series can have the six digit stem assigned once in every Federal Group (possibly 76 times). This series of numbers is used when assigning Interim Stock Numbers to items that are nonexpendable, non-standard to this Activity and that accountability will be maintained by Headquarters Property-In-Use accounts. It can readily be seen that the Federal Supply Class (first four digits) cannot be changed on this type number; therefore, to move an item into a different class would automatically cancel the original stock number and necessitate assignment of a new Interim Stock Number. This type of stock number will not appear in the Supply Catalog.

LOCAL STOCK NUMBERS

Local Stock Numbers are assigned by Field Units usually for locally procured items that cannot be identified by a Federal or Interim Stock Number. These numbers are required when the item is to be carried in on hand or in use inventories. It is necessary that the Federal Supply Classification Code be correct, and this code can be found in the Alphabetical Index to Federal Supply Classification Codes of this publication.

WASH STOCK NUMBERS

Wash Stock Numbers are assigned by Headquarters for non-standard items which cannot be identified by a Federal or Interim Stock Number. These numbers are for one time computer use and allows financial data to be retrieved from historical data. These numbers are of no value to requisitioners for reorder purposes except in certain specified instances.

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
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(b)(3) NatSecAct

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Appendix J *

1. Logistics Instruction [redacted], Jun 69. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
2. Domestic Real Property Report, Mar 53
Form No. 36-219. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
3. [redacted]
4. [redacted] (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
5. Public Law 81-784, Budget and Accounting Procedures Act.
6. Field Handbook [redacted], Financial Accounting Procedures
for Property (Revised 1969). S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
7. Comments of [redacted], solicited 1 Jun 71. S. (b)(6)
Notes on file OL/SD/FSB. (b)(3) CIAAct
8. [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
9. [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
10. [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
11. [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
12. Logistics Notice [redacted], 28 Jul 58. S. Copy on file (b)(3) NatSecAct
Real Estate and Construction Division (RECD), OL.

* Unless otherwise noted, documents are in the files of the Supply Division.

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13. Logistics Notice [redacted], subj: Reorganization, 22 Mar 65, effective date 1 Apr 65. S. On file OL Records and Services Branch. (b)(3) NatSecAct
14. [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
15. Supply Division Instruction [redacted], Dec 67. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
16. Field Handbook [redacted], Administrative Reporting for Small Stations. 6 Apr 65. S. (b)(3) NatSecAct
17. [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
18. Memo for Deputy Director for Support from Director of Logistics, subj: Proposed Increase of Dollar Value Expendability Criteria for Property Accounting, 20 Mar 70, [redacted]. Concurrence (b)(3) NatSecAct obtained from Director of Finance on 23 Mar 70, recommendation approved by Deputy Director for Support on 28 Apr 70. S. Copy on file, OL/SD/FSB.
19. [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
20. [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
21. Interview with [redacted] conducted on 4 Jun 71. S. (b)(6)
Comments on file OL/SD/FSB. (b)(3) CIAAct

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Secret


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Return To

THE CABLE SECRETARIAT
1952 - 1966

~~Secret~~

OC-9

November

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(b)(3) CIAAct

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THE CABLE SECRETARIAT
1952-1966

OC-9

by

Frank R. Reynolds


Revised and Rewritten

by

Burney B. Bennett

Approved by:

(b)(6)


Jack J. Keith
Director of Communications
Directorate of Management
and Services
November 1973

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Foreword

This history of the CIA Cable Secretariat from 1952 through 1966 is a condensation of an original four-volume draft completed in 1971. Because that draft is preserved in the archives of the CIA Historical Staff* and is available to Agency personnel who may be interested in the detailed records of the Cable Secretariat, this condensation does not include appendix material other than source references.

The original four-volume draft of the history of the Secretariat was written by Frank R. Reynolds, and a later two-volume version was written by Reynolds with the assistance of This one-volume condensation was written by Burney B. Bennett of the CIA Historical Staff, who was at no time a member of the staff of the Secretariat and thus relied wholly on the work done by Reynolds and on the documents included as attachments in the first draft.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

* See HS/HC-875.

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The Cable Secretariat

1952 - 1966

I. Origin and AntecedentsA. Predecessors of the Cable Secretariat

The history of the CIA Cable Secretariat-Message Center actually begins on 15 July 1952, some five years after the Agency was activated in September 1947. During that five-year period, of course, there was a cable-processing activity in the Agency, but it was closely patterned after those developed by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) from June 1942 to October 1945, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) of the War Department from October 1945 to January 1946,* and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) from January 1946 to September 1947. Although the July 1952 reorganization of the cable-handling procedure in the Agency brought about some major changes,

* Although SSU was not officially terminated until 11 April 1947, 1/ the SSU cable processing unit was transferred to CIG upon the activation of CIG on 22 January 1946. 2/ For serially numbered source references, see the Appendix.

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the basic methods and techniques practiced by the predecessor cable units were retained -- with, of course, modifications. It is appropriate, then, that a brief description of the OSS, SSU, CIG, and early CIA cable-processing units be given here.

1. The OSS Secretariat and Message Center

OSS headquarters was a small group of buildings at 2430 E Street NW in Washington. The office of the Director, General William J. Donovan, was on the first floor of the Administration Building, one of the smaller of the group. The Cable Secretariat, the central point of authority for the processing and distribution of OSS cables, was on the second floor, just above the Director's office. The Secretariat was staffed by Mrs. Frances Jenks and Miss Virginia Woodberry. The entire basement of the building, below the first-floor offices of the Director and his staff, was occupied by the Message Center.

Action responsibility for cables was assigned by the Message Center to appropriate headquarters units, and information copies were sent to other units in accordance with guidelines and distribution patterns determined by the Secretariat for each type

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of cable. Distribution was simple during the early stages of OSS development; information copies were furnished only to the Director, the Secretariat, the Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch, and a number of senior officers on the Director's staff. All distribution copies of incoming cables were plain-text paraphrases of the decoded messages. The paraphrases were written and typed by the code clerks, a procedure that was quite practicable as long as the volume of incoming cables was small.

By the end of 1942, however, cable traffic had increased to the point where Second Lieutenant John W. Delafield, chief of the Message Center operations, had to establish a typing section and specialized cipher sections. By early 1943, message centers had been established in Algiers and Cairo and elsewhere in the Mediterranean area. By the end of 1943 there were 75 administrative and traffic-handling people in the Headquarters Message Center.

By early 1945 the number of headquarters personnel had risen to 130, and about 400 others had been recruited, trained, and sent overseas to staff about 25 message centers in 15 different countries.

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In addition to OSS cable traffic the headquarters Message Center reproduced and distributed Army, Navy, and State Department cables that were of intelligence interest to OSS. In late 1942 the Message Center was processing about 1,000 classified cables a month -- OSS, Army, Navy, and State cables; by late 1944 the volume had increased to more than 4,000 a month. In addition, the Center transmitted official OSS unclassified telegrams to commercial telegraph companies -- about 900 a month in late 1942 and more than 2,000 a month in early 1945.

2. The SSU Secretariat and Message Center

In October 1945 OSS was terminated, and that part of it that had been concerned with clandestine activities was transferred to the War Department as the Strategic Services Unit.* 3/ Brigadier General John Magruder, who had been Donovan's deputy in OSS, assumed command of the unit. At the same time, Lieutenant (jg) Robert Thurn, USNR, was named chief of the SSU Secretariat, which occupied the same Administration Building quarters as had the OSS.

* There was also an intelligence research unit in OSS; although it did not remain intact after the termination of OSS, many of its personnel were placed in the State Department, from whence they later transferred to CIA.

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Secretariat. 4/ In early November 1945 the Secretariat was divided into two sections -- a Registry Section, which remained in the Administration Building, and a Cable Control Section, which was housed in South Building next to the Message Center, which had moved there from its crowded quarters in the basement of the Administration Building. 5/

Robert Waterman, a senior Secretariat officer, was assigned as chief of the Cable Control Section, which was charged with the responsibility for typing, reproduction, and distribution of copies of SSU cables -- a job that formerly had been done by the Message Center. 6/

Distribution patterns and cable addressing procedures remained much the same as those OSS had used. The Cable Control Section furnished copies of all cables to the Director, to Staff II (Operations), to the SI and X-2 offices, and -- when appropriate -- to the Operations Auxiliary Branch and the Personnel and Services Branches. 7/ In February 1946, however, the old OSS procedure of addressing cables by names of individuals or branches was discontinued, and a new system of addressee/addressor five-letter indicators was used to identify the originator and

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the action unit at headquarters. At the same time a new method of showing the authority by which a cable was sent was introduced*; all cables to overseas missions bore the words "SIGNED: MAGRUDER," and all cables from the field showed in like manner the name of the chief of mission as the signer -- regardless of the actual originator of the cable. 8/

In September 1945 Delafield, by that time a Major, left the Army and his job as chief of the OSS Message Center and returned to private law practice. At about the same time Captain Henry H. Eldredge returned from the OSS mission in Rome and was assigned as chief of the Center. By the time Eldredge reported for that duty -- in October 1945 -- the OSS Message Center had become the SSU Message Center and had been relocated in South Building in the west end of the third floor. In the spring of 1946 Lawrence M. Harper, who had served under Eldredge in a number of message centers in the Mediterranean area during the war, became deputy chief of the Center.

* These changes are noted here because -- with modifications -- they carried over to become elements in the CIA cable-handling procedures.

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Although the establishment of the Cable Control Section of the Cable Secretariat had relieved the Message Center of the typing, reproduction, and distribution chores, the other functions of the Center continued much as they had been under OSS. As noted above, there was a change in the addressee/addressor identification technique in February 1946, and by that time the paraphrasing step in cable processing had been completely eliminated,* but essentially the Message Center procedures remained the same. There was, however, a new problem that plagued the Center -- transmission garbles. In February 1946** Peter G. S. Mero, at that time Acting Chief of the Communications Branch, reported to Magruder:

The processing of traffic, particularly in Washington, was and will continue to be adversely affected by the fact that SSU traffic is handled by carriers whose facilities are not only handicapped by shortage of personnel

* Actually, paraphrasing was eliminated for the most part by the OSS Center in the fall of 1944 when a secure cipher system was developed. 9/

** Although the Central Intelligence Group was established by Presidential Directive in January 1946 and a Director of Central Intelligence was appointed, SSU continued to exist as a War Department unit until April 1947; most of its activities, however, were absorbed by CIG in July 1946. 10/

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but also by the use of inexperienced replacements. In fact, the communication systems of the Federal Government carrying SSU traffic as a part of their over-all traffic have reverted to routine "peace-time" operating principles, which principles are governed by economy in personnel and funds rather than efficiency and security. Furthermore, in this post-hostilities phase, intelligence traffic as such is not recognized as having any precedence over any other traffic and therefore is subject to all delays, insecurities, and general slowing-down of official U.S. peace-time communications. The messages, while encyphered in SSU systems and processed by SSU Message Centers, are therefore in the majority of instances extremely garbled by poor transmission and sloppy terminal handling, which results in substantial delays in the code rooms. 11/

Colonel William W. Quinn succeeded Magruder as Director of SSU on 4 April 1946; Quinn had served as Executive Officer since the establishment of SSU in October 1945. 12/ By June 1946 it had become apparent that SSU was to become a component of the newly established CIG; and on 1 July, in anticipation of that change, the Message Center was assigned the responsibilities of the Cable Control Section of the SSU Cable Secretariat -- a return to the OSS cable-processing pattern. To facilitate the change, on 27 June 1946 a complete revision of SSU cable procedures had been issued. 13/

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B. Developments in CIG and CIA, 1946-1952

Although the 1946-1952 period bridges both the life span of CIG and the first five years of CIA, there was a continuity of development in cable handling that can best be described without separation. Not until August 1952 was the pattern changed in any major way -- a change that re-created, so to speak, a Cable Secretariat, a unit that did not exist as such during the 1946-1952 period.

1. Organizational Development

On 11 July 1946 CIG activated the Office of Special Operations (OSO), a component designed to conduct CIG's clandestine activities. At that time the former SSU Communications Branch and the Message Center were absorbed intact by OSO and became components of the Special Support Division, which was under the Executive for the Assistant Director, OSO (ADSO). 14/

In 1947 CIA reorganized OSO, and the Communications Branch became the Communications Section, one of six divisions under the Chief of Administration and Services (CAS), who reported to the Executive Secretary for the ADSO -- referred to as the

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OSO Executive. 15/ On 1 January 1949 the Communications Branch, re-named the Communications Division, was moved from the office of the CAS and placed under the direct supervision of the Office of the ADSO. 16/ The DCI removed the Communications Division from OSO in July 1951 and established it as the Office of Communications (OC) under the Deputy Director for Plans (DDP). 17/ The next change, as noted in some detail later, came in August 1952, when the DCI removed the Office of Communications from the DDP and placed it under his own command. 18/

2. The Message Center

During the early period of the development of OSO -- from July 1946 to September 1947 as a CIG component and then to September 1949 as a CIA component -- the Message Center had few cable processing problems. The procedures established by SSU in June 1946 were effective in controlling cable traffic between OSO headquarters and the seven OSO foreign branches. By September 1949, however, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) had been established to handle covert paramilitary operations and had begun to set up overseas missions -- many of them in the

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same locations where OSO branches had already been established. The responsibility for OPC cable traffic was assigned to the Message Center, and life became complicated. Not only did the total volume of cable traffic more than double, but also new designations had to be devised to distinguish between OSO and OPC cables and to indicate OPC addressee/addressor identities.

Fortunately for the Message Center it was spared the chore of the distribution of OPC cables. The OPC organization was so complicated and OPC operations were so tightly compartmented that OPC decided to do its own distribution. Within the OPC Registry there was established a cable unit. The Message Center sent to that unit nine copies of all OPC cables, and a staff of cable analysts within the unit determined the internal OPC distribution of the copies. It soon developed, however, that many of the OPC operations overseas were of vital concern to OSO, and it was necessary to develop an indicator that would be applied to cables of mutual OSO-OPC interest. Such an indicator was devised but it was left to the Message Center to determine whether OSO or OPC

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should be assigned the action responsibility on a given cable. This problem continued until January 1952, when OSO and OPC were merged to form the Clandestine Services. 19/

In the meantime the Message Center expanded rapidly. In May 1948 it was moved from South Building to Temporary Building L, and its name was changed to the CIA Signal Center. At that time it was assigned the additional responsibility of enciphering, deciphering, and transmitting classified telegrams from and to the field offices of the Contacts Division of the Office of Operations (OO/C).

The first of these field offices, [redacted]

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[redacted] 20/ had been activated by CIG in January 1947, and soon thereafter field offices were established in

[redacted] 21/

The already heavy load of the Signal Center increased more than two-fold after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and by the summer of 1952 the Processing Branch of the Center was typing, reproducing, and distributing more than 12,000 cables a month. With little more than half of its T/O filled, the branch was always heavily backlogged; the [redacted]

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people in the branch were barely enough to cover an extended day that began at 0600 hours and continued until 1700 hours. This was the situation that the CIA Cable Secretariat inherited when it was established in August 1952.

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II. Establishment of the Secretariat,
1952 - 1953

A. General Smith Acts

By the beginning of July 1952 General Walter B. Smith had been in the DCI position about 21 months. During that time he had become increasingly dissatisfied with cable distribution procedures in the Agency. His Executive Assistant at the time, John S. Earman,* recalls that on one occasion during the first few days in July he tried to explain to Smith that because there were thousands of incoming cables each month only those that the DDP, the ADSO, and the ADPC decided that the DCI should see were brought to his attention.

Apparently this did not satisfy Smith. He said, "what we need is a Cable secretariat as I had in SHAEF -- there ought to be someone responsible to me, through you, who will read all cable traffic and select for me those cables he thinks I should see." Smith then

* This account is based on an informal memo written by Earman in January 1971. 22/ The direct quotations are given here as they appeared in the memo.

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picked up from his desk a group of cables that had been addressed to the DDP and other officials and told Earman that it was not proper for cables to be addressed to his deputies, that cables should be addressed to the Director, and that he wanted cable distribution to be controlled by a cable secretary in a secretariat. Then he said, "we must tell Mac [*] to set it up that way."

Smith then called General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, and told him that he was setting up a cable secretariat in CIA and that he wanted a Major Gordon Butler to be located and ordered to call Smith in Washington. Smith did not ask Collins to arrange for Butler to be assigned to the Agency -- he simply told Collins "I want him."

When Earman expressed concern that an officer from outside CIA would know nothing of the organization, procedures, and administration of the Agency, Smith told him not to worry -- "this is a sharp young officer who knows what I want; he will learn fast;

* Major General H. M. McClelland, Assistant Director for Communications (ADCO), then reporting to the DDP.

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if he does not, we will find someone else." Smith then told Earman that he feared that some blunder overseas might become public knowledge before he learned anything about the situation that caused it. He said, "a general who does not know what his troops in the field are doing is no good -- he is not in command."

A few days later Smith held a staff meeting that was attended by all of the deputy directors and assistant directors, including, of course, McClelland. Smith addressed the group at length on the treatment to be given incoming and outgoing messages, particularly the addressee and originator information. Speaking directly to McClelland, he said that he wanted cable procedures established that would make it clear that the DCI was "in command" and would have access to all messages through a command element directly responsible to the DCI and would eliminate the addressing of messages to subordinates and subordinate elements, both at headquarters and in the field. In the field the senior representative at any given field station was to be "in command" just as was the DCI at headquarters. 23/

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McClelland had his orders, and he carried them out promptly. On 9 July, only a few days after the DCI's staff meeting, he submitted to the Director a memorandum on "Establishment of a CIA Message Center." 24/ The memorandum first established the facts bearing on the matter:

1. The CIA Signal Center, operating under the Assistant Director for Communications, contains a Processing Branch contiguous to the Communications Center, which performs the CIA Message Center function but at a level considerably below the Director of Central Intelligence. It does not have the equivalent of a Cable Secretary.
2. Trained personnel presently assigned to this Processing Branch could immediately serve as a nucleus of a message center organizationally positioned under the Director's Office.
3. Current cable procedures, including distribution and origination principles, are not entirely consonant with the Director's stipulated desires.
4. Cable procedures, in accord with the DCI command and staff concepts, are currently being developed.

The recommendations were these:

1. A CIA Message Center, consisting of a Cable Secretariat and a processing unit be established immediately, and that this be done by redesignation of the present Processing Branch of the Signal Center as the Message Center.
2. The present Chief, Processing Branch be appointed Acting Cable Secretary and be

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responsible to the Director through the Executive Assistant for bringing to the Director's attention all cables warranting such action immediately they are received.

3. Senior Representatives or Chiefs of Station be designated for each station in the Field.

4. Covert Cable Procedures be revised in accordance with the command channels which follow upon the designations recommended above.

5. A firm Table of Organization covering the fully operating CIA Message Center be established after a development and trial operational period.

Smith approved the recommendations on 14 July and returned the memorandum to Earman with this endorsement: "Put in effect as soon as merger paper is issued and senior reps designated. We must also issue a cable correspondence manual." 25/ The "merger paper" was issued on 15 July 1952 and had an effective date of 1 August. 26/ It was actually a DCI directive that placed the Clandestine Services (which had been established in January 1952 by merging the OSO and OPC) directly under the command of the DDP,* at that time Frank G. Wisner. The chiefs

* The DDP position had been established on 4 January 1951 with Allen W. Dulles as incumbent. Dulles had been Deputy Director for Operations; (cont. on next page)

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of the CS area divisions were designated to serve as channels between headquarters and the various field installations and, in effect, would act as the Director's executive officers for their respective areas of responsibility. The directive also designated senior representatives -- later called chiefs of station -- in field installations and charged them with the responsibility for command supervision of all CIA field activities in their areas.

The final paragraph of the DCI's directive contained the charter for the Cable Secretariat-Message Center:

Procedures. The changed organizational structure recognizes only two command echelons: The Director and the Senior Representatives, with the Deputy Director (Plans) acting for the Director through the medium of the Area Divisions on matters pertaining to the conduct of clandestine activities. . . . Cable procedures will be adopted similar in general to current practices of other Government agencies. The Assistant Director for Communications will prepare for approval and prompt distribution a cable procedure manual in conformity with the above, and will arrange for the establishment of a message center, under the direction of a cable

(continued) that title was changed to Deputy Director for Plans, but until August 1952 the DDP functioned as a member of the DCI's staff, not as the chief of the Clandestine Services. 27/

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secretary, to centralize and standardize the handling and distribution of communication traffic. When in operation, the message center will become the responsibility of the Executive Assistant to the Director.

The Army Chief of Staff, Collins, had done what Smith had told him to do. On 22 July 1952, just a week after the DCI's directive had been issued and a week before it became effective, Major Gordon W. Butler reported for duty, detailed by the Army to CIA.

Butler recalls that he reported directly to Smith in the DCI's office and that the interview went substantially as follows: "Well, Butler, I'm glad to see you. How is Mrs. Butler? Take a few days to get settled in. You know what I want. Do you have any questions? Good. See Jack Earman for anything you need." The very brief interview did not surprise Butler; he had worked for Smith in the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington and later in the Secretariat of the General Staff in Supreme Allied Headquarters in Africa (AFAQ) and in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF).

Butler knew what Smith wanted, of course, but he soon found that to give it to him he needed more people. The Signal Center processing branch, the

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element that was to be converted to the Cable Secretariat-Message Center, had a T/O of [] slots -- barely enough to staff the Message Center alone. As he had been instructed, Butler went to Earman with the problem, and Earman initiated action. In a 26 July 1952 memorandum to Colonel Lawrence K. White, the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration (ADDA), McClelland requested the establishment of a T/O of [] slots for the Cable Secretariat. 28/ White approved the request, subject to later review, 29/ and Butler had a total of [] positions with which to work. (b)(3) CIAAct

B. Key Personnel Assignments

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The first order of business in the use of the [] positions was the appointment of people to fill the key slots. The Director had made it quite clear that Butler was to have the top position, that of Cable Secretary. Before Butler came on board, Smith told McClelland to nominate a CIA employee -- one with communications and operations experience and familiarity with the organization and administration of the Agency -- to serve as Butler's deputy. McClelland nominated Kenneth E. Greer, 30/ who had served as a communications officer in OSS, SSU, CIG, and CIA (b)(3) CIAAct

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and as an operations officer in CIA since December 1950. At the time that McClelland nominated him, Greer was serving as Acting Chief of the Far East (FE) Division's Branch. Smith approved of (b)(1) Greer's qualifications 31/ and the chief of FE re- (b)(3) NatSecAct leased Greer with the understanding that, after a year as the Deputy Cable Secretary, Greer would return to FE.*

The next key position to be filled was that of the Assistant to the Cable Secretary. Frank R. Reynolds, Deputy Chief of the Telecommunications Branch of the Operations Division of OC, learned of the vacancy and requested transfer to the Cable Secretariat. Earlier Reynolds had served as Chief of the Signal Center Cipher Unit, as Signal Center Watch Officer, and as Deputy Chief of the Signal Center. The OC career service board approved his request, and the transfer became effective on 17 August 1952.

The appointment of Reynolds filled the third of the nine additional slots made available to the Cable Secretariat. Four of the nine were earmarked for

* Routine personnel actions are not documented here; verification is available in the personnel files of the Cable Secretariat.

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cable duty officers. The slots were GS-12 positions, officially designated as Senior Processing Branch Officers. All four slots were filled by GS-09's who had served in the Signal Center Processing Branch.

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[] became chief of the Cable Secretariat Processing Branch, Morris F. Cascio became assistant chief of the branch, [] became chief of the Top Secret section of the branch, and []

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[] was appointed with "assignment pending." The remaining two of the nine slots were secretarial ones.

C. Establishing a Table of Organization

Even with the filling of the seven key positions in the Cable Secretariat and the anticipated transfer of the [] slots from the OC Processing Branch, Butler knew that he could not handle two of the major functions that properly belonged within the Cable Secretariat -- the responsibility for the screening of outgoing cables and the responsibilities of the Agency Cable Duty Officer. These two functions had not been performed by the OC Processing Branch, and consequently the slots of the 11 officers who did perform them were not to be transferred to the Secretariat. Butler felt that he would have officers

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capable of doing the jobs or capable of being trained to do them, but he would have to have 11 additional slots for clerical personnel at the GS-03, 04, and 05 levels to handle the routine work that those officers would ordinarily take care of along with their other duties.

At that time clerical personnel were hard to get and hard to keep. In the Secretariat the usual problems of resignation, transfer, and maternity leave were complicated by the necessity for shift work. These problems not only made it almost impossible to get the additional 11 clericals but also made it difficult to keep the clericals who would be transferred to the Secretariat with the OC Processing Branch; and when the first actual T/O for the Cable Secretariat was finally approved by the ADDA on 28 October 1952, it did not provide for the outgoing cable and Agency cable duty officer responsibilities.

The approved T/O was composed of ☐ positions, (b)(3) CIAAct
☐ transferred from the OC Signal Center Processing (b)(3) CIAAct
Branch and the nine established earlier for the Cable Secretary function. The ☐ positions provided for the (b)(3) CIAAct
continuation of the functions of the OC Processing

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Branch, the new function of the Cable Secretariat itself, and the additional function of a cable courier service. The document that the ADDA approved on 28 October actually listed the Agency cable duty officer responsibilities as belonging to the Secretariat, but one of the endorsements stated that "It is understood that certain of the listed functions (e.g., providing the cable duty officer for the Agency. . .) cannot be performed until additional personnel have come on duty. . . ." 32/

D. Assumption of the Cable Duty Officer Functions

The approval of the ☐-slot T/O did not mean, of course, that Butler had ☐ people to work with. Although the transfer of the OC Processing Branch personnel began in November 1952, by 1 December the on-duty strength of the Secretariat was only ☐ people; and these were spread among three eight-hour shifts seven days a week. In spite of this overload, Butler moved ahead with the effort to absorb the Agency cable duty officer and outgoing cable functions. In September he had reached an agreement with the ADCO, McClelland, that the Secretariat would assume the responsibility for screening outgoing cables

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before transmission as soon as 11 additional clericals entered on duty with the Secretariat. By early December, through the efforts of the DDP Chief of Administration (COA), Lyle T. Shannon, and the Office of Personnel, the 11 clericals had come on board.

That made it possible not only to take over the screening of outgoing cables but also to take the first steps toward assuming the Agency cable duty officer function. In August, Butler had proposed to the DDP that a Secretariat duty officer be authorized to function as the Clandestine Services duty officer during other than normal duty hours -- nights and non-work days. He had promised that within 30 days after its on-duty strength reached ☐ the Secretariat would provide the DDP with competent duty-officer coverage. He kept the promise, and on 29 December 1952 the DDP issued Clandestine Services Instruction (CSI) 5-3, "Clandestine Services Duty Officers," to become effective on 14 January 1953. On that day the Cable Secretariat Cable Duty Officer (CSDO) Staff began to function as DDP duty officers from 1730 hours to 0830 hours. At the same time, the CSDO's relieved the Signal Center Watch Officer Staff of the

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responsibility for providing duty-officer coverage for the rest of the Agency.

The DDP duty officer chores had been handled by the Foreign Intelligence (FI) Staff; and after the CSDO's took over the job, FI continued for some time to assign officers to act as advisers. The time spent by the FI officers with the CSDO's gradually diminished; and by early February 1953, FI advisory coverage had been reduced to a three-hour period in the late afternoon and early evening -- primarily to give the FI Staff an advance look at cables that otherwise they would not see until the next morning. Thus by the end of January 1953 the Secretariat had acquired the responsibilities for outgoing cable screening and, for the most part, Agency cable duty officer functions -- and Butler felt that he could provide the kind of cable service that the DCI wanted.

E. Administrative Support

A necessary part of the development of the Cable Secretariat was the provision of effective administrative support. During the early months of development, from July to mid-November 1952, administrative support had been given willingly and promptly when

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and where it was needed -- after all, the Secretariat was a creature of the DCI, and the Cable Secretary reported to the DCI through the Executive to the DCI. This kind of *ad hoc* support could not continue indefinitely, however, and in November systematic procedures and specific responsibilities were established.

This action took the form of a memorandum of understanding dated 13 November 1952 and signed by Earman, the Executive Assistant to the Director; Perry T. Johnson for McClelland, the ADCO; and W. L. Peel, Chief of the ADDA Organization and Management Staff. 33/ The memorandum was largely a confirmation of support procedures already in effect. A large part of the support came from the components of the DDA -- personnel, logistics, and security.

A significant minor part of the support, however, came from the Office of the DCI and the Office of Communications, which at that time was still a component of the DDP. Ruby L. Johnson, the Budget Officer of O/DCI, handled the Secretariat finances -- funds had been transferred from OC along with functions and personnel. Shannon, the DDP/COA, and

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[] Chief of the OC Administrative Staff, had handled the transfer of the positions from OC to the Secretariat and continued to handle personnel and placement matters.

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It was the last support function, the handling of personnel matters, that soon led to trouble. The second paragraph of the 18 November 1952 memorandum of understanding was:

The Office of Communications will provide all personnel and career management support for the Cable Secretariat not normally provided by the CIA Personnel Office. The career management of all Cable Secretariat personnel will be administered by the Career Service Board of the Office of Communications before which there will be Cable Secretariat representation when Cable Secretariat personnel are considered. All personnel actions on Cable Secretariat personnel will require joint approval from appropriate representatives of the Office of Communications and the Cable Secretariat.

F. The Career Management Problem

Actually the trouble started when the memorandum of understanding was in draft form -- about two weeks before it was issued on 13 November 1952. Butler didn't like the drafted "Career Management" paragraph and went to [] chairman of the OC career service board, and explained his objections. 34/ There were two: first, the criteria

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by which Secretariat personnel became eligible for consideration for promotion by the OC career board; and second, the provision for the rotation of personnel between OC and the Secretariat. [] didn't agree with Butler on either point, 35/ but he was willing to compromise; the draft of the career management paragraph was changed, and when the memorandum of understanding was issued, the paragraph made no mention of the criteria for promotion of Secretariat personnel and no mention of the rotation of personnel between OC and the Secretariat. (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)

The compromise-by-omission tactic did not satisfy Butler, and the issues were still very much alive. By April 1953 the situation had developed to the point where Butler felt that something had to be done about it. Accordingly, on 2 April he sent to Earman a three-page memorandum describing the problem, giving specific examples of situations that had developed, and giving his own views on how the career development of Secretariat personnel should be handled.

Butler pointed out that the omission of the "promotion criteria" and "rotation policy" in the

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13 November 1952 memorandum had been meaningless and the OC career board had applied both of them in the handling of Secretariat personnel. He explained why those two factors could not be reasonably applied to his people, and he recommended that the career management of Secretariat personnel be placed "elsewhere than in the Office of Communication." 36/

Earman discussed the memorandum with Butler, agreed in principle with Butler's recommendation, and suggested that Butler send the memorandum to McClelland. Butler did so on 13 April, and on 1 June McClelland called and told Greer, Butler's deputy, that he had no objection to -- in fact was in favor of -- Butler's recommendation. 37/ By 12 June a revision of the 13 November 1952 memorandum of understanding had been written and submitted for official approval. 38/ The revision was very much the same as the original; the only major difference was the wording of the last sentence of the "Career Management" paragraph. In the original memorandum the last sentence was:

All personnel actions on Cable Secretariat personnel will require joint approval from appropriate representatives of the Office of Communications and the Cable Secretariat.

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The revision that was submitted for official approval simply changed "Office of Communications" to "Office of the DD/A" -- a small change in words but a major change in procedures. The acting DDA,* White, approved the change in procedure but thought that the wording should be more explicit. His endorsement stated that his concurrence was subject to an amendment:

Acting Deputy Director (Administration) concurrence in Memorandum of Understanding, "Administrative Support Cable Secretariat" is subject to substitution of the following in lieu of the last sentence of paragraph two, "Career Management":

Procedures for giving approval to personnel actions affecting Cable Secretariat personnel prior to forwarding to the Personnel Office will be jointly developed by appropriate representatives of the Office of the DD/A and the Cable Secretariat.

When the revision was issued on 22 July 1953, it contained White's change in the wording.

Butler had not waited for bureaucratic wheels to grind. As soon as he knew that Earman had

* On 1 July 1953 the title of the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration was changed to Deputy Director for Administration. 39/

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approved the transfer of Secretariat personnel management out of OC and that McClelland had no objection to the transfer, he assigned his assistant, Reynolds, to work with the OC career board -- which no longer had veto authority but did have processing machinery -- to clear up the backlog of Secretariat personnel actions. still chairman of the OC career board, cooperated fully; and by 16 June 1953 promotions had been approved for three Secretariat officers from GS-09 to GS-11 and for one from GS-07 to GS-09, and promotion recommendations for three others from GS-07 to GS-09 had been scheduled. 40/ Before the actual transfer of Secretariat career management from the OC career board to the DDA career board, then, Butler's plans for promoting his people had been accomplished, and personnel affairs in the Secretariat were in good order.

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)

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III. Establishment of Policy, Procedures, and Services

A. Services for the DCI and the Deputy Directors

1. Distribution to the DCI and the DDCI

Within the first few weeks after beginning his duties as Cable Secretary in August 1952, Butler began to discharge what he saw as his most pressing responsibility -- furnishing to the Director, concurrently with other senior officials -- copies of cables that warranted his attention. To do this and to get experience that would provide guidance for his staff, Butler reviewed every cable processed by the Cable Secretariat. He gave particular attention to those received since the close of business the previous day. He began his review of the overnight accumulation at 0600 hours and made sure that cables he thought the Director should see were processed in time to be in the first delivery at the opening of business. His personal review of all cables continued throughout the working day and started again the next morning. In Butler's absence the early review was done by

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Greer or, in the absence of both, by Reynolds. As the number of incoming cables increased and the requirements became greater in number and complexity, Butler had to start his work day at 0300 hours. 41/

In September, after the cable duty officers had gotten a feel for their jobs, responsibility for the selection of cables for the DCI was delegated to them. In addition, and as a particular responsibility, they were to review all outgoing cables for statements involving national policy. 42/ Through Earman, Smith had made it clear that he expected Butler to bring such cables to his attention before they were transmitted -- unless other action was personally approved by himself or, in his absence, by Dulles, the DDCI.

Butler's early-morning examination of all cables continued as a means of back-stopping and monitoring his staff's DCI selections, reviewing cable distribution in general, noting and following up on the need for new requirements, checking on the proper release of cables, and checking the quality and legibility of reproduced copies.

Cryptonyms and pseudonyms contained in cables were "broken out," or identified, for the Director by

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the cable duty officer in charge. This was done by printing the identifying phrase or the true name directly above the code designations wherever they appeared in the text of the cable. Without these identities the text of a cable was almost unintelligible, except to those officers primarily involved with the project or subject. In late August this selection and identity service was extended to the DDCI who, until then, had shared the Director's copy. 43/

The Cable Secretariat cryptonym and pseudonym card file of identities -- inherited from the Signal Center -- was far from complete; and in instances when a search of the file failed to produce an identity, the words "No Info" were printed above the code designation. This service was provided only for the DCI and the DDCI, and Butler's instructions to the staff were precise: "There must be no guessing -- either we know, we find out, or we say we don't know." 44/

Butler's way of finding out was to design a small routing slip that -- if the cable was to be furnished to the Director -- the cable duty officers attached to the action unit's copy of every cable

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containing an unknown code designation. The slip was addressed from the cable duty officer to the chief of the action unit, it identified the cable, and it was worded to the effect that "We have no identifying data for the Director on [cryptonym]. Your cooperation in supplying us with an identity will be appreciated." When the identity was received, the cable duty officer passed the information on to Earman's secretary by note or telephone, and then a card was made and added to the Cable Secretariat file.

This method of obtaining data proved to be an unsatisfactory solution to the problem because it provided data after the fact when the obvious solution was to obtain the data before it was needed. Only a few "No Info's" reached Smith's desk before his displeasure was made known to the Cable Secretary, to the DDP, and to the DDP's senior staff. Immediately thereafter, a file of identities that the DDP had used in his Administration Building office was transferred to the Cable Secretariat; and area division chiefs were directed to furnish the Cable Secretariat with identities of all code designations that might be expected to appear in cables.

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To make it easier for the Director and the DDCI to read cables, in October 1952 Butler developed a procedure that involved the preparation of synopses for cables furnished to the DCI and the DDCI.* These synopses, "briefs," as they came to be called, were particularly helpful in cases where a current cable made reference to several prior cables that had not been furnished to the DCI or the DDCI. By summarizing these references as background in the synopsis of the current cable, the necessity for including the prior cables as attachments was eliminated. A half-page form was designed, and briefs were not to exceed the limits of the single half page.** This was a new responsibility for the cable duty officers, but they rapidly adapted to the requirements of condensing the substance of a two- or three-page cable to the half-page limit of the briefing form. This was no easy job, but the efforts were well received by Smith and Dulles, and within a few months other officials began to request the same service.

* Such cables were referred to as "DCI Selects."

** See Figure 1, p. 39.

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Figure 1

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct



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The number of DCI Selects averaged between three and four percent of all CIA cables processed; in October 1952 there were 573, in November 606, and in December 581.

2. Distribution to the Deputy Directors

In February 1953 the Cable Secretariat began to furnish to Loftus E. Becker, the Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI), briefs of those cables that were distributed to both the DCI and the DDI. Briefs of such cables continued to be furnished to the DDI when Robert Amory, Jr., replaced Becker on 1 May 1953. 45/ Also in February 1953 Charles V. Hulick, the DDP Executive Officer, requested that break-outs be made for the DDP's copies of cables furnished to both the DCI and the DDP. The Cable Secretariat complied with this request and in April began to prepare briefs for the DDP and to make distribution to him identical to that being made for the DCI and the DDCI. 46/

Allen Dulles was sworn in on 26 February 1953 as DCI, succeeding Smith. On 23 April 1953 Lieutenant General Charles P. Cabell was sworn in as DDCI. President Eisenhower had named Cabell to succeed Dulles as DDCI on 24 January 1953. 47/ The Cable Secretariat's

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selection, break-outs, and briefing of cables for the DCI and the DDCI continued as before, unaffected by these changes.

At that time the DDP, Frank Wisner, maintained two offices, one in the Administration Building near the office of the Director and one in L Building near the offices of his senior staff and the operating units of the Clandestine Services. Wisner divided his working day between the two offices, and -- because he could never know when the DCI might want to speak with him about any given cable -- he asked the Cable Secretariat to provide both of his offices with copies of DCI Selects complete with break-outs and briefs. The Cable Secretariat complied. The DDP's requirements for cables, and other than DCI Selects, were extensive, and a large number of cables were sent to him, copies of which were delivered only to the L Building office. These were processed without either break-outs or briefs, but were arranged in numerical order. 48/

In April 1953, break-out service was extended to the DDA, then Walter R. Wolf, for cables that were disseminated to both the DCI and the DDA. There were

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very few of these at the time, for one reason because Shannon, the DDP/COA -- later designated DDP-Admin -- had assumed the basic administrative support functions for the Clandestine Services when that component was established by Smith. 49/ Another reason was that in April the DDA's subjective cable requirements, and those of the DDA complex of offices, were still in the process of being coordinated with the DDP.

Cable requirements for the DDA had been sent to the DDP in November 1952, and there the matter rested until 17 August 1953, 50/ when agreement was reached on the type of Clandestine Services Cables the Cable Secretariat should furnish the DDA and his component offices. These requirements, which were approved by White on 31 August 1953, described three types of cables that were *not* to be distributed to the DDA initially but could be made available to him upon approval of the DDP or the action unit:

- (1) Cables concerning purely routine administration.
- (2) Cables bearing indicators which by direction limit distribution to specific offices among which DD/A is not named.
- (3) Cables containing operational or operational administrative information.

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The cable distribution requirements for DDA component offices contained the same provisions -- except (1), which was applicable only to the DDA himself.* 51/

3. Cable Deliveries

Although it was understood that the Cable Secretariat's responsibility for providing a cable delivery service for the Agency would be delayed until its courier staff entered on duty, Butler did not delay delivery service for the Director and the Deputy Directors. In September 1952 he established a cable delivery schedule that provided for concurrent delivery during the normal work days at eight and ten o'clock in the morning and two and four o'clock in the afternoon. Butler used Cable Secretariat mail clerks,

* These requirements remained in effect without substantive change until 3 February 1955. At that time there was a major reorganization in which the Administration directorate became the Support directorate and the DDA became the DDS. An agreement between the DDS and the DDP abolished the DDP Administrative Staff. Responsibility for the functions of the staff shifted with the career service transfer of its members to the DDS and the offices under his command. The functions of the staff continued without interruption under the direction of the Special Support Assistant, who represented the DDS in the Clandestine Services (SSA/DDS). Under this agreement the DDP delegated to the SSA/DDS authority for specified administrative actions within the Clandestine Services.

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supervisors, and cable duty officers for these deliveries, which were referred to as "hill runs."* Most of the senior officials on the hill were at their desks by a few minutes after eight o'clock, and the first hill run was timed to arrive no later than eight-ten. On Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays the first hill run was timed for nine o'clock, unless otherwise directed, and additional deliveries were adjusted to the actual work schedule of the Administration Building offices. Two and sometimes three deliveries were made on Saturdays, and frequently one or more deliveries were made on Sundays and holidays.

The Receipt and Delivery Section of the Records Integration Division (RID/R&D) of the DDP was responsible for providing messenger service for cables, dispatches, and mail within the DDP complex. This service included carrying outgoing cables to the Signal Center, carrying incoming cables to recipients, and carrying cables between divisions for coordination.

The DDP staffs and divisions were concentrated

* The E-Street area where the North, Central, Administration, and South buildings were located was referred to as "the hill."

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in J, K, and L Buildings, except for the Western Hemisphere Division (WH), which was located in Quarters Eye, a half mile away. One RID/R&D courier, [] was used full time for the ex- (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) change of classified mail between WH and other DDP offices. To assist the Cable Secretariat, [] volunteered to make deliveries of cables to the WH Division, the Office of Logistics, and the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI). 52/ [] (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) chief of RID, approved the arrangement and authorized it to continue after the Secretariat assumed responsibility for the delivery of cables. A similar arrangement was made with [] chief of (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) the Mail and Courier Branch of the Logistics office, for the delivery of cables to the Personnel Office and the Office of Training. Without this assistance from [] and [] the Secretariat could not have made deliveries to its Potomac Park customers (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) without adding an additional courier to its staff.

It was the middle of March 1953 before the Secretariat's five-man courier staff had entered on

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duty and was being fully used, one courier assigned to the hill runs and four covering I, J, K, and L Buildings.* Secretariat couriers handled cables exclusively and were not required to carry any other type of mail. During the normal work week they made six scheduled deliveries a day to a central cable desk in each area division, staff, and office in I, J, K, and L Buildings. On these runs they picked up outgoing cables that had been released and were ready for transmission, but they were not authorized to carry cables between offices for coordination; to do so would delay scheduled deliveries of incoming cables. 53/

The Cable Secretariat did not provide week-end or holiday courier service to Agency components except the hill offices. Other offices open on those days would send someone to the Secretariat to pick up their cables. The offices of the DDP and his divisions and staffs regularly worked a half day on Saturdays and called for their cables several times before closing at about one o'clock. Thereafter, until the opening of business on the next normal


* See Figure 2, p.47.

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Figure 2

Cable Processing and Delivery System

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working day, offices relied upon the Secretariat cable duty officer to alert their on-call duty officer to any cable that required action out of normal working hours.

For cables bearing a precedence of "Priority," notification by the cable duty officer was optional, but for the two higher precedences, "Operational Immediate" and "Emergency," it was mandatory that after-hours delivery be made to the action unit 54/ or to a designated representative regardless of the time the cable was received. The majority of calls were made on "Operational Immediate" cables, action responsibility for which was almost exclusively assigned to the various DDP area divisions, and division duty officers were frequent visitors to the Cable Secretariat at all hours of the night.

B. Cable Regulations and Procedures

In his July 1952 memorandum, General Smith had instructed the ADCO to "prepare for approval and prompt distribution a cable procedure manual," and on 30 July 1952 the ADCO's staff issued a manual to become effective concurrently with the establishment of the Clandestine Services on 1 August.

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The manual, *Covert Cable Manual (Headquarters)*, was largely a revision of OSO cable procedures and guides that served as basic instructions for Signal Center processing of cables. There was little or no change in cable terminology, in security classification rules, in assignment of precedence, or in general security precautions -- these were subjects not affected by the Director's assumption of command control of cable communication.

In the drafting of new rules the ADCO's staff had drawn heavily on the wording of the Director's memorandum, which -- in effect -- stated that only those officials designated by the DCI were authorized to release cables; that the Cable Secretariat would maintain a list -- with specimen signatures -- of such officials and would accept only cables bearing signatures of those officials; that it was mandatory for outgoing cables to be coordinated with and physically pass through the area division responsible for the activities of the addressee; and that the chief of the area division would act as an executive officer to the Director for the release of cables to officials in his area. 55/

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The new rule on cable distribution stated specifically that authority for assigning action and for distributing information copies of cables addressed to the Director was delegated to the Cable Secretary, who would also determine the distribution of confirmation copies of outgoing cables. 56/ [REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

This system appeared to be a simple modification of existing addressing procedures clearly expressing the DCI's directive that there be "only two command echelons: [REDACTED]"

(b)(3) NatSecAct

in the structure of the Clandestine Services. 57/

Up to this point the drafters of the *Covert Cable Manual* had reflected accurately the Director's

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command and staff concepts, and the manual might well have been approved for publication had procedures for addressing of cables stopped with the basic system described above. The reason that it was not, was that the system of address indicators controlled by the ADSO provided for a person-to-person indicator that resulted in an "EYES ONLY" distribution to a single official -- for example, (b)(3) CIAAct

In view of the ADCO staff's awareness of the Director's "two-echelon" command concept, it is not clear why the manual included a procedure for "EYES ONLY" addressing of cables to anyone other than the Director or his senior representatives, but in a sub-paragraph it did:

- (3) Internal Address for Person to Person Messages requiring minimal handling addressed to one given individual *only* will be processed under the following conditions.
 - (a) Such messages may be released by the Director, his authorized headquarters representatives, those designated by the Director as field senior officials, and those sub-field officials at bases and sub-bases designated by senior officials.
 - (b) Such messages may be addressed to (1) the Director, CIA, or his authorized headquarters representatives, (2) senior representatives or chiefs of stations,

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bases, or sub-bases, and (3) individuals subordinate to the originator.

- (c) Such messages will be delivered directly to the addressee by the receiving Signal Center. 58/

This was a clear and precise procedure. If approved as worded, it would authorize cables to be addressed to the DDP, the COP, senior staff chiefs, and area division chiefs; and it would authorize the Signal Center to deliver such cables only to the official addressee, thus by-passing the Director and his Cable Secretariat. This, of course, was totally unacceptable to Earman. He knew that Smith was intensely dissatisfied with this "EYES ONLY" practice, as it had existed in the OSO addressing system, because -- as noted earlier in this paper -- he feared that some blunder overseas would become public knowledge before he knew anything about the situation that had produced it. As he had put it to Earman, a general who does not know what his field forces are doing is not in command.

Greer had taken on the task of editing and organizing the procedural material in the manual into the format of an Agency regulation and of coordinating the proposed regulation. He consulted Earman

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on the wording that the Director preferred for person-to-person addressing of cables, and after several drafts the following met with Earman's approval:

(c) Internal Address for Person to Person Messages

Person to person indicators such as "EYES ONLY" and "EYES ALONE" are not authorized for use in cables. To effect distribution to *one individual only*, the pseudo- (b)(3) NatSecAct nym of the addressee; e. g. [] will be used. Person to person cables are authorized for the following categories of officials *only*:

- (1) Person to person cables to Washington may not be addressed to any specific individual other than the Director of Central Intelligence.
- (2) Person to person cables *from* Washington may be addressed to any Senior Field Official, but may not be addressed to any individual subordinate to the Senior Field Official.

Three additional provisions of the regulation authorized person-to-person cables from Washington to headquarters representatives on temporary duty within the area of a senior field official -- but only for cables that dealt with matters clearly outside the sphere of responsibility of the senior field official; authority was also given for senior field officials to exchange person-to-person cables, but a senior field official was prohibited from addressing such

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cables to any individual subordinate to another senior field official.

The final provision charged senior field officials with responsibility for establishing policies governing person-to-person cables within their own commands. Greer completed the coordination of the proposed regulation during September, and with the approval of the DDA it was published on 28 October 1952 as [] the DDP approved the (b)(3) NatSecAct field version, and on 7 November 1952 it was published as [] (b)(3) NatSecAct

Smith was displeased with cables addressed for his personal attention only, and in one such instance his cabled response was a bit caustic:

LET ME SAVE YOUR OVERWORKED CODE CLERKS SOME TIME. MESSAGES ADDRESSED TO ME AUTOMATICALLY GO TO DULLES AND TO ALL OTHERS DIRECTLY INTERESTED. THOSE EMANATING FROM YOU ARE ASSUMED HERE TO REPRESENT THE OPINIONS OF YOUR STAFF INCLUDING . . . IF LATTER ASSUMPTION INCORRECT, PLEASE INFORM. OTHERWISE SUGGEST YOU CONFORM TO CABLE INSTRUCTIONS YOU HAVE RECEIVED. 59/

He was also quick to express his views on "EYES ONLY" addressing of cables to officials other than himself, advising one senior representative in a "Personal-from-the-Director" cable dated 3 November 1952:

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AS MY SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE IT IS IMPROPER FOR YOU TO DIRECT MESSAGES FOR THE EYES ONLY OF ANYONE IN THIS AGENCY BESIDES MYSELF. MOREOVER, I HAVE PROVIDED SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT SUCH RESTRICTIONS. KINDLY COMPLY WITH INSTRUCTIONS YOU HAVE RECEIVED IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSMISSION OF CABLES. 60/

Butler sent a copy of this cable to C. V. Hulick, EO/DDP, suggesting that it might be wise to inform releasing officers to avoid use of the "EYES ONLY" term and to have them advise the field officials not to use it in cables addressed to the Director. 61/ Because the field regulation had not yet been published and because it would require several weeks to reach the field after publication, cabled instructions seemed justified.*

C. Cable Volume and Reduction Efforts**

In March 1953 CIA cable volume reached a new high

* In 1954 the term "EYES ONLY" was restored for use in cable addressing, but the restrictions that limited the use of the term to cables for the DCI or a chief of station or base remained in effect. A provision added in 1967 enjoined field officials that "Cables requiring action at headquarters should not be addressed EYES ONLY to the Director unless it is intended that the Director personally take the action indicated." 62/

** This brief discussion covers only the early efforts to reduce cable volume. For a full discussion of the cable reduction program, see IV, below, p. 82.

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of 14,900 cables, and in April the new DCI, Dulles, issued a notice that directed Agency personnel to review all cable traffic for the purpose of reducing the volume by diverting to pouch facilities all correspondence not requiring the most expeditious handling. The notice pointed out that the Depart-

(b)(1)

(b)(3) NatSecAct

DCI considered it imperative that a similar reduction be made in CIA cables. 63/

During the next eight months the Cable Secretariat became deeply involved in the compilation of statistical data for use in measuring the success or failure of Agency efforts to achieve the reduction requested by the DCI. The Cable Secretariat's study of approximately 5,450 cables processed during the first 15 days of June 1953 provided the following:

One: Intelligence cables comprised only 7.2% of the total incoming traffic; operational 62%; administrative 31%.

Two: Total traffic exchanged with the various geographic areas: EE 25.5%; FE 34.6%; NE 11.8%; SE 6.2%; WE 16.0%; and WH 5.7%.

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Three: Originators of Outgoing Cables: DD/P Area Divisions and Staff components 84.1%; COMMO 3.7 %; Finance Division (FD) 3.1%; Transportation Division (LO/TD) 2.4%; and all other components 6.6%.

Four: Incoming action assignments: DD/P Area Division and Staff components 90.3%; COMMO 4.9%; Finance Division 4.0%; all other components .8%.
64/

Compilation of figures for these four categories of cables continued through December 1953, and although there were fluctuations of a point or so from one month to another, at year end the only change of substance was in the administrative category, which was down to 25 percent, a decrease of six points. 65/

Cable volume had always fluctuated from one month to another, and it continued to do so during the six months that followed the issuance of the DCI's directive. Measured from the April base figure of 13,800 cables, October volume of 10,950 cables was a reduction of 2,850 cables, nearly 21 percent.

In theory, if this reduction was a direct result of the diversion of cables to pouch facilities, there should be a corresponding decrease in Signal Center workload as measured by group count, and there should be a corresponding increase in the workload of RI as measured by the number of documents pouched. In

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actual application, however, this apparent correlation in cables, group count, and pouched documents did not work out as anticipated.

In November the Organization and Management Staff (O&MS) of the DDA compiled a tabulation of the Cable Secretariat's cable volume, the Signal Center's group count, and RI's pouched document volume. These data led to the conclusion that factors other than the diversion of cables to pouch channels had contributed to the reduction in cable volume and that it appeared necessary that further efforts would be required to carry out the DCI's directive.

With the Signal Center's group count down only by 4.6 percent in December -- indicating more words per cable -- and a 5.1 percent increase in documents pouched by RI, it appeared that little real progress had been made.* 66/

The decline in cable volume, measured from the March high of 14,900 to the December figure of 10,100 was most fortunate for the Secretariat, which at the close of 1953 was operating with an on-duty strength of people -- seven short of its adjusted T/O of slots.

(b)(3) CIAAct

* See Figure 3, p. 59.

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FIGURE 3

Extract from O&MS Study, November 1953Cables, Group Count, and Pouched Documents

1953	Cables a/		Cable Groups b/		Pouched Documents c/	
	Number	Percent Change	Number (Thousands)	Percent Change	Number	Percent Change
Jan	12,365		3,976		25,821	
Feb	12,208		3,961		26,695	
Mar	14,904		4,562		27,598	
Apr	13,831	Base	4,460	Base	36,198	Base
May	11,539	-16.6	4,115	- 7.7	30,489	-15.8
Jun	12,391	-10.4	3,925	-12.0	30,794	-14.9
Jul	12,161	-12.1	4,539	+ 1.8	37,394	+ 3.3
Aug	10,774	-22.1	3,855	-13.6	30,628	-15.4
Sep	10,301	-25.5	3,846	-13.8	30,273	-16.4
Oct	10,954	-20.8	4,257	- 4.6	38,028	+ 5.1

- a. Cable Secretariat cable count.
b. Signal Center group(word) count.
c. RID pouched document count.

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)

D. Changes in Responsibilities

1. The Cable Secretariat Screening Section

The Screening Section operated from August 1952 to July 1953 with the same personnel and procedures that it had had as an activity of the Signal Center. The section was staffed with three regularly assigned personnel who handled non-CIA cables, copies of which were furnished to the Cable Secretariat by OCD/CB. The Secretariat made distribution only to DDP components; OCD/CB was responsible for the distribution of

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non-CIA cables to all other CIA components, including the DCI. The combined volume of cables from State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) fluctuated between 7,000 and 8,000 a month, the major portion from State. Of the total number, about 25 percent were screened in the Secretariat and were filed as being not responsive to the DDP components' stated requirements. The remaining 75 percent were processed by the simple method of multiple routing, under cover sheets, of several copies of each cable to three or four components. About 300 of these cables each month were of such wide general interest that they had to be typed, proofed, reproduced, and mailed to customers in the same manner as that used for CIA cables. 68/

From 30 June to 10 July 1953 Butler was on detail to the Department of State at the request of General Smith, who was then Under Secretary of State. Smith had borrowed Butler to survey State's Secretariat Message Center procedures and to take a fresh look at State's guidelines for distribution of cables to CIA. In a 13 July personal letter to the DCI, Smith had this to say of Butler's detail to the Department:

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Butler's approach was direct and constructive. His suggestions for improvements in our Message Center procedures are being implemented. He has provided the Secretariat with a fuller understanding of CIA's cable requirements and how we can better meet them. I believe his detail here has been mutually advantageous to both State and CIA. 69/

The DCI forwarded a copy of the General's letter to Butler under a covering memorandum in which he expressed his appreciation and belief that "The work that you did will aid both the Department and this Agency in achieving common aims." 70/

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

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The DDP position, as expressed by Hulick, the EO/DDP, was that the DDP was unwilling to make known to OCD its requirements in sufficient detail to permit OCD to make distribution of non-CIA cables to the DDP division level and that the DDP [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct because there would be additional delay in getting the cables to appropriate points in the DDP if cables were to be processed through OCD. The DDP would be willing to [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct only if the Secretariat were to distribute all non-CIA cables.

(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct

The two sides reached a compromise in which it was agreed that in the future OCD/CB would distribute direct to FI/RQM those cables that it had previously distributed to the Cable Secretariat. FI/RQM would then make the necessary distribution to DDP components and the Secretariat would be out of the picture

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entirely insofar as distribution of non-CIA cables was concerned. 71/ In August 1953 the agreement was formalized by the transfer of three persons from the Secretariat to FI/RQM [redacted] (b)(3) NatSecAct of responsibility for processing non-CIA cables. (b)(3) CIAAct This reduced the Secretariat's T/O to [redacted] positions and its budget by [redacted] 72/ (b)(3) CIAAct

OCD/CB began sending cables for the DDP complex to FI/RQM instead of the Secretariat on 20 August, and [redacted] report for that month noted that the (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6) Cable Branch was also providing support to FI/RQM by furnishing them [redacted] of (b)(3) NatSecAct all cables received by the branch. 73/ Her September report stated that the Cable Branch [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct

2. DDI Suspense Procedures

From August 1952 to July 1953 the Cable Secretariat distributed to the DDI cables containing substantive intelligence information, but not when

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such cables contained operational information in addition to the intelligence information. A number of cables containing both types of information were received each month, and for these the Secretariat restricted dissemination to components of the DDP -- the only exception was the inclusion of the DCI and the DDCI. Loftus Becker, the DDI, protested to Butler that intelligence information contained in these cables was frequently mentioned in the DCI's morning staff meetings, and this caused him, Becker, great embarrassment because, having no prior knowledge of the information available to others in the meeting, he was unprepared to answer questions raised by the DCI. Becker argued that he was not aware of any limitation on the DDI receiving operational information and that it seemed obvious that the DDI's need to have cables containing substantive intelligence, so that he might be able to answer questions raised by the DCI, had no relation to whether or not the cable contained operational information. 75/

Butler replied that he personally saw no objection to furnishing such cables to the DDI; but in the absence of a directive reflecting DDI and DDP coordination

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he believed that he should continue to follow the instructions of Richard Helms, the DDP Chief of Operations (COP), which were to the effect that for protection of methods and sources, the distribution of Clandestine Services cables containing intelligence information was to be confined to Clandestine Services components when such cables also contained sensitive operational information. 76/ Existing procedures provided for intelligence information to be extracted from such cables and passed to certain DDI components by teletype or memorandum, but this process was considerably slower than receiving initial dissemination of cables from the Secretariat.

When Amory succeeded Becker, Amory's protests to Butler were identical to those of Becker but decidedly more vehement. Butler restated the position he had taken on the issue when it had been raised by Becker -- that an agreement between the DDI and the DDP about what cables would be furnished the DDI was necessary. Butler said that the DCI was aware of the distribution policy being applied to the type of cables that Amory wanted and that he had received no instruction from the DCI to modify the policy.

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Amory was unsuccessful in arranging with the DDP an agreement that would permit the Secretariat to furnish the DDI with cables containing a combination of intelligence and operational information, and Secretariat dissemination policy for such cables remained unchanged until July 1953.

At that time the DCI intervened and charged the Cable Secretary with the responsibility of furnishing the DDI with all intelligence items contained in cables. The method by which the Cable Secretary would discharge this new responsibility was described as follows:

The Cable Secretary will refer those cables which, in his judgment, might contain material of a sensitive operational nature to the appropriate Area Division to determine whether the entire cable or only portions may be released to the DD/I; and, in addition, to obtain guidance from the Area Division as to the breadth of the dissemination within and beyond the DD/I. If the entire cable is not forwarded to the DD/I, the DD/P will cause the appropriate portions to be transmitted by PD, teletype, or other means.

In the event that the Cable Secretary believes a cable or portion thereof contains material of intelligence value and the Area Division recommends that it not be disseminated to the DD/I, the Cable Secretary will refer the issue to the Executive Assistant to the Director to obtain the decision of the Director or the Deputy Director.

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In order to assist the Cable Secretary in performing the screening function and to ensure that the requirements of the DD/I are being met, the DD/I will require a senior member of his office, who has limited official contacts outside of CIA, and who is acceptable to the DD/P to spot-check on one day of each month all incoming cables received by the Cable Secretariat during a day, but which were not selected for distribution to the DD/I. Excluded from the cables the DD/I representative may see will be EYES ONLY, KAPOK, RYBAT, and such other cables as are specifically designated by the DCI. Such cables received during the day under examination will be sent by the Cable Secretary to the EA/DCI for verification by the DCI that they should be withheld. 77/

This procedure was proposed in a 7 July 1953 DCI memorandum addressed to the DDCI, the DDP, the DDI, and the Cable Secretary. The change was to become effective on 31 July, but it was delayed until 20 July to allow time for the Cable Secretary to obtain from the DDP and the DDI concurrences on Secretariat operating instructions governing the new procedure. These instructions involved the identification of cables containing a combination of intelligence and operational information by placing the phrase "Suspense DD/I" on the dissemination line of the cable and the attachment of a "Cable Suspense Sheet" to the action copy of the cable. The cable suspense sheet was a half-page form* designed and printed on bright yellow

* See Figure 4, p. 69.

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Figure 4

Cable Suspense Sheet

FORM 75 USE PREVIOUS
6-73 EDITIONS~~SECRET~~

CABLE SUSPENSE SHEET	REPLY REQUESTED	DATE	
	EXPEDITE	IN NUMBER	SUSPENSE TIME
SUSPENSE ACTION: _____	FROM: CABLE SECRETARIAT - 1 A 53 HQS.		
<p>THE ATTACHED CABLE APPEARS TO CONTAIN POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AS WELL AS SENSITIVE OPERATIONAL INFORMATION AND IS SUSPENDED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE TO THE FOLLOWING ENCIRCLED UNITS:</p> <p>FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY: DDI, D/OCI, DDS&T, D/OSI, D/FMSAC, D/MS, D/ONE</p> <p>PLEASE INDICATE BELOW THE ACTION DESIRED AND RETURN THIS FORM AND THE CABLE TO THE CABLE SECRETARIAT BY THE TIME SHOWN ABOVE. SEE PARAGRAPH 70, DATED 6 APRIL 1967.</p>			
REPLY TO: CABLE SECRETARIAT		TUBE CT 7 or ES 6	
<p>() DISTRIBUTE COPIES OF CABLE () AS RECEIVED () AS MODIFIED FOR CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY TO: THE UNITS ENCIRCLED ABOVE: TO C/FI 2, CIW, DDO/DO AND THIS DIVISION.</p> <p>() CABLE MAY NOT BE RELEASED. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS BEING DISSEMINATED AS TDFIR _____</p> <p>() CABLE MAY NOT BE RELEASED. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED BY MEMORANDUM IN ATTACHED ENVELOPE(S) ADDRESSED "DDI (SUSPENSE CABLE RELEASE)" AND IF APPROPRIATE "DDS&T (SUSPENSE CABLE RELEASE)." PLEASE FORWARD MEMORANDUM TO ADDRESSEE(S).</p> <p>() CABLE MAY NOT BE RELEASED. FILE. (TO ASSIST DDO REVIEW OF CLANDESTINE SERVICES SUSPENSE SYSTEM, GIVE ONE OR TWO SENTENCE REASON)</p>			
SIGNATURE _____			

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(47)

(b)(3) CIAAct

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During August, the first full month in which the suspense procedure was in effect, out of a total of 7,000 incoming cables the Secretariat suspended 45 for DDI distribution. A tabulation of the actions taken on the suspended cables follows:

Released to the DDI, AD/CI, and FI/RQM-----	10
Released through preliminary dissemination-----	27
Released to OCI by telephone-----	4
Release to the DDI disapproved-----	4

The four cables that the area divisions disapproved for release to the DDI were considered to be "too sensitive," "operational information," or "information received from another agency"; and the Cable Secretary concurred in the decisions of the area divisions. 79/

In September there were 63 cables suspended and nine cables disapproved for release. Greer, the Deputy Cable Secretary, did not concur with the reasons given for one disapproval and forwarded the cable to Earman to force release of the intelligence information. Earman agreed with Greer, and the information was released to the DDI. In October the number of suspense items rose to 116, of which 13 were disapproved for release; and again there was

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one that Greer referred to Earman with his reasons for non-concurrence. Again Earman agreed with Greer. In November there were a total of 154 suspense items, 19 of them disapproved for release for reasons that were concurred in by the Cable Secretariat. Among the disapproval reasons given by the area divisions were these:

- Lateral cable, not for Washington action;
- CE internal security material;
- Previously disseminated, contains no new information;
- Awaiting confirmation before dissemination;
- Dissemination disapproved because of incorrect information;
- Operational source identification; and
- Available from other sources, overt press coverage.

Earman did not agree that overt press coverage was a valid reason for disapproving release of information to the DDI, and he instructed the Cable Secretary to so inform the area divisions should that reason be used again.

The DCI memorandum upon which the DDI suspense procedure was based prescribed that once each month a representative of the DDI, one acceptable to the DDP, would screen one day's cable volume as a check on the Cable Secretariat's performance. There were a number of steps involved in the implementation of this action:

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One: A call was made to the DDI's office for the name of the representative who would screen the cables.

Two: A call was made to the DDP COP's office to furnish him the name of the DDI representative and to get his approval of the person named.

Three: All incoming cables received in one 24-hour day were assembled for screening.

Four: The assembled cables were screened by the Secretariat to remove those sensitive operational cables that the DCI had indicated should not be shown to the DDI representative -- EYES ONLY, KAPOK, RYBAT, and a number of others identified by cryptonym.

Five: Cables selected for exclusion were sent to the EA/DCI for verification by the DCI that the cables should be withheld.

Six: An appointment was made for the DDI representative to review the cables in the office of the Cable Secretary.

Early in the week of 21 September 1953 Earman advised Greer that Amory, the DDI, had designated Frederick A. Voigt of OCI as the DDI representative to screen one day's incoming cable traffic. Greer informed Helms, the DDP COP, and arranged for Voigt to do the screening on 24 September.

Incoming traffic for the 23rd was assembled, and Greer separated it into two groups, one group for screening by Earman, the other group for screening by Voigt. There were 247 cables involved, 65 of which

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were sent to Earman for verification that they should be withheld from Voigt's screening. Voigt screened the remaining 182 cables and found only one cable of possible interest to the DDI that had not been distributed to or suspended for the DDI. Greer's personal opinion was that the cable was of counter-espionage interest only, but he arranged for future cables on the same subject to be suspended for the DDI. 80/

The second DDI cable screener was James J. Hitchcock, a special assistant to the DDI. Hitchcock screened cables once each month from October 1953 through March 1954. The press of other business caused Hitchcock to cancel screening appointments in April, May, and June.*

In six consecutive screening visits Hitchcock had found that the Cable Secretariat had failed to suspend only five or six cables of possible DDI interest, and he recommended to Amory that the

* Hitchcock became the first Director of the National Indications Center (NIC), activated as a community support staff in July 1954. 81/ Preparation for this assignment may well have been the reason for cancelling appointments to screen cables.

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